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A Critique of Japan's Official Discourse on Human Security

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A Critique of Japan's Official Discourse on
Human Security

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B.Sc, B.Mus, Master of International Diplomacy

**A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

Bond University

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Abstract

A critique of texts on human security published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan between 1998-2008 and made publicly available through the Internet is undertaken. Analytical and problematisation strategies focus on textual representation of discursive objects categorised broadly according to four poles: 1) the meaning and concept of human security, 2) reason and justification for the pursuit of human security, 3) events and phenomena posited as being in an antagonistic relationship with the condition of human security, and 4) relations between agents undertaking human security praxis. Critical and problematising strategies which had not yet been applied to Japan's human security discourse were applied to texts with a focus on comparing discursive formations and tropes both within and between official documents. These were derived from consideration of difference and inconsistency in representation of key discursive objects, identification of promoted and marginalised interests, implications for human security and freedom at the individual level, indication of omissions, silences and ambiguities in textual representation. As a whole, Japan's human security discourse is characterised by a finely detailed postulation of factors making up human security, high levels of representational inconsistency, an absence of theoretical elucidation, a complex system of rationalisation of human security praxis, and the postulation of ambiguous relationships between various agents of human security. Japan's human security discourse was found to share numerous characteristics with other human security discourses but was unique in situating the human individual as only one of a plurality of policy beneficiaries, conceptualising human security as an extension of state security, and being explicitly committed to the use of securitisation as a way to affect policy agendas.

Declaration

This thesis is submitted to Bond University in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This thesis represents my own original work towards this research degree and contains no material which has been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at this University or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made.

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Chapter I: Introduction, Justification, Methodology

The Object of Inquiry

This thesis is concerned with Japan's official discourse on human security. Specifically, the object of inquiry is Japan's textual representation of certain elements of social reality which are associated with the notion of human security.¹ The work is motivated by two concerns. The first is normative; in the sense that the critique undertaken here aims to add a critical perspective to a policy movement which Japan has been pursuing since around 1995.² From its own account, Japan's commitment to enlarging its profile in international relations – and being seen as doing this³ – together with its significant economic resources, have contributed to a considerable expansion of its human security

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- 1 A rich body of literature on the topic of human security is in existence. For a general discussion on the topic, see: Amitav Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," *International Journal* 56 (2001): 442–460; Sarka Waisova, "Human Security-the Contemporary Paradigm?," *Perspectives* 20 (2003): 58–72; Tobias Debiel and Sascha Werthes, *Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases* (Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2006); Marlies Glasius, "Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 31–54, doi:10.1177/0967010607086822. For an introduction to human security from a historical point of view see: Sabina Alkire, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security* (Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, 2003); Paul M. Evans, "Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning,," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 263–284. For discussions regarding the relationship between human security and other forms of security or international law, see: Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," 2001; P. H. Liotta, "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 473–488; Ralph Pettman, "Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2005): 137–150; Gerd Oberleitner, "Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?," *Global Governance* 11 (2005): 185–203.
 - 2 Japan's first invocation of human security was in 1995; framed as a new security strategy for the United Nations. See Bert Edstrom, "Japan's Foreign Policy and Human Security," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 212–13.
 - 3 Keizo Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'" (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html.

practices around the world. As of August 2009, Japan had spent approximately US\$347 million on United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security projects implemented in 118 countries. Furthermore, within the period of just two years, 2006-2008, it appropriated 31 billion Japanese Yen (approximately US\$376 million) for its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects.⁴ As Christie has observed, “human security has shaped and altered security narratives and practices [and] thus cannot be dismissed as being irrelevant either to policy or to the development of current Northern trends of engagement with the global South”.⁵ The stakes in the determination, adoption and implementation of a set of human security practices are high: the very terms of the experience of being human. Human security, as a form of politics, is concerned with monitoring, regulation and control of biological, medical, economic, psychological, philosophical and economic facets of life to the most general and overarching extent; in the sense that, through the use of the adjective *human* and as a form of *international* activity, it encapsulates every single person on the planet as an object of interest. It is because of its potential for such wide ranging, complex and comprehensive intervention that the interrogation of human security discourse at both theoretical and ethical levels is of the utmost significance. The second motivation is that of developing and utilising a methodological perspective which has not been applied widely to the field of Japan's human security policy. The conceptualisation of Japan's human security documents as making up a discourse and approaching it from a point of view which is familiar in literary theory⁶ but still somewhat unusual in the field of human security studies,⁷ contribute to the development of the critical perspective that is necessary for realising the normatively directed analysis envisioned in the thesis.

4 “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009), 4, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.

5 Ryerson Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To Critique?,” *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 171.

6 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

7 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 01 (2010): 77–94.

The thesis itself takes the form of a monograph that deals with the concept and elements of the practice of human security as represented by Japan in its publications on the topic. It engages with these publications in the sense that the topics discussed in the thesis correspond to the ones raised in Japan's texts; the intent being to concentrate on facets of the idea which Japan has incorporated into its politics of representation by invoking them publicly. This type of engagement is relevant to the chosen methodology because it encourages reflection on the question of how the discursive formations found in these texts can be interpreted to promote certain interests and ideas, whilst concurrently taking emphasis away from or marginalising the significance of others. It is important to point out that a focus upon representation does not necessarily come with the assumption or suggestion that Japan's human security texts are either purposefully untruthful about human security policy or are a *misrepresentation* of it. Rather, questions about truth or truthfulness are bracketed here, with the focus being on the political aspects of representation in which some facets of human security are expressed, having been voiced by Japan in a particular way, whilst others are left out. What is more, it is not the case that the data are perceived as either propaganda or ideology in the sense articulated by Morgenthau.⁸

Morgenthau argued that the meaning and content of diplomatic language and in fact all political language is hidden by ideology; such that the form of language which political agents use to speak about their motivations, objectives, strategies, rationales or desired outcomes does not reveal the fundamental pursuit of power that political and diplomatic activity aims to satisfy.⁹ One of the objects of Morgenthau's inquiry and theorising was the political agent who was interested in power; one who had to keep this interest concealed from the domestic polity because its legitimisation would lead to a generalised and

8 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Seventh (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).

9 *Ibid.*

chaotic pursuit of power by all people.¹⁰ On Morgenthau's account, political agents are aware of and acknowledge amongst themselves, the apparent truth that the pursuit of power is the fundamental objective of political activity. However, they must also keep this truth hidden from non-political bodies¹¹ so as to prevent an unbridled contest for political power in the domestic sphere. In order to keep the true nature of political activity hidden from the domestic population, the language of politics aims to obscure reality through the use of so-called ideology: language which does not evoke or explain the power-political nature of politics, but cloaks it in terms of patriotism, humanitarianism, human rights, world peace, security, biological necessity or some other popular slogan. At the same time – continues Morgenthau's argument – since the pursuit of power is a natural instinct for people, their activities need to be directed at pursuits which are non-political or of marginal political significance and as such this is a necessary part of the state's political practice.

In contradistinction to the position of Morgenthau or neo-realist views of international relations, in this thesis it is not postulated that the language of politics is an ideology used to “mask, sustain or advance the power-oriented interests of states”.¹² Alternatively, as enunciated in discourse theoretical views,¹³ language is not seen, *a priori*, as opaque; as part of a truth-concealing strategy. The language used by political agents is understood as representing reality in a transparent way, albeit the meaning of that language might not always be consistent with common or general language use. Moreover, the

10 For Morgenthau, this was a matter of human nature: so-called *man* is by nature inclined to pursue power.

11 Morgenthau did not provide any means to distinguish between political and non-political agents other than to postulate that the former, in distinction to the latter, were official practitioners of politics.

12 Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (1999): 265.

13 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Allen Lane (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,” *New Left Review* I, no. 166 (1987); Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse* (Oxford, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999).

discursive methodology taken in this thesis does not suggest that political agents are not capable of telling lies, purposefully misrepresenting issues, obfuscating their beliefs or misleading their interlocutors. In reference to the approach taken in this thesis, the main difference between the ideological perspective taken by Morgenthau and the discursive approach, in regard to language, is that in the latter (a) it is not assumed outright that political agents use language merely to cover up the truth about their activities, and that (b) the phrases and expressions used by political agents work to represent or construct objects in ways which implicitly promote certain interests over others and have ramifications for the relative positioning between political agents as well as the conditions of life for human individuals. As an aside, an underlying assumption in this thesis is that Japan's representation of human security is implicitly made in line with its own interests; that it functions to naturalise, make facile and unproblematic practices made in the name of human security. The discursive view taken in this work does not suggest that when an agent explains action in reference to, for instance, human rights, they must be telling the truth; that they cannot be lying, hiding the truth, or attempting to mislead. However, the discursive view rejects the automatic assumption that phrases such as *human rights* or *human security* represent little more than rhetorical devices which conceal one's true intentions or objectives, or ways by which to manipulate public attention or opinion. Alternatively, a discursive approach requires that one asks what a phrase such as *human rights* means for the particular political agent at hand: its connotations, implications, connections to other aspects of political activity and political objectives, *as well as* its rhetorical value. Because the term *meaning* can connote a kind of psychologism in which the thoughts of the human subject are postulated as being open to empirical observation through either linguistic or extra-linguistic signs, for the most part it has been avoided in this thesis in lieu of the term *representation*, which is used here in a way which excludes consideration of humans' subjective mental states, focusing instead only on the form that objects take in discourse.

That is to say, it is not the contention of this thesis that Japan's human security

discourse is either a linguistic or rhetorical obfuscation of its true or honest policy objectives – insofar as the notion of true or honest policy objectives can be theoretically maintained – or that it constitutes an attempt to present an image of how things should be or might be despite a significantly different reality. Such nefarious motivations on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan are not being implied here. To the contrary, although not utilised directly in the thesis, background interviews with a number of individuals involved with Japan's human security policy have revealed quite the opposite: an empathetic, compassionate and authentic desire to improve the security conditions in which human beings exist.¹⁴

One of the reasons for avoiding postulating Japan's utterances as being a form of ideology is that “[ideology] always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth”.¹⁵ Lacking a point of reference from which questions about the truth of Japan's human security language might be answered, the analysis taken up in this work is not concerned with objective notions of truth. Rather, it is interested in how truth might be perceived and what its effects might be, if a discourse *purporting* to be true was to secure a hegemonic or dominant position in discussions on topics such as human security, or if such a language of human security was acknowledged as encapsulating the concepts and relationships needed for theorising or talking about human security.¹⁶ Questions about objective reality do not contribute to an analysis of political representation in which the focus is on what is *taken* to be truthful by those who subscribe to, operate in terms of, or propagate such

14 Interview data was originally envisaged as one of the kinds of texts that would be analysed in the thesis but this idea was abandoned because of the difficulty in accessing officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and because of a high degree of overlap between the statements of interviewees and the content of texts available from the Ministry's website.

15 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London : Ringwood, Vic.,: Penguin, 1991), 60.

16 Whilst the dynamic interplay between various state and non-state discourses on human security and their proponents' attempts at hegemony and dominance are fascinating and important research avenues, the scope of this thesis is limited to Japan's human security discourse and the representations found within it.

discursive formations, rather than it being on what *is* truthful according to an imagined authority rooted in fields such as science or religion. In terms of Wittgenstein's language games,¹⁷ it hardly matters whether the categories and terms used by participants in a game are considered to be true by non-participants, if the game's players implicitly agree to abide by its rules and to treat them as valid within its bounded context. Accordingly, the analysis undertaken here is concerned with finding out and problematising the terms, categories and rules of a language game as the one comprised by Japan's human security discourse.

The main site or representation selected for this research was that of cyberspace; the Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.¹⁸ The majority of texts chosen for analysis were speeches made between 1998 and 2009 at various diplomatic forums, as well as a number of documents and pamphlets on the topic of Human Security published by the Ministry. This eleven year period makes up the Ministry's official, public chronology of human security.¹⁹ Analysis of texts did not incorporate a temporal dimension which may have considered a development of discourse over time or conceived of the texts as making up a cohesive, longitudinal narrative which would have been open to methodologies such as narrative policy analysis.²⁰ It could certainly be fruitful and interesting to examine the way in which tropes, themes or concepts found in the discourse have appeared in various guises through time; how they may have changed, been dropped or picked up again in different contexts or settings. However, because speeches and documents were of unknown authorship and were presented by different people, rather than considering them in terms of a linear narrative, and because elements within texts seemed to

17 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Singapore: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2009).

18 "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan," accessed July 14, 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/index.html>.

19 Though beyond the scope of this thesis, it is of interest that the Ministry's chronology does not include human security themed speeches prior to 1998, even though these were being made as early as 1995. See Edstrom, "Japan's Foreign Policy and Human Security," 2003.

20 Emery Roe, *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice* (Duke University Press, 1994).

appear, disappear and reappear in complex ways, it was deemed to be more interesting to consider them in relation to each other without the added variables of time or temporal context.

Cyberspace as a site of representation is significant mainly as a delineation of the data used in this study. However, the presence of this representational (web)site is remarkable because it exists as a discrete place with clear boundaries which are delineated according to the organisation of the site; there is a specific page for human security texts,²¹ which can be found in a section dedicated to foreign policy.²² As such, it is possible to refer to, and point towards, a body of human security texts published by Japan: a discourse on human security. The texts under examination in this thesis are written exclusively in English; either official translations or documents composed originally in English. Because the analytical emphasis of the thesis is representation in the public sphere and the resultant images and constructions of human security as they are inscribed in texts, the issue of translation from Japanese to English is not problematic. Had the research programme been aimed at determining things such as the meaning of human security as held by Japanese members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan or the ministry itself, or the intent behind publishing these speeches, issues relating to translation or cultural differences as manifested through language would have been significant. However, the primary objective of the thesis was the examination of a particular discourse, published in English, which is a *de facto* site of representation for Japan's official stance on human security which exists independently in English.

As the focus of this thesis is public rather than private or confidential discourse

21 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Human Security," *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed May 7, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.

22 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Foreign Policy," accessed June 14, 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/index.html>.

on the topic of human security, analysis was limited to those documents which could be obtained through open sources; specifically the Internet website mentioned above. Whilst it would be possible to make the case that *Japan's* human security discourse could be taken to include texts produced by non-government institutions, organisations or individuals, a conscious decision was made to focus on documents or transcripts which were explicitly published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. This choice was grounded in practical and ethical considerations. Practically speaking, both time and word limit considerations prevented inclusion of potentially enormous networks of texts which may have served as elements of, or intertexts for, Japan's human security discourse. In ethical terms, whilst a consideration of texts which could not be clearly delineated as being official utterances of the Japanese state may certainly have added more depth to the discussion of issues raised in analysis, it would have limited the scope of the thesis as an analysis and critique of *official* human security, if the counter-argument were to be raised that the discourse examined did not entirely reflect the position of the Ministry of Affairs of Japan.

Discourse Theory

The object of inquiry in this dissertation is Japan's official discourse on human security. A key theoretical assumption of this thesis is that official Japanese human security discourse defines the “systems of signification”²³ held by Japan as a state actor. In this thesis, discourse is not understood as being a representation or interpretation of an objectively existing reality. Rather, it refers to the “conditions [under which] thought [is] able to reflect relations of similarity or equivalence between things, relations that [...] provide a foundation and a justification for [...] words, their classifications, their systems of exchange.”²⁴ In the field of international relations, systems of signification

23 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 229.

24 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, World of Man: A Library of Theory and Research in

can be conceptualised as the sphere of actors' subscriptions to ideas about the composition of reality. They are manifested in language and are a form of linguistic currency regarding issues such as:

- the content of state and non-state actors' interests and appropriate means for their realisation;
- what is recognised or imagined by the state and non-state actors as a phenomenon pertaining to their activity and interests;
- relational structures with other states and political actors that determine which of these actors will have a bearing on policy formation;
- meaning or value attributed to material resources;
- significance and construction of common international relations theory constructs such as sovereignty or power;
- notions of membership in a society of states including ideas about how states act in and are acted upon in the world they experience and construct.

Another important theoretical presupposition of this thesis is that state and non-state actors exist in worlds of their own construction, where subjective meanings attributed to material objects or ideas determine behaviours and policies.²⁵ A system of signification – expressed through language in official documents, speeches and texts and referred to in this thesis as discourse – serves as the conceptual, theoretical, and hermeneutic horizon which makes particular policy ideas and practices come across as thinkable, facile, warranted,

the Human Sciences (ed: R.D. Laing) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1994), xxiv.

25 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33–75; Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: A Users' Manual," in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71–81; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

justified or in the realm of the possible. At the same time, the truths, logic or forms of argumentation inscribed in this system can work to preclude other forms of practice from serious consideration if these are inconsistent with the logic of the signification system. Such linguistic systems of signification can also be understood as common-sense folk theories to which states subscribe regarding their existence and reality in a broader sense.

Through its systems of signification, Japanese human security discourse represents a commitment on behalf of the Japanese state – as embodied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan – to a particular version of the *truth*. In the words of Foucault:

Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.²⁶

The regime of truth is the foundation for the content of states' folk theories regarding the nature of their being and action in international politics. With this in mind, the analysis of discourse is not about unlocking the nature of a pre-existing world by revealing the meanings that actors ascribe to material and ideational objects in the world. Rather, though materially objects exist independently of observers, there is no sense in which they have meanings and attributes independent of the collective, societal mind – as represented by language; consistently with Wittgenstein's reminder that there is no such thing as a private language.²⁷ Discourse defines subjects (including states and people) according to the way in which they are spoken about, written about and otherwise represented. Objects or subjects do not have meanings beyond discourse, although there can be competing discourses (truth claims) about

26 Foucault, "Truth and Power," 1991, 73.

27 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 2009.

them; with international relations actors both reinforcing and challenging dominant or repressed discourses through their practices. The constructive or constitutive effects of discursive representation can include the ascription of power to some bodies, whilst overlooking or glossing over the importance of others. In this way, even though power can take the form of a resource held by particular actors such as states, kings, or individuals, it is also the case that their power is a result of the play of the discourses which constitute them and represent their nature; such subjects are themselves the result of the power of discourse.²⁸

The fundamental task of this thesis is to reveal and problematise Japan's human security system of signification, consistently with the discursive practices approach. As such, Japan is not itself a direct object of observation and it is not conceptualised anthropomorphically, *a priori*, as being a rational, calculating actor that makes strategic policy and diplomatic decisions based on a hierarchy of preferences or cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly, questions focusing on the reasons for why Japan has been pursuing human security or why it has adopted the notion as a part of its foreign policy, are not a focus in this thesis.²⁹ Whilst the search for causes and reasons is both an interesting and established pursuit in international relations scholarship, it also comes with a number of theoretical difficulties which have resulted in this aspect of knowledge being

28 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 1976.

29 For an introduction to work which does concern itself with questions of causality in regard to the presence of human security in Japan's foreign policy, the reader is directed to: Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, "Japan and the 'Human Security' Debate: History, Norms and Pro-active Foreign Policy," *Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies* 3, no. 2 (2005): 58–74; Satomi Ho, "Japan's Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of Its Limits and Failures," *Japanese Studies* 28, no. 1 (2008): 101–112; Nobumasa Akiyama, "Human Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context," in *Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building*, IPSHU English Research Report Series 19, 2004, 252–70; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security," *Asia-Pacific Review* 12, no. 1 (2005): 103–116; Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, "Japan's Pursuit of Human Security: Humanitarian Agenda or Political Pragmatism," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 193–07; Tadashi Yamamoto, "Human Security-From Concept to Action: A Challenge for Japan," *Korean National Commission for UNESCO*, 2004, http://www.unesco.or.kr/kor/activity2003/ss_data/Paper-Tadashi_Yamamoto.doc.

bracketed in this work. One of the difficulties in attempting a causal analysis of Japan's human security discourse is that the authorship of the texts under examination is uncertain and potentially comprised of a number of individuals who may have different positions within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such, beliefs or reasons for acting may be inconsistent across the various authors of the discourse. Furthermore, even if the authors of these texts were known and available for comment, considering the political status of the texts, there would be no grounds for asserting that the beliefs or motivations they expressed for acting were not themselves politically or strategically minded acts of representation, aimed at situating them or the Japanese state in a particular light. Furthermore, as Foucault points out in relation to the history of science, questions of causality are theoretically problematic:

It is not always easy to determine what has caused a specific change in a science. What made such a discovery possible? Why did this new concept appear? Where did this or that theory come from? Questions like this are often highly embarrassing because there are no definite methodological principles on which to base such an analysis. The embarrassment [...] probably reaches its highest point in the case of the empirical sciences: for the role of instruments, techniques, institutions, events, ideologies, and interests is very much in evidence; but one does not know how an articulation so complex and so diverse in composition actually operates.³⁰

Instead of being concerned with questions regarding the causes which have led to Japan producing discourse on the topic of human security or apparently undertaking actions in its pursuit, official Japanese assertions and claims that – inter-alia – “the Japanese Government is steadily promoting Human Security as a *pillar* of its diplomacy”³¹ inform the epistemological commitment of this thesis to situating discourse as an object of analysis; a system of signification which constitutes international relations actors' representations of identities and subjectively experienced and understood realities. In other words, this thesis

30 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 1994, xii–xiii.

31 “Human Security and National Security,” *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0406.html emphasis added.

has at its centre the notion that *discourses* define what actors understand, believe or take to be *truth*. Consequently, discourse places restrictions but also provides opportunities for state actors in regard to what kind of action is possible, legitimate, rational, irrational, desired, neglected or simply unimaginable according to that which the discourse establishes as logical and consistent with its own precepts. Dominant discourses determine the content of thought about foreign policy and diplomacy. Subjects that are not defined or constructed by discourses literally do not exist for the state and its agents. Just as changes in discourse about sexuality in Europe during the Victorian age reconstituted subjects such as morality, reproduction, or deviance in response to the development and dominance of a particular discourse on the political and economic meaning and significance of populations,³² human security discourse in Japan determines how the Japanese state construes the world of international relations and diplomacy, at least insofar as its human security texts constitute the language through which the policy world – including its inhabitants and their actions – is apprehended and communicated.

An integral part of the analytical framework undertaken in this thesis, is the reformulation of the main research question from a *why* type to a *how* type of question. Rather than looking for causes, the concern is with *how* Japan's texts represent international relations – particularly in reference to human security – and *how* these representations function to legitimate human security policy or affect the life experience of human individuals. As Doty indicates:

When we pose a how-possible question, we can still ask *why*, but we must in addition inquire into the practices that enable social actors to act, to frame policy as they do, and to wield the capabilities they do. Perforce more critical, this mode of questioning takes us to relations of power - power in its productive aspect that *why*-questions neglect.³³

32 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 1976.

33 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 299.

Grounded Theory

A number of questions with which to interrogate Japan's human security texts were posed at the outset of the study, but a first reading revealed that some facets of the concept were brought up and elucidated upon more than others. Consequently, the original conceptual and organisational scheme which had been envisaged for the data had to be reassessed. Because of the uneven nature of the data and its complexity, it became necessary to listen to the texts; in the sense that the basis for the construction of the analytical categories which comprised the thesis' four substantive analytical chapters was dictated partially in terms of the content of the texts; rather than solely in accordance with the interests of the researcher. This approach, in which the object of inquiry – a node in an endless network of language³⁴ which appears in various forms depending on the perspective of the observer and is connected to both the past and future through the concept of intertextuality³⁵ – was approached with a necessary attitude of naivety. Analytical categories were formulated according to what texts had to offer, rather than being imposed by the researcher; consistently with the idea of a grounded theory:

A grounded theory is one that, rather than selectively choosing data according to *a priori* theoretical categories formulates the theory from the data by developing provisional categorisations via empirical study and abstraction, comparing on the basis of new data whether these categories fit and, if necessary, reformulating the categories so that they are empirically valid.³⁶

34 As Laclau reminds, “language (and by extension, all signifying systems) is a system of differences [in which] linguistic identities – values – are purely relational and that, as a result, *the totality of language is involved in each single act of signification*”. Ernesto Laclau, “Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?,” in *Emancipation(s)* (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 37 emphasis added.

35 Fabienne Darling-Wolf, “Texts in Context: Intertextuality, Hybridity, and the Negotiation of Cultural Identity in Japan.,” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 24, no. 2 (April 2000): 134–155.

36 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” 1999, 234.

In claiming to have eschewed the formulation of theoretical categories prior to a careful reading of the texts under examination, it is not being argued that it is possible to be totally free of pre-conceived notions about the research topic at hand. It is acknowledged that – *inter alia* – formative education, upbringing, psychological drives and other factors constitute one's understanding of social reality.³⁷ Even ignorance may be a factor in determining a *de facto* theoretical stance; as simply stating that the constructs one uses to guide data collection or understanding do not represent a theory does not make it so. Furthermore, an epistemological position based on the idea of a grounded theory is in itself a form of meta-theory which conveys an understanding of the relationship between subject and object, and therefore itself takes on the status of theory.³⁸ However it is possible to have the intent to be theory-unladen as a point of departure, even if the attempt can only ever be asymptotic and never quite achieves the ideal.³⁹

The approach indicated above by Milliken identifies the analysis, or body of knowledge which is a final result of research and writing processes, with a theory containing *generalisations* about the data at hand. However, the method taken here differs from Milliken's characterisation in one important aspect. Whilst the attitude towards texts is the same, it is not one of the objectives of this thesis to make generalisations about them. To do so would entail, in figurative terms, an attempt at arbitrarily separating one particular area in the sea of discourse from the rest of the ocean; attempting to explain too much and implicitly working towards reifying and fixing the meaning of Japan's human

37 I refer here to the idea of “intertextuality”, where the interpreted assumptions implicit in one kind of discourse merge and are supported through commitments to other discourses. For a discussion of how texts are layered to construct reality, see Darling-Wolf, “Texts in Context,” April 2000.

38 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 259–294.

39 Marisa Kelly and Steven Maynard-Moody, “Policy Analysis in the Post-Positivist Era: Engaging Stakeholders in Evaluating the Economic Development Districts Program,” *Public Administration Review* 53, no. 2 (1993): 135–142.

security texts in one specific point in time and place. Rather, the interest in this work is in examining the *details* of Japan's discourse on human security; contemplating, probing and problematising them in relationship to each other and in regard to their differing relative positioning across and within texts, rather than devising categories which efface differences and inconsistencies in the interest of formulating elegant, logical, easily comprehensible and predictive theories. Analytical categories are present in this work but they serve not as fixed points of reference for generalisation or theory building, but as impermanent, convenient and ultimately arbitrary conceptual schemes through which to apprehend and comprehend the complex and sometimes counter-intuitive, diverse or contradictory metaphysics constructed by Japan's human security discourse.

The Concept of the Political

The notion of representation is key in this thesis. Accordingly, analysis does not presuppose the discovery of real, factual, or truth-like universal elements in Japan's human security discourse. Instead, emphasis is placed upon these elements as *represented* by Japan and the resultant image of Japan's human security policy that is formed, as well as the overall image of international relations reality as it pertains to human security. The significance of political representation can be discerned through Carl Schmitt's notion of the political; distinguishable from the social, the economic or the cultural on the basis that it essentially categorises people as either friends or enemies, with the potential result of this division being armed conflict, destruction or death.⁴⁰ Similarly, in the words of Mouffe, the political is “the dimension of antagonism which [is] constitutive of human societies”.⁴¹ One aspect of the political is that of

40 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Expanded edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

41 Chantal Mouffe, *On The Political* (Routledge, 2005), 9.

convincing others of the apparent truth or validity of a friend-enemy division,⁴² and this visage of truth is created through politics; that “ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions that seek to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'”.⁴³ With these notions of the political and politics in mind, discursive representation of different facets of human security in Japan's official texts on the subject is a political issue because it demarcates objects within the realm of international relations as either ones which necessitate a response as part of security practice or as ones which can be safely ignored. In the words of McDonald, decisions regarding “who is to be protected, from what threats, by what means and so on are fundamentally political choices”.⁴⁴ From this point of view, it is possible to conceive of Schmitt's enemy as those phenomena, people, bodies or events which come to be represented as problems for, or threats to, human security.

Delimitations

Representation of a discursive object can be undertaken from a vast number of points of view and in reference to numerous other discursive objects. For this reason, analysis of representations positioned relatively to each other can conceivably be continued perpetually and in reference to ever more distant and specialised nodes of the discursive network which is envisioned as the object of inquiry in this dissertation. This necessitates the imposition of some boundaries on one's analytical scope. For the most part, delimitations are based on practical considerations about the time available to carefully analyse, critique and problematise the large volume of human security texts available through the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Texts for analysis were

42 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 2007.

43 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?,” *Social Research* 66, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 754.

44 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” *Global Society* 16, no. 3 (2002): 289.

primarily selected according to the degree of elucidation they contained on various aspects of human security, as well as for the novelty of their content. As such, texts whose content had been encountered elsewhere were discarded in favour of new material which had not been seen in other documents.

Analysis

The method of discursive analysis used in this thesis relies on a focus on presupposition, predication, subject positioning, framing and metaphor⁴⁵ to bring out the main constructs present in Japan's human security texts and to apprehend them from a critical point of view. Following the “subjectivist” methodology of Pouliot,⁴⁶ objectification of the data is undertaken by contextualising findings in reference to scholarly work in the field of human security.⁴⁷

Following Doty, if “discourse creates a 'world' in the sense that a particular 'reality' must be accepted in order for the statements to make sense”, one way to apprehend this world is through the analytical tools of presupposition, predication, and subject-positioning.⁴⁸ The first of these, presupposition, refers

45 See Saft & Ohara (2006). This approach will only be used to the extent that metaphorical language is present in diplomatic texts. Moreover, considering the linguistic complexity of translation, it is beyond the scope of this work to analyse Japanese metaphors which have been translated into English.

46 Vincent Pouliot, “‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (June 2007): 359–384.

47 For example, early Japanese human security discourse often referred to the Asian Financial Crisis as a key driver in the development of a human security agenda. The reasoning was along the lines that the crisis had resulted in severe economic hardship at the individual level, thus justifying a human security approach for the security of individuals. An investigation into the details of subsequent Japanese human security policy revealed that Tokyo did indeed focus on economic elements of human security, but in light of the contested nature of the link between human security and economic security (see Liew 2000), it was not entirely clear whether it was the state (and moreover which state) or individuals, who would benefit. The point here is not to assert that official talk about human security might be ideological, but rather, to explore the notion of what Japanese policy-makers really mean when they talk about human security.

48 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S.

to background knowledge – taken to be true – which is implicit in statements. For example, for a clause such as “the logic of *realpolitik* retains lasting relevance because it captures best the essential nature of the international political system”⁴⁹ to be comprehensible, one must assume that “*realpolitik*” – whatever it happens to be – exists and has a logic, that there is an international political system which has an essential nature that can be captured and that the author is in a position to make this assertion of fact with legitimacy. The second analytical tool of predication, involves bringing to light texts’ attribution of values and properties to discursive objects through the adverbs and adjectives used to describe them. For example, the contention that “the United States has stood for fair play, for aid to the weak, for liberty, and freedom”,⁵⁰ establishes the United States as a particular kind of object defined, in part, by its egalitarianism, sense of justice and altruism, as well as a commitment to liberty. Thirdly, the idea of subject positioning brings to one’s attention the way in which subjects/objects are related to each other and thereby mutually define each other. Doty’s deconstruction of the following excerpt on Filipino natives demonstrates these three critical strategies of discourse analysis clearly, and is included here as a point of reference for similar analyses undertaken on Japan’s official human security texts in chapters two through five:

The whole time he treats you with the deference due to the superiority which he recognizes. He knows the duties of no occupations with efficiency and he is perfectly willing to be a 'jack of all trades'. So long as he gets his food and fair treatment, and his stipulated wages paid in advance, he is content to act as a general-utility man. If not pressed too hard, he will follow his superior like a faithful dog. If treated with kindness, according to European notions, he is lost. The native never looks ahead; he is never anxious about the future; but if left to himself, he will do all sorts of imprudent things, from sheer want of reflection on the consequences. The native has no idea of organization on a large scale, hence a successful revolution is not possible if confined to the pure indigenous population unaided by others, such as creoles and foreigners. Under good European officers they make excellent soldiers. There is nothing they delight in more than pillage,

Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” 1993, 308.

49 Ibid., 306.

50 Ibid.

destruction and bloodshed, and when once they become masters of the situation in an affray, there is no limit to their greed and savage cruelty.⁵¹

According to Doty, this passage unproblematically presupposes the superiority of the European through the assertion that “under good European officers [Filipinos] make excellent soldiers”, and that “if not pressed too hard [the native] will follow his superior like a faithful dog”. An analysis of predication reveals that Filipino natives are said to be – among other things – inefficient, dog-like followers who never look ahead, enjoy violence, and are limitless in their greed and cruelty. As the speaking subject, the European is constructed in a way which is implicitly the opposite of the native. One way in which these two subjects of the discourse are positioned – i.e. the European and the native – is in regard to agency. For instance, the proposition that Europeans have the qualities it takes to be officers and that they are able to make good soldiers out of the natives, whilst Filipinos are followers who do not reflect upon the ramifications of their actions, works to position the former subject with relatively more agency. The difference in positioning is also discernible if one considers that the European subject is implied as having knowledge of Filipinos as well as the authority to make statements about them; in this case the latter is merely the object of the knowledge of the former.

An example by Milliken also demonstrates how this kind of discursive analysis can be undertaken in practice.⁵² The following section invokes the discursive objects of Japan, the US, Korea and Asia in the context of the US-Korean War:

51 Ibid., 307–09.

52 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” 1999, 232.

If the US does not take any action in Korea, this would produce a marked psychological reaction in the public mind and in the minds of Asian leaders. US prestige would be damaged throughout the region. Japan, the linchpin of our policy in Asia, would lose morale and experience a strengthening of the widespread desire for neutrality, with the result that not even a commitment of significant US military strength would keep Japan in the West.

Milliken argues that through predication and positioning in relation to the discursive object of the US, Japan is constructed as being able to feel emotions (since it has “a desire” for neutrality), has psychological reactions (by losing “morale”), is generally passive and has a subordinate position to that of the United States.

Another element of the methodology employed in this thesis is that of framing. Frames are general ways of construing phenomena, with ramifications on the kinds of reactions and responses that are consequently considered by readers to be appropriate in dealing with the issues at hand.⁵³ The idea stems from critical discourse analysis, which assumes that issues are framed in certain ways, not only as a part of a process of reality construction, but also actively for the “exertion and maintenance of power and control”.⁵⁴ The active use of framing to promote a particular world view is, in general terms, consistent with the idea that discourse is strategic.⁵⁵ In other words, that the representation and framing of objects and subjects in discourse involves highlighting certain elements of those objects and subjects, whilst backgrounding others; and as such, working to promote certain political projects over others.

As a precursor to the critical work taken up in the thesis, the analytical

53 Scott Saft and Yumiko Ohara, “The Media and the Pursuit of Militarism in Japan: Newspaper Editorials in the Aftermath of 9/11,” *Critical Discourse Studies* 3, no. 1 (2006): 81–101.

54 *Ibid.*, 82.

55 Michael J. Shapiro, “Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of ‘Security Policy’ in the Video Age,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990): 327–340.

categories and concepts discussed above have been applied to data at hand with the purpose of ordering and making sense of it. The necessary first step of the critique was the identification of the key metaphysical elements that make up the human security world as depicted by Japan in its texts on the subject. In this regard, the idea of *presupposition* was useful because it allowed the development of questions which served as a point of departure for an interrogation of the ontology of Japan's human security texts. Such questions include:

- Of what does the condition of human security consist?
- Who or what is to be the object/beneficiary of human security practice?
- What are to be the agents working in the interests of human security?
- What are the issues or phenomena which are relevant to, or associated with human (in)security? For the most part, in this thesis, this question is concerned with those things which are in a relationship of antagonism with human security.

The idea of *predication* brings to light questions about the qualities and attributes of the discursive objects identified according to questions inspired by analysis of presupposition. Predication involves asking about the nature, characteristics and qualities of those objects posited as being the beneficiaries of human security practice, as well as those objects who are to realise human security and those things which bring about depressed levels of human security. The idea of *subject-positioning* was most consciously applied in the fifth chapter, which deals with texts' invocations of agents that are to be working in the realisation of human security and with the relations between those agents. It manifested itself as a series of questions about the power relations between various actors posited within the texts as being necessary for realising human security. Finally, the notion of *framing* featured prominently in chapter three, where texts were examined for the way in which human security was depicted as being related to other pressing issues; it involved asking questions such as:

- What is the reasoning and rationale for pursuing human security?

- What are the benefits of achieving human security?
- What is at stake in realising human security?
- What are the dangers of *not* working towards human security.

Critique

The critical approach taken in this thesis is, in part, an attempt to address the unreflective tendencies of the field of human security studies – partially attributable to a commitment to policy relevance and accessibility to policy circles – especially in regard to a lack of engagement with issues of epistemology, ontology and methodology.⁵⁶ Such tendencies can also be discerned in the literature on Japan and human security, particularly manifest in the lack of attention paid to the representational – and thus political – aspects of official texts on the subject. Critical voices in the field of human security are not entirely absent, with engagement having come from a number of perspectives including those which seek to further develop security discourses, examine issues of gender, contribute to human emancipation, introduce ethico-political elements to theorisation, and examine ways in which the development of human security discourse has affected technologies of governance.⁵⁷ The research paradigm pursued here is consciously committed to

56 Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” 2010.

57 Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,” April 1, 2010. See also: Barry Buzan, “A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 369–70; Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict: The Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 41, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 285–303; Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (2001): 231–236; Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 358–359; McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” 2002; Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In Southern Africa,” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 2 (2006); Ngambouk Vitalis Pemunta, “Health and Development: HIV/AIDS and the Double Appropriation of Human Security Discourse by Practitioners of Female Circumcision and Development NGOs in Cameroon,” *Journal of Human Security* 3, no. 1 (2007): 45–61; Kyle Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional Debate,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2008): 383–401; Mark Duffield, “Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror,” in *New Interfaces Between Security and Development* (presented at the 11th General Conference of

the idea that “critical approaches question ‘reality’ as a central part of their goal [and that] they raise questions about existing policy assumptions and the interests they serve”.⁵⁸ It deals with the way in which Japan's human security discourse creates opportunities for the application of power in the governance of individuals' lives, how it justifies and legitimates its own existence and right of being, and how it promotes the interests of state policy objectives.

Inspiration for undertaking critique and justifying it was drawn from the work of Michel Foucault and Richard Ashley. For Foucault:

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.⁵⁹

Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.⁶⁰

Such a critical attitude is deemed to be appropriate because “the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism”.⁶¹ This kind of critical approach is thus directed by a commitment to improving the object of critique, having acknowledged that it is a constituent part of social reality. Essentially, the critique undertaken in this thesis is committed to the question of whether the normative prescriptions contained within Japan's human security discourse

the EADI, Bonn, 2005), 1–16; Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, *Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage* (University of Lancaster, 2004); Miguel De Larrinaga and Mark G. Doucet, “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 5 (2008): 517–537; Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” 2010.

58 Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” 2010, 90.

59 Michel Foucault, “Practicing Criticism,” in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, ed. L.D. Kritzman and Alan Sheridan (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), 154.

60 *Ibid.*, 155.

61 *Ibid.*

and realised through its human security practices,⁶² are justified in terms of theoretical coherency and in reference to the idea of a just society in which human beings are guaranteed the maximum amount of freedom and choice in their everyday lives, without excessive intervention or regulation by the state.

Richard Ashley's sustained critiques of international relations theory, particularly in reference to neorealism⁶³ and economic determinism,⁶⁴ also provide direction to the critical approach of this thesis. One of Ashley's longest and most well known deconstructions of neorealism concludes with the following justification for the seemingly harsh and non-apologetic tone taken throughout the body of the critique:

Let us then play havoc with neorealist concepts and claims. Let us neither admire nor ignore the orrery of errors, but let us instead fracture the orbs, crack them open, shake them, and see what possibilities they have enclosed. And then, when we are done, let us not cast away the residue. Let us instead sweep it into a jar, shine up the glass, and place it high on the bookshelf with other specimens of past mistakes.⁶⁵

As this passage suggests, Ashley's reasoning for his critical work is positive in regard to the discipline within which he operates, for the results of his writing take the form of a reminder of mistakes to avoid in future theorising. Moreover, the fracturing of which he speaks provides the foundation for an analytical approach in which the key elements of a theory can be apprehended one by one in order to assess their cogency, as well as providing a means by which to assess their legitimacy on the basis of the ramifications they have for human freedom.

62 The actual practices undertaken by Japan as part of its human security policy are largely beyond the scope of this work. Whilst chapter 5 examines the discursive representation of agents of human security, their relationships and particular aspects of human security praxis, the rest of the thesis is concerned with representation of issues surrounding the meaning of human security, reasons for its pursuit and those things which are postulated as being antagonistic to human security.

63 Richard K Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225–286.

64 Richard K Ashley, "Three Modes of Economism," *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1983): 463–96.

65 Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," 1984, 286.

In the case of this thesis, the criteria according to which the elements of Japan's human security discourse were primarily weighed were theoretical and representational consistency across and between texts, as well as the consequences that constructions of human security have on individuals' experiences of life.

A brief remark by Jacques Ranciere, that “critique acknowledges some thing's existence, but in order to confine it within limits”,⁶⁶ served a negative function in the development of the critical attitude applied throughout this thesis. Namely, as a reminder to avoid writing in a way which would limit the potential for elucidation, change or reorientation in theoretical formulations of human security or to devalue the contribution that Japan's human security policies have had in promoting health, safety, security, well-being, peace and prosperity around the world. Instead, by focusing on ramifications, underlying assumptions, political interests, theoretical inconsistencies and omissions of Japan's human security discourse, the aim has been to remove limits to further advancement of human security thought and theory.

Problematization of the representations found in Japan's corpus of texts follows the general methodological strategy of comparison. Representations are compared both across and within texts for consistency and coherence, with their theoretical ramifications and implications discussed and compared across different representational categories.

Outline and Structure of Thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapters two to five contain the bulk of the substantive critical and analytical work that was undertaken throughout.

66 Jacques Ranciere, *Hatred of Democracy* (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 2.

This first introductory chapter is concerned with the methodological, theoretical and normative commitments of the thesis, as well as the objective of undertaking the research compiled within, whilst the final chapter is a conclusion of the findings from chapters two to five.

In broad theoretical terms, chapters two to four take Japan's representation of a number of facets of its human security discourse as their object of analysis and critique. Importantly, and consistently with the constructivist commitments of the thesis, questions asked of these texts are not underwritten by a search for truth or objective reality. Throughout the thesis, the constructs brought up and discussed are approached as images, representation or pictures of an international relations reality inscribed in text. Whether the texts examined were considered to be an expression of truth by those involved in their compilation or publication is a theoretically interesting question, but one which is not taken into consideration in the thesis due to its foundation in a different methodology than that proposed here.

Chapter two is dedicated to the question of how Japan's human security texts represent the meaning of the concept of human security. Accordingly, the materials under investigation are considered in terms of how they represented, implicitly or explicitly, answers to questions such as:

1. Who determines the meaning of human security?
2. Which humans are to be secure?
3. What is the status of human security as a body of knowledge?

In chapter three, only one fundamental question is asked of Japan's human security texts: namely, why should the security of humans be pursued? Because the texts under consideration are somewhat impoverished in terms of direct

answers to this question, the functional analysis is based on the question of how ideas about human security invoked in these texts work to evoke a picture in which the pursuit of human security comes across as warranted, justified or facile.

Chapter four addresses representations of discursive objects which are positioned as having an adverse effect on human security. As such, texts are primarily interrogated with the following questions in mind:

1. What is considered to be a threat to human security?
2. Who or what is the cause of human insecurity?
3. Who determines what is ascribed with the property of being a threat to, or problem for, human security?
4. How do threats differ from problems?

The fifth and final analytical chapter is concerned with human security practice; particularly in terms of representations of actors said to be responsible for its realisation and the relations between them. The key analytical questions are:

1. Who is to act in the name of human security?
2. What is the form of relations between different bodies ascribed with a role in realising human security?

The sixth chapter is comprised of a summary and conclusion of the findings discussed throughout the thesis.

Having discussed the motivation, theory and methodology underlying this thesis, the next chapter takes up the question of how human security, as a state or condition of being, is represented in Japan's official human security texts.

Chapter II: The Meaning of Human Security

This first analytical chapter is concerned with Japan's representation of the concept of human security. Specifically, three analytical perspectives have been undertaken in exploring and problematising this element of the discourse. The first part of the chapter deals with the subject of human security practice; asking of the texts who the beneficiaries of Japan's human security policy are. The second analytical theme undertaken in this chapter is concerned with the ontological construction of human security and asks about the representation of the concept of human security in reference to its component parts. Notions which have been brought up across the discourse as implicit parameters of human security are numerous, but analysis focused upon only some of these, primarily because the discourse is impoverished regarding the theoretical treatment of these component parts; at times there was literally nothing to examine, analyse, or problematise about them other than to point out that it is not enough to invoke concepts without even an attempt at definition, let alone exploration of their relationships with each other. Japan's human security discourse has made some contribution towards countering Thomas et. al.'s 2001 charge that in general the concept remained “theoretically underdeveloped”, but there are certainly numerous omissions remaining.¹ In the terms of Imre Lakatos, the concepts examined can be considered as the hard core of Japan's human security concept. They sit in this position simply because as the most commonly invoked aspects of human security, they are the least impoverished in terms of elucidation. The final part of this chapter is concerned with Japan's representation of human security from an epistemological point of view; in reference to implicit claims regarding its status as an authoritative source of knowledge.

1 Nicholas Thomas, Michael Wesley, and Hee-Soo Kim, “Human Security in the Western Pacific: The Asian Economic Crisis and Beyond 1,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 29, no. 1 (2001): 122.

Whose security?

This first section is concerned with the question of whose security and interests are at stake in human security discourse. In Japan's human security texts, there is a measure of conceptual opaqueness regarding the question of who is to be the beneficiary of actions taken in the name of human security. Such indeterminacy was present from the beginnings of Japan's human security chronology,² as can be seen in the earliest speeches delivered by Obuchi Keizo in 1998. To an extent, this indeterminacy is not surprising since Obuchi's speeches form the genesis of Japan's human security policy; with exuberance and excitement associated with promoting the idea making up for a lack of theoretical rigour. The lack of clarity is evident in all of Obuchi's three major speeches that touched upon human security, when one considers that the titles of the speeches – “Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium”,³ “An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow”,⁴ and “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia”⁵ – do not indicate a concern with the human as a subject of security practice. Even though on its website Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has categorised these three texts under the heading of Human Security Foreign Policy,⁶ at first glance they point towards activities which are aimed at furthering the interests of states (Japan) and regions (Asia) rather than humans.

2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chronology of Activities Related to Human Security by the Japanese Government,” *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed October 29, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/chronology.html.

3 Keizo Obuchi, “Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium” (Singapore, May 4, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html>.

4 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow” (presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>.

5 Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” (Hanoi, Vietnam, December 16, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html>.

6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Human Security,” *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed May 7, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.

The indeterminacy mentioned above is not resolved by Obuchi throughout his speeches, but made more acute when he expresses his belief that “we must deal with [...] difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of "Human Security," and that we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region”.⁷ In this formulation, one can observe the conceptualisation of policy not only in regard to a region, but also vis-a-vis a particular segment of population. The problem of an unclear beneficiary is further compounded when Obuchi asserts that “in our times, humankind is under various kinds of threats [and] environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for future generations”,⁸ as here he sets the beneficiary of policy as a kind of being (i.e. humankind/human-being), and adds humans conceptualised in terms of generations to the human security policy equation.

Fukushima has argued that Obuchi's human security speeches “formed the foundation of Japan’s approach to human security and its policy agenda”,⁹ but this is only a partially accurate characterisation. One element which was missing from Obuchi's speeches, but has been a constant feature of all the texts after Obuchi, is the individual human being as the avowed beneficiary of policy. With later Japanese speeches, the matter of the object of policy was made more complex because human security began to be theorised in reference to the interests of individuals, rather than just groups of humans (i.e. a population) or non-humans such as the state or region. It was in the speeches of Takemi that the gaze of the state was magnified via the assertion that “it is also extremely important, however, that [human security] challenges be addressed from a standpoint that gives full consideration to protecting the interests of *individual*

7 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

8 Ibid.

9 Akiko Fukushima, *Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice*, CCHS Human Security Visiting Fellow Paper (Vancouver: Canadian Consortium on Human Security, August 2004), 16.

human beings”.¹⁰ More recently, in his statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, Takasu similarly argued that “all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and from want”, but a clear picture of the beneficiary was lost when he continued to say that human security policy should “protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfilment”.¹¹ The difficulty is in the fact that at the same time as speaking of individuals' entitlements, Takasu defines goals of policy in reference to *human* freedom and fulfilment; i.e. in using the term human as an adjective to freedom and fulfilment, it is implied that these two goals of policy must be such that they apply to all humans, irrespective of individual differences. As Foucault has pointed out in relation to biopolitics, a significant expansion of the powers of the state resulted from the appearance of the idea of a population.¹² Insofar as a characteristic of human security is the postulation of “the individual as the referent object”,¹³ Japan's version is not unique in implying a further expansion of state power through foreign policy not only because it conceives of populations beyond sovereign borders as objects of policy, but also because its view of the object of policy is magnified beyond the level of the population to include the individual. In terms of the categorisation of conceptions of human security according to whether the object of policy is within or outside sovereign borders, Japan clearly fits in the latter group.¹⁴ However, as an aside, Japan's

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- 10 Keizo Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century” (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html; Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html emphasis added.
- 11 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security” (presented at the The General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, United Nations General Assembly, May 22, 2008), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2008/un0805-6.html>.
- 12 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
- 13 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 358.
- 14 Thomas, Wesley, and Kim, “Human Security in the Western Pacific,” 2001, 126.

interest in the human security of non-Japanese nationals abroad does not imply a corresponding willingness to expose its own citizens to the critical gaze of other agents of human security. This is because, as Neary has argued, Japan is “[not] prepared to allow foreigners to pass judgement on [its] legal system or custodial practices”.¹⁵

Japan's conceptual imprecision regarding the actual object of policy is not unique, as in actual fact it seems that “most definitions of human security do not clearly distinguish between human security for individuals and human security for groups”.¹⁶ For Hudson, the ramifications of not adequately theorising whether the object is the individual or the group, is that the conceptualisation of human security at the group level can have the effect of leading to a myopic policy which does not recognise the security needs of particular political identities. Hudson's criticism is aimed at the inability of human security, in general, to deal with differences in gender but,¹⁷ as will be discussed later in this thesis, from the perspective of Japan's human security discourse there is scope for recognising differences between humans, although this expanded scope comes with the risk of undermining the meaning of basing categorisations on such universal markers of group identity as *human*. McDonald also argues that human security policy runs the risk of overlooking certain forms of political identity, but in contradistinction to Hudson his argument is aimed at excessive use of the individual, rather than the group, as the focal point of human security practices. Specifically, he asserts that “treating individuals as the referent object of security does not always represent the best means of understanding a

15 Ian Neary, “Japan’s Human Security Agenda and Its Domestic Human Rights Policies,” *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 284.

16 Heidi Hudson, “‘Doing’ Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security,” *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 164.

17 For the relationship between gender and security, see: Lene Hansen, “Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 3, no. 1 (2000): 55–75; Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006).

particular situation of insecurity, or redressing it”.¹⁸ Giving the example of discrimination against Kurds, McDonald argues that there are cases in which people are treated unjustly not because of their individual identity, but on the basis of their affiliation with a group, and so “issues of identity and ethnic difference, for example, may be ignored by a Human Security approach that effectively abstracts individuals”.¹⁹ For McDonald, the solution to the tunnel-vision of either an exclusively group level, or entirely individual level expression of human security, is to avoid setting definitively the referent object of policy in either/or terms, but rather to allow context to dictate which perspective should be taken. Japan's human security discourse certainly has scope for such a selective application, because it takes into consideration both levels of analysis and since a context dependent application of policy practice was advocated by Takasu, who asserted that “threats to human security differ from country to country and individual to individual”.²⁰ However, Japan's human security discourse omits to acknowledge the presence of unresolved theoretical tension between individual and group level security interests, nor does it suggest a way by which one might go about determining when such a shift between the two levels of analysis and practice might be warranted. A characteristic problem for Japan's human security discourse in this regard is also the lack of theorisation as to a way by which to mediate the security interests of different groups or individuals, or how to resolve potential conflicts of interests between the individual and the group level.

For Foong Khong, one of the difficulties in speaking of human security at the level of the individual, is that “ironically, in making all individuals a priority,

18 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” *Global Society* 16, no. 3 (2002): 281.

19 Ibid.

20 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.

none actually benefits”, because priorities exist in a relative hierarchy.²¹ In other words, to prioritise the interests of some means that the interests of others are necessarily sidelined or marginalised. Foong Khong's argument is not based on the idea that individual interests may come into conflict with each other, but that it is by definition not possible to prioritise everyone's interests. Indeed, insofar as prioritisation presupposes a relative perspective, this criticism holds irrespective of whether human security policy is to be aimed at individuals, or at humankind; as long as the objective is the security of every person, one cannot prioritise any particular human's security interests. Foong Khong's critique is valid in principle, but only in cases where there is an attempt to prioritise certain elements of human security over others. In Japan's case, prioritisation of policy in terms of different beneficiaries has not been a key theme; indeed the impression is often that Japan would like to address all people's human security interests without claiming that certain people or certain elements of human security are more important than others, even though this claim comes with its own theoretical problems.²² However, some prioritisation could be discerned throughout the corpus of texts examined, though the problem brought up by Foong Khong was avoided. For example, in his speech on the relationship between human security and health, Sumi has claimed that “for all people health is always the primary concern and they are ready to sacrifice everything in order to get proper health care”.²³ Here health has been defined as the primary priority for the human security of everyone, and as such the problem of trying to determine who or what has priority is averted, simply by asserting that health takes that number one position in spite of all other measures of human security.

Returning to the discussion about the beneficiaries of human security practice

21 Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (2001): 233.

22 The problem, *inter alia*, is that the realisation of all people's human security interests, as they are defined by Japan, necessarily leads to conflicts of individual interests.

23 Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html emphasis added.

in early expressions of Japan's human security discourse, in speaking of human security policy for the benefit of populations, Obuchi did not speak of the entire population but rather in terms of “the socially vulnerable segments”.²⁴ Through his assertion that, with human security in mind, Japan had given assistance to “the poor, the aged, the disabled, [and] women and children”, vulnerability was constructed primarily as a matter of economic standing, age, gender, and norms of ability, although he hinted at “other” unspecified forms of vulnerability as well.²⁵ Notably, women were grouped with children in one category, suggesting that not only is vulnerability a matter of gender and age, but also a function of one's role in the family unit. In a sense Japan's human security texts are a positive response to calls for the engendering of human security²⁶ according to the idea that “women's security cannot be subsumed under people's security since [they] have special needs and have been marked as special targets”,²⁷ or that women and girls experience armed conflict differently to men and boys and are particularly vulnerable,²⁸ even though the risk of constructing vulnerability in terms of gender/sex is that women will continue to be perceived as weak and requiring the assistance of the non-vulnerable/strong, thus reinforcing gender/sex as a valid category for discrimination between people.²⁹ This point is similar to one raised by Christie in his critique of a feminist approach to critical human security studies, in which he warns that “essentialization of the different expressions of men and women, as well as youths and adults, [is] likely to result in ‘solutions’ that reinforce the divisions between these various groups”.³⁰ In any

24 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

25 Ibid.

26 Gunhild Hoogensen and Kirsti Stuvoy, “Gender, Resistance and Human Security,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 207–228.

27 Anuradha M. Chenoy, “A Plea for Engendering Human Security,” *International Studies* 42, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 177.

28 Myriam S. Denov, “Wartime Sexual Violence: Assessing a Human Security Response to War-Affected Girls in Sierra Leone,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 3 (2006): 319–342.

29 An alternative construction of vulnerability in regard to human security, which does not contain categories based on gender, sex or age is offered by Suhrke. This version of vulnerability consists of three categories of the most vulnerable: victims of war and internal conflict, those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster, and victims of natural disasters. See: Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (1999): 272.

30 Ryerson Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To

case, Japan's emphasis on the vulnerable is superfluous because their concerns – whether they were to consist of women, children, or the aged – would be addressed in an approach that focused upon the level of the individual; as Japan purports to do, albeit somewhat inconsistently according to the representations of policy beneficiaries in its human security texts. This is because an individualist human security approach would by definition take into consideration the particular concerns of the person of interest; removing the necessity of thinking in group level categories such as gender, sex or age.

Whilst Obuchi delineates vulnerable humans as the ones upon which policy is to focus, he also paints a picture in which, generally speaking, the object of human security practices is a vulnerable, weak being who is accosted on all sides by forces beyond his or her control, with the only source of salvation in the hands of non-human beings such as the state in the first instance, as well as other forms of agency, such as non-governmental organisations, in the second instance. This being would spend its life in an ideal setting undertaking creative activities in a dignified manner, with no need to be concerned with the multitude of potentially harmful forces by which it is surrounded or that would impinge upon its security if those non-human forms of agency – states, non-governmental organisations or international organisations – were not there to care for it. Such a visage makes delineations of policy according to whether the object of concern is vulnerable seem redundant, because the impression from Obuchi's speeches is that *all* humans are vulnerable. In this way, the analytical significance of including the idea of vulnerability within the concept of human security – at least in the speeches of Obuchi – is actually marginalised because it does not help in distinguishing between people who might need more or less assistance. On the other hand the characterisation of all people in terms of vulnerability and an inability to deal with the threats to their own security, certainly works to paint the state and its collaborators as indispensable,

Critique?," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 179.

legitimate agents in the pursuit of human security. In this regard, Japan's human security discourse is not inconsistent with a large body of policy and academic human security literature which situates the state as a key agent³¹ in policy practice.³²

The establishment of the individual as the key object of security practice is a common trope in most definitions of human security.³³ For this reason it is of interest that Japan's very earliest expressions of human security policy focused more on the level of the population or species than the individual, making it unique in the field, despite the later refocusing away from the group and towards the individual. One of the implications of postulating the concern of policy in terms of the practically all inclusive heading of humankind, is that policy can be extended to anyone and everyone who can be legitimately classified as being of this kind, irrespective of any other forms of identity or agency with which they might be associated. However, this broad palette of human security subjects is a two edged sword, since whilst it may allow a legitimate human security promoting agent to apply power to people beyond such categorisations as citizenship, nationality or legal status, it also comes with the risk that it may require the agent to act in the name of people whose actions are directed at the human security agent itself. The conundrum of an agent of human security, acting in the interest of a body which is antagonistically positioned towards it, can be avoided if that agent can successfully deny the humanity of such bodies. However, this is obviously a problematic position to take as it can effectively lead to the suspension of human standards of

31 The issue of agency in the realisation of human security is the focus of chapter five.

32 Satomi Ho, "Japan's Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of Its Limits and Failures," *Japanese Studies* 28, no. 1 (2008): 101–112; Christie, "Critical Voices and Human Security," April 1, 2010; Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, "The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002): 373–77; P. H. Liotta, "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 473–488; Miguel De Larrinaga and Mark G. Doucet, "Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 5 (2008): 517–537; Lincoln Chen and Vasant Narasimhan, "Human Security and Global Health," *Journal of Human Development* 4, no. 2 (2003): 181–90.

33 McDonald, "Human Security and the Construction of Security," 2002.

behaviour, leading to policies such as those carried out by Nazi Germany which led to the extermination of people who were categorised as sub-human.³⁴

It is interesting to observe that Takasu attempted to reconcile the discrepancies regarding the object of policy concern, at least in terms of the tension between the individual and group level, by asserting that policy is about *both*; that concern with the individual is an improvement on policy which deals only with the group level, as “the human security approach is *not content* with a general approach of aggregating of country or people as a whole, but it insists on improvement in the livelihood and dignity of individuals and the communities”.³⁵ It is because human security is not content with addressing aggregates, that one can conclude that a form of human security which prioritises aggregates and groups³⁶ is considered by Japan to be inferior to one which prioritises both aggregates and individuals. Nonetheless, despite recognition that one of the key debates around human security focuses upon the line between what Newman has characterised as “universalist and particularist values”,³⁷ few of the texts examined demonstrated a substantial engagement with the distinction or the issue of how to realise both sets of interests at the same time.

In summary, the preceding discussion has aimed to show that the question of the referent of policy – i.e. the beneficiary of efforts taken in the name of human security – is ambiguous and unsettled across the body of Japan's human security texts. On the one hand, it is not just people who are positioned as

34 Jerry Bergman, “Darwinism and the Nazi Race Holocaust,” *Creation Ex Nihilo Technical Journal* 13, no. 2 (1999): 101–11; Alexander Alvarez, “Adjusting to Genocide: The Techniques of Neutralization and the Holocaust,” *Social Science History* 21, no. 2 (July 1, 1997): 139–178.

35 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008 emphasis added.

36 For an example of a human security approach which is concerned with the aggregate level see: Thomas, Wesley, and Kim, “Human Security in the Western Pacific,” 2001.

37 Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” *International Studies Perspectives* 2 (2001): 247.

benefiting from policy, but also non-human entities like the state or the region. Moreover, whilst later speeches spoke predominantly of the human security interests of individuals, it is the case that the earliest texts also conceptualised the recipient of policy to be vulnerable segments of populations. Whilst it is possible that a change of focus to the individual at the expense of the group occurred in Japan's human security thinking after the Obuchi period, from Takasu's declarations that policy is for individuals and communities, it is more likely that the individual was simply added alongside the list of potential objects of policy practice. Acharya advocates for a concept of human security that distinguishes between, but actually takes into account both individuals and communities, although he asserts that the individualistic aspect, "at least to a certain Asian mindset, conflicts with the old 'Asian approach to human rights' developed in the heyday of the 'universalism versus cultural relativism' debates about human rights in Asia".³⁸ Clearly this individualistic aspect is not lacking from Japan's human security discourse, even though its presence leads to the problem – unconsidered in Japan's human security texts – of how it might be practical or even theoretically possible to address the interests of all individuals, whilst maintaining the interests of the group in which those individuals exist, not least in regard to the conflict of interests between the security of the individual in relation to the security of the group. This problem of conflicting interests was identified quite early in debates on human security by Suhrke, who asked, "when objectives conflict, *which* interest are to be served?".³⁹ This remains an unresolved and unaddressed issue in Japan's utterances on human security. However, the inclusion of such a broad range of referent objects serves to ascribe Japan's discourse with a theoretically horizon-less scope for the application of human security practices across the entire population of the planet.

38 Amitav Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," *International Journal* 56 (2001): 449.

39 Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States," 1999, 270.

The core parameters of human security

This section is concerned with examining the construction of human security as a state or condition of being, in Japan's human security discourse. In other words, analysis focuses around representation of what it means to say that humans are secure. Another way to conceive of the main analytical concern in this section is to think in terms of examining the discursive objects which are presented as making up the state of human security. If in general terms *security* can be defined as “the state of being free from danger or threat”,⁴⁰ it might seem like a matter of fact assertion that the condition of *human security* would be comprised in terms of an absence of dangers or threats to human lives so as to maintain life. However, for Japan human security comes across as being a much more encompassing condition which goes beyond consideration of only dangers or threats to biological life, to include a number of considerations about ways in which one's life should be led or how it is to proceed.⁴¹ The most common elements which are to be secured are life and survival, livelihood, and a particular way of life (most commonly one that is characterised in terms of dignity). Moreover, the experience of living is conceptualised in a complex way that involves the analysis, measurement and regulation of one's activities, thoughts and feelings, as well as one's biological state. For the most part the conditions of human security have their locus on the human subject itself, rather than being on the environment within which one exists, although Koizumi provides an exception to this by speaking of a necessity to “build and sustain *a society* where individual human beings can fully realize their possibilities”.⁴² Whilst Japan's human security discourse is relatively broad in

40 “Security,” *New Oxford American Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

41 A similar concern with a “multiplicity” of aspects of life was observed by Ngoma in his analysis of non-governmental organisations' representations of human security. See: Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In Southern Africa,” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 2 (2006): para. 12.

42 Junichiro Koizumi, “Remark at the International Symposium on Human Security” (presented at the The International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, Japan, December 15, 2001), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0112_pm.html emphasis added.

terms of the elements of human life that it measures as part of human security – particularly considering the status of human security policy as a foreign policy rather than domestic policy – the development of these parameters is theoretically impoverished, although concurrently general enough to legitimate numerous policy agendas.

Even though human survival is said to be the “most fundamental” element of human security,⁴³ it is also the case that, for Japan, states of human security also refer to a *way of life*. To be able to say that humans are secure, a particular way of living must be realised. The corpus of texts examined constructed human security in terms of a life that is creative,⁴⁴ meaningful,⁴⁵ dignified,⁴⁶ defined by

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- 43 Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html.
- 44 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
- 45 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
- 46 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Yoshihiro Mori, “Keynote Speech” (presented at the Palm 2000 (Second Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting), Miyazaki City, Japan, April 22, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2000/palm-summit/seika/keynote_mori.html; Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000; Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security, Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_fm.html; Shinako Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “Human Security - Its role in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html; Koichi Haraguchi, “Statement at the Wrap-up Meeting of the Security Council Focusing on the Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Situations” (presented at the Wrap-up Meeting of the Security Council Focusing on the Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Situations, United Nations Security Council, April 30, 2003), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/uno304-3.html>; Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the

well-being,⁴⁷ freedom,⁴⁸ independence,⁴⁹ chances and opportunities,⁵⁰ agency (i.e. “the ability to make decisions about one's future”),⁵¹ the ability to realise

Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network” (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html; Kenzo Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III” (presented at the General Assembly, United Nations, New York, April 19, 2005), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2005/un0504-3.html>; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Representative of the Government of Japan, “Statement at the 39th Session of the Commission on Population on Development” (presented at the 39th Session of the Commission on Population Development, United Nations, New York, April 4, 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2006/un0604-9.html>; Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html; Nobuko Kurosaki, “Statement to the Sixty-second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Item 64: Social Development” (presented at the The Sixty-second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Item 64: Social Development, United Nations General Assembly, October 8, 2007), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0710-8.html>; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

- 47 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual,’” June 24, 1999; Kiyohiko Toyama, “Statement at the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development” (presented at the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, United Nations, New York, September 14, 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ps/state0609.html>; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at Open Debate of the Security Council on Women and Peace and Security” (presented at the Open Debate of the Security Council on Women and Peace and Security, United Nations Security Council, October 23, 2007), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0710-13.html>.
- 48 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual,’” June 24, 1999; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, May 8, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html; Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III,” April 19, 2005; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Yukio Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security” (presented at the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bangkok, Thailand, June 1, 2006), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0606.html; Toyama, “Statement at the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development,” September 14, 2006; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
- 49 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
- 50 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
- 51 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow:

possibilities,⁵² having one's individual viewpoint respected,⁵³ as well as being respected in general,⁵⁴ achieving one's potential,⁵⁵ not having anxiety,⁵⁶ having hope and the ability to realise it,⁵⁷ having rights,⁵⁸ being safe,⁵⁹ having welfare and self-respect,⁶⁰ being healthy,⁶¹ being fulfilled,⁶² having gender equality,⁶³

Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

- 52 Koizumi, “Remark at the International Symposium on Human Security,” December 15, 2001.
- 53 Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community,” February 25, 2003.
- 54 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
- 55 Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community,” February 25, 2003; Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
- 56 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003.
- 57 Ibid.; Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004.
- 58 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III,” April 19, 2005; Representative of the Government of Japan, “Statement at the 39th Session of the Commission on Population on Development,” April 4, 2006; Toyama, “Statement at the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development,” September 14, 2006; Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
- 59 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; Kenzo Oshima, “The Roles of Women in the Consolidation of Peace” (presented at the The Open Debate of the Security Council on Women and Peace and Security, United Nations Security Council, 26 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2006/un0610-13.html>.
- 60 Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III,” April 19, 2005.
- 61 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
- 62 Ibid.; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
- 63 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

being empowered,⁶⁴ having a livelihood,⁶⁵ being happy, and being allowed to develop one's ability to the maximum extent.⁶⁶ As the preceding list shows, the conditions of human security are vast and complex, covering the physical, medical, psychological, economic, political, philosophical, and social spheres. The only areas of human life which are not included in Japan's human security discourse are those of the mystical or religious. However, most of these aspects of a secure human life were only invoked in passing or without elucidation. On the other hand, some of them – discussed below – were encountered across a number of texts with enough detail to warrant analysis and discussion.

All people should be born in dignity, should be able to live in dignity, and should be able to end their lives, still in dignity.⁶⁷

Japan's human security policy is very commonly presented as in part being a

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- 64 Kinichi Komano, "Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network" (presented at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ottawa, Canada, May 18, 2005), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0505.html; Oshima, "The Roles of Women in the Consolidation of Peace," 26 2006; Kenzo Oshima, "Statement at the Open Debate of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict" (presented at the The Open Debate of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations Security Council, November 28, 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2006/un0611-5.html>; Takasu, "What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People," May 18, 2007; Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security," May 22, 2008.
- 65 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999; Kawaguchi, "Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community," February 25, 2003; Tsuchiya, "Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 'Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community'," February 25, 2003; Haraguchi, "Statement at the Wrap-up Meeting of the Security Council Focusing on the Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Situations," April 30, 2003; Komano, "Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 18, 2005; Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006; Kurosaki, "Statement to the Sixty-second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Item 64: Social Development," October 8, 2007; Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security," May 22, 2008.
- 66 Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security," May 22, 2008.
- 67 Tsuchiya, "Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 'Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community'," February 25, 2003.

matter of human dignity. Dignity is a common trope in human security discourse in general, and its presence is not exclusive to Japanese texts.⁶⁸ Acharya explains its prevalence in Japan's context primarily in relation to “widespread poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation caused by the economic crises of the 1990s”.⁶⁹ He also asserts that in Japan's case, to a lesser degree, dignity is also prominent because of an increase in intra-state conflict, the spread of democratisation and the advent of humanitarian intervention; although, as discussed in more detail in chapter three, it was found that Japan's human security texts show a tendency to disassociate human security practice from humanitarian intervention. Dignity as it pertains to human security is problematic, not least because of the ambiguous, imprecise and under-theorised form it takes in Japan's human security texts, as well the overtones of instrumentality through which it is only tentatively related to the life experience of individual humans. It appears in the earliest speeches, as this example by Obuchi demonstrates:

It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired. While the phrase "human security" is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats.⁷⁰

The postulation of *dignity*, represented in the above citation as a component of human security, is troubling due to a number of under-theorised matters. A key aspect missing in the text is that of the perspective from which dignity is to be conceptualised and assessed. As such, a precise understanding of the text is not possible because it is left open to numerous interpretations. Dignity can be felt in regard to one's self (e.g. like having a sense of pride in one's self), or perceived

68 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 01 (2010): 77–94; Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?,” *Global Governance* 11 (2005): 185–203; Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, *Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage* (University of Lancaster, 2004).

69 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001, 450.

70 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow,” 1998.

in regard to others (e.g. *he bowed with great dignity*)⁷¹, but such difference in perspective is not discussed or even acknowledged in Japan's official human security publications. This conceptual problem is significant not least when formulating policy which is sensitive to different levels of dignity, or concerned with undertaking actions which might have an effect on it. Nowhere in Japan's human security texts was there a discussion of – *inter alia* – whether subjective or objective levels of dignity are to serve as benchmarks which determine if an intervention is necessary, what kind of intervention might be appropriate, or whether manipulation of one form of dignity might affect another form.

Considering Japan's numerous references⁷² to the Commission on Human Security's report on human security,⁷³ one might imagine the presence of a fuller exposition of dignity there, but at least in regard to the question of perspective, it is silent too.⁷⁴ Other than postulating dignity as a component of human security, the only other detail brought up is that in regard to pursuing the human security of refugees, “the emphasis should be on the productive capacities of refugees, not on their vulnerabilities, for this will allow them to

71 “Dignity,” *New Oxford American Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

72 For example: Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2007); Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Komano, “Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 18, 2005; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 2008); Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

73 Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 2003.

74 It is interesting that Japan has had some success using the Commission on Human Security to bolster the legitimacy of its human security policy through association with the United Nations. Despite having been established by Japan, a number of researchers in the field have referred to the Commission as a part of the United Nations system. See Chenoy, “A Plea for Engendering Human Security,” April 1, 2005, 167; Denov, “Wartime Sexual Violence,” 2006, 329; P. H Liotta and Taylor Owen, “Why Human Security,” *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 7 (2006): 37; Ralph Pettman, “Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2005): 138.

regain their livelihoods and dignity”,⁷⁵ and that men and women can possess a “natural dignity”.⁷⁶ Whilst this tells one that dignity is in some way related to being productive, and that dignity is seemingly a natural state of being for people, there is still no indication as to whether dignity is to be a subjective or objective measure of human security, nor are there any hints as to how one could possibly measure it.

As Schachter points out, whilst references to human dignity have for some time been included in many international instruments, including the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the idea has never been explicitly defined; its meaning being left to “intuitive understanding [and] conditioned in large part by cultural factors”.⁷⁷ Schachter asserts that the problem of *not* defining human dignity in a clear way results in an inability to determine when the concept is being misused and does not allow one to formulate implications that the concept might have for policy conduct. A seemingly apparent prerequisite for pursuing dignity as a manifestation of human security might be that of asking those particular individuals whose human security is at stake, how they conceive of their own dignity and what should be done in order to measure and realise it, particularly since dignity can be either a subjective or objective state, as indicated by the preceding discussion.⁷⁸ A similar suggestion for the introduction of a subjective measure into conceptualisations of human security is spoken of as a “welcome innovation” by Glasius, who argues that “a subjective approach to human security may not be as wide eyed and unamenable to policymaking as it seems, [since] in crime prevention, subjective notions of security have long been

75 Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 2003, 48.

76 *Ibid.*, 8.

77 Oscar Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,” *The American Journal of International Law* 77, no. 4 (October 1, 1983): 849.

78 For Christie, the failure of human security discourses to take into consideration the voices of those who are presented as their main beneficiaries should be “laid bare”. This oversight, together with the status of human security as a new “orthodoxy”, warrants his assertion that “we must challenge and attack it”. Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,” April 1, 2010, 186–187.

privileged over absolute crime figures [and] require would-be providers of security to actually ask the victims they intend to save what makes them feel secure and insecure”.⁷⁹

Sweet and Masciulli⁸⁰ have also indicated the preponderance of dignity in various international documents. Like Schachter, they have pointed out the similarity of dignity to worth, as well as associating it with the idea that people should not be used for instrumental ends; rather that they should be an end in themselves. However, to speak of both worth and the individual as an end in itself raises the possibility of a tension that cannot be resolved according to Japan's human security discourse because a discussion about perspective in the conceptualisation of dignity is missing. The tension lies in the fact that if dignity is a matter of worth, measured from the perspective of the Other (i.e. objectively), the way is opened for an instrumental use of the human subject, since the idea of worth is itself associated with value; i.e. a value for something, as defined by the Other. In other words, if the dignity of the individual is conceptualised in relation to the value or worth it may have for the Other, there is a risk that it will not be an end in itself but a means to an end. Only if dignity is measured from the perspective of the Self (i.e. subjectively), and the Other is not given the opportunity to make judgements about individuals' dignity, can the idea of the person as a means to an end be ruled out, replacing it with the idea of human dignity as a means in itself.

It is possible to glean greater detail about the construction of dignity inherent in Japan's notion of human security, from a speech Obuchi made at the Institute for International Relations in Vietnam. In speaking of the necessity of the state

79 Marlies Glasius, “Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 37, doi:10.1177/0967010607086822.

80 William Sweet and Joseph Masciulli, “Biotechnologies and Human Dignity,” *Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society* 31, no. 2 (2011): 6–16.

and market to contribute to the realisation of human security, he claimed that:

Our experience has taught us [...] that both the state and the market, unless carefully managed, may well hurt human dignity by shoving suffering on the socially vulnerable. Asian society in the 21st century must be one in which all people can truly appreciate peace and prosperity and be convinced that tomorrow will be brighter than today.⁸¹

The implication from this statement is that dignity is related to the idea of egalitarianism and is measured in relative terms. People may lose dignity when the well-being of others is achieved or maintained through their suffering and retain it when all people can live in peace and be prosperous. In other words, in objective terms dignity is constructed as a condition which is highly dependent on the state of others' life experiences. At the same time, it is presented as a concept which retains some element of the unknown, thus leaving Japan's exposition open to interpretation. Obuchi is unable to provide certainty regarding the circumstances under which dignity might be eroded, using only a conditional modal verb to claim that mismanagement of the market or state “*may well hurt*”⁸² human dignity.

In associating human security with the Asian financial crisis, Obuchi added economic considerations to the construction of dignity, claiming that “the crisis [...] has been a direct blow to the socially vulnerable [...] threatening their survival and dignity”.⁸³ What is missing from this picture of dignity is a comprehensive exposition of how economic crisis might affect it; specifically regarding the mechanism by which *not* being in economic crisis means one *has* dignity. There is no guarantee that even with affluence one will necessarily act in a dignified manner; Charles Dicken's character – Ebenezer Scrooge – is a well known Western literary example of exactly the opposite case, where economic affluence is synonymous with undignified behaviour. The attachment of

81 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.

82 Ibid. emphasis added.

83 Ibid.

economic measures to dignity functions to represent human security policy as an objective pursuit, through the argument that the possession of a level of economic affluence can facilitate individuals' efforts to acquire dignity when they accumulate material possessions and the external trappings of wealth. However, the postulation of dignity as a function of economic well-being brings to mind the kind of “variable economism” which was decried by Richard Ashley in his criticism of international theorists' “exaggeration of the economic sphere's importance in the determination of social and political relations and a corresponding underestimation of the autonomy and integrity of the political sphere”.⁸⁴

Working to fill the signifier of dignity with a modicum of meaning,⁸⁵ Takemi represents it as a state of being which can exist for “all the peoples of the world”, presumably meaning that dignity could be experienced by all people concurrently.⁸⁶ However, despite his invocation of the period of the 21st century, Takemi's assertion does not guarantee that all people can or will have dignity at the same time. This is because a century can be conceptualised as a period of time rather than a point in time, and as such, it is conceivable that dignity could be realised for everyone sometime throughout that period, but not exactly in the same moment. Without clarifying the temporal aspects of how universal dignity might come to be manifested, one cannot conclude if it is to be conceptualised as something which could potentially be mutually exclusive or corrosive across individuals, or whether it is something which everybody could have at the very same moment. Since Takemi's construction of dignity omits such considerations, the reader of his text is not able to ascertain whether the realisation of the dignity of a particular individual might not somehow impinge

84 Richard K Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1983): 463.

85 For more on the concepts of signifier and signified, see Ernesto Laclau, “Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?,” in *Emancipation(s)* (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 36–46.

86 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

upon the dignity of another or how mutually exclusive conceptions of dignity across individuals might be resolved.

By presenting human dignity as a grounding for “an age of peace and prosperity”, Takasu raises the possibility that the concept is indeed conceived of as something related to value or worth, insofar as its realisation can pave the way for realising the objectives of peace and prosperity.⁸⁷ Irrespective of how ethically or economically appealing peace and prosperity might be, they are not intrinsic to dignity, and thus the postulation of the latter as presupposition of the former suggests that the definition of human dignity is bounded by the need for it to function in a way that is congruent with peace and prosperity; giving the impression that, in the terms of Sweet and Masciulli mentioned above,⁸⁸ Japan's notion of human dignity is conceived of as being instrumental in the realisation of objectives signified as peace and prosperity.⁸⁹ However, as discussed above it is conceivable that dignity can be absent despite economic prosperity, and it is not unimaginable to envisage a situation in which peace prevails but dignity is lacking.⁹⁰ The presence of dignity as a theme in Japan's human security discourse is brought up again in the following chapter, where it is discussed in the context of representations about the reasons for pursuing human security.

***To enjoy a healthy and happy life*⁹¹**

87 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

88 Sweet and Masciulli, “Biotechnologies and Human Dignity,” 2011.

89 I am grateful to one of my examiners for pointing out the texts' lack of elucidation upon whether the peace which is invoked should be positive or negative.

90 For example, debates about mandatory detention of refugees in countries which are not in a state of war have in part involved contest as to whether the practice allows people to maintain their dignity. See Dean Lusher and Nick Haslam, eds., *Yearning to Breathe Free: Seeking Asylum in Australia* (Federation Press, 2007); Danielle Every, *The Politics of Representation: A Discursive Analysis of Refugee Advocacy in the Australian Parliament*, Ph.D Dissertation (University of Adelaide, August 2006); “Dignity Not Detention,” *Detention Watch Network*, 2012, <http://detentionwatchnetwork.org>.

91 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

Life figures as an important component of Japan's official and public representation of the condition of human security, though its construction takes a number of forms. Most notably texts vacillate between the use of the term *life* as a state which can be distinguished from death, as opposed to a usage which emphasises a *way* of life. According to Obuchi:

An unavoidable fact is that Asia's remarkable economic development in recent years also created social strains. The current economic crisis has aggravated those strains, threatening the *daily lives* of many people.⁹²

Here human security policy is said to be concerned with a form of life which can be identified in temporal terms. It is not the state of being alive or people's entire life which is of concern here, but life conceptualised as something which happens to people on a day-to-day basis. By expressing life as a noun, life comes across as just another one of the activities people undertake on a daily basis, rather than as a phenomenon which encapsulates all other human activities; as would have been implied if the verb *to live* had been used instead.

Another expression of life in temporal terms can be found in Sumi's exposition of the relationship between human security and health:

As of today the Japanese people enjoy the longest average longevity of over 80 years in the world; however, it is only 50 years ago that the average life of Japanese people was only 50 years. There are three elements for this success. First, people have full access to advanced health care. Second, the provision of a safe water system leads to the drastic reduction of communicable diseases. The provision of safe water constitutes a fundamental condition for health. Third, eradication of parasites. I would like to point out that Japanese success is based upon the combination of a health system and a well advanced education system.⁹³

This excerpt expresses the concept of life in human security vis-a-vis health and longevity, giving the impression that one aspect of life under a human security

92 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998 emphasis added.

93 Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

regime is that of life-span; that living longer constitutes, at least in part, the condition of being secure as a human. The idea that longevity is in part a constituent of the state of human security has the potential for legitimating a form of human security policy in which people's productive capacity is exploited for longer periods through such acts as delaying the official retirement age; especially if one considers how life under the human security regime has been expressed in socio-economic terms as well. Sato, for instance, has claimed that through human security policy, "the HOPE of the ordinary people will enhance the resilience of each and every individual, thus advancing forward socio-economic conditions for their life (*sic*) and helping to realize sustainable development".⁹⁴ Indeed, Japan's earliest texts on human security contained such a socio-economic element, through their association of human insecurity with the Asian Economic and Financial Crisis and the pursuit of policy objectives expressed in terms of prosperity.⁹⁵ Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the construction of human security in terms of human potential and capabilities also contributes to creating an image of the concept in which economic aspects are a core element.

A temporal mode of presenting life can likewise be discerned in a publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which paraphrases the 1994 United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report, marginally filling out the meaning of daily life by representing policy as being a matter of "protecting [people] from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life".⁹⁶ The implication of this statement is that people's daily lives are conceptualised in terms of recurring patterns of activity and that being secure presupposes only changes which retain the integrity of those patterns or affect

94 Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 28, 2004.

95 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998; Obuchi, "Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia," December 16, 1998; Obuchi, "Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium," May 4, 1998.

96 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 2.

them only in regulated ways. Moreover, what is taken to be a significant change in the patterns of daily life and thus worthy of an intervention in the name of human security, is measured in terms of the seemingly subjective notion of pain/hurt which cannot easily be compared across individuals. Unfortunately, neither of these aspects of daily life shed much insight into exactly what activities might be included, other than delineating that it is non-spontaneous or non-abnormal, patterned activities which are undertaken every day that are of concern. The use of terms such *hurtful* and *sudden* are ambiguous and offer little conceptual precision, although they contribute to the formation of an image of the Japanese state as caring, benign and concerned with stability in a dangerous and rapidly changing context. On the other hand, Takasu's paraphrasing of former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement that "no calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to make their lives better",⁹⁷ gives a different image regarding the temporality of human security life. Here the emphasis is not so much on regularity or the short-term, but about life in general or in its totality.

Obuchi's characterisation of threats and issues which are said to be pertinent to human (in)security is also notable because of its implications for the construction of human life in terms of temporality. Specifically, in asserting that "environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for future generations",⁹⁸ Obuchi transgresses the lifespan of any one individual and inserts into the concept of human security a consideration of life in terms of generations. In other words, Japan's human security policy is represented as dealing with numerous temporal dimensions of people's lives. These dimensions include the short term (*daily life*), the medium term (*entire life*), and the long-term (*generation*).

97 Takasu, "Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World," May 8, 2000.

98 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

Similarly to the the idea of dignity, the primary difficulty with daily life as a component of Japan's concept of human security is its theoretical underdevelopment and inconsistency in the meaning with which it is ascribed across various texts. For instance, a close reading reveals little about what it is that actually makes up this aspect of human security. One characteristic of the problem is that it is unclear as to the extent to which daily life, whatever it happens to be, needs to be affected so as to warrant a response. In reference to this question, it is not possible to conclude whether it is only those things which lead to a real or figurative death of daily life that justify human security practices or whether something less than its death is grounds for preventative or curative interventions. Furthermore, without a specification of the object of assessment, even in such simple and intuitive terms as “the activities and experiences that constitute a person's normal existence”,⁹⁹ there is no possibility for determining when either death or damage to daily life has occurred. Just what constitutes the activities and experiences of a normal experience of daily life is left to readers' imaginations. Moreover, from the formulations of Japan's documents, one cannot conclude whether daily life is made up of *all* the things that one does in a day or whether only *certain* activities constitute daily life. Nor is there a consideration of whether these activities, irrespective of what they may be, should be carried out *every* day so as to be regarded as facets of daily life, or only on certain key, albeit unspecified days.

As indicated above, the discourse is impoverished regarding the exact meaning of *life* and the distinction between life in biological terms and life as a form of human experience is not always clear. However, the association of the term with a wide temporal range that spans from the everyday to the generation, works to open up a space for a similarly wide range of biopolitical interventions which can thus be legitimately pursued within a human security framework. Insofar as

99 “Daily Life,” *New Oxford American Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, 2010), http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/daily.

human security practices are, at least in part, a form of biopolitical regulation, the discourse is partial to consideration of the individual's entire life span as well as that of their progeny as a site for the application of power aimed at realising the conditions which make up human security. Problematically, and similarly to the absence of a way by which one might prioritise competing human security interests of numerous individuals, the discourse does not clearly specify how to determine if the security concerns of a particular individual trump those of their progeny, or conversely, if interventions which have a negative impact on an individual's security interests might be justified if they can be shown to promote the human security of their children. This unresolved tension is reminiscent of controversy regarding the rights of the unborn, in which debate revolves around the question of whether the interests of a foetus should be ascribed with more or less importance than that of their mother.

The indeterminacy of the discourse regarding the question of whether the human security concerns of the individual should be ascribed the same importance as that of their progeny, is not only problematic on its own terms; it also has a bearing on human dignity, which is a core element of Japan's construction of the state of human security. Specifically, the notion of dignity at the level of the individual cannot be easily maintained if policy allows for practices which work to enhance the human security of those yet unborn, unless the dignity of the individual is considered as homogeneous with that of the child. Conceptualising dignity in this way is possible but causes problems for the conceptualisation of human security in individual terms; since conceiving of the dignity of a person with that of their children serves to destabilise the idea of an individual human being and individual human security interests.

Speaking of daily life as a component of human security brings with it the sense that policy is about the mundane yet nonetheless essential elements of human existence; minutiae which do not necessarily relate to the acts of outstanding individuals, but manifest their importance through the fact that they are indeed

common to *all* people. If this is the case, one can observe a kind of pragmatism and prudence in the discourse which appeals to the necessity of being able to govern and direct a population through regulation of its most fundamental and material concerns. However, policy is not represented as just being about the unremarkable, routine activities of humans. In expressing his conviction that “human beings should be able to lead lives of *creativity*, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired”,¹⁰⁰ Obuchi went beyond thinking of life in a utilitarian, pragmatic or functional way, to a conceptualisation which brings to mind aesthetic, artistic, or constructive acts. But, the human security picture offered by Japan does not envisage the kind of creativity associated with, for instance, the archetype of the tortured artist. For in postulating that it is “primarily the responsibility of the individual to do his or her best to overcome any impediment and to try to fulfill his or her potential to lead a *happy* life”, Takasu clarified that whatever the content or direction of the creative lifestyle might be, it must be such that the individual is “happy”.¹⁰¹ With the addition of happiness to the parameters of human security, one can discern a psychological and spiritual element in Japan's human security discourse, although as symptomatic of Japan's human security discourse, there is no theoretical clarification as to whether happiness is to be measured subjectively or objectively.

The association of creativity with life in human security policy was also hinted at in a text by Takemi. In his Keynote Speech, he also talked about a life that is meaningful, although the focus in this text was the objective of realising the conditions under which people can, if they wish, take responsibility for themselves:

Human beings inevitably possess a rich potential to live creative and meaningful

100 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998 emphasis added.

101 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000 emphasis added.

lives. The wisdom of human beings comes from this potential. This wisdom can only be realized if human beings are provided the freedom to live their lives in a manner where they can assume their own responsibilities.¹⁰²

What seems apparent from this excerpt is that the secure human life is one in which people have the *possibility* of taking responsibility for themselves, although it is not revealed what those responsibilities are or under what circumstances they might need to be undertaken by people themselves, rather than being taken on by the state or some other agent of human security. It is also notable that the way of life which is being suggested here is not one in which people are obligated to take responsibility for themselves, but rather one in which they have the freedom to do so if they wish; this is evident from the use of the modal auxiliary verb *can*, which indicates potential for doing something, rather than an obligation or commitment to it. This excerpt thus explicates life under a human security regime in reference to the environment in which a person lives, rather than to people themselves, because it deals with the conditions under which humans might potentially be able to engage in certain behaviours, rather than the characteristics of people themselves which might lead them to undertake certain courses of action. As such, the discourse demonstrates a sensitivity to the context in which human life is experienced, as well as being considerate of human attributes related to the experience of life such as the perception of happiness. This element of the discourse – postulating a causal relationship between one's environment and one's behaviour – functions to advocate a human security role for bodies which are able to exert influence upon the environment in which humans live.

Another example which similarly legitimates the engagement and participation of non-human agents such as the state in the realisation of human security through the regulation of life/lifestyle, was brought up by Takemi in his

102 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

association of human security with the “freedom to participate in family life”.¹⁰³ As such, the aspects of life which are theorised as being under the auspices of human security policy are relations based on kinship, even though the nature and extent of such family life is underdeveloped. Whilst the discourse opens up a space for intervention, control or regulation of family relations by legitimate agents of human security, there is a lack of specification in regard to what that family life should look like. This omission is conspicuous because not all forms of relations based on kinship are universally regarded as legitimate. Demonisation and preventative policies against nepotism framed as corruption are evidence of the fact that there are limits to the kinds of family relationships which are considered to be normal according to the standards of democratic, elected government.

The life which is of interest to human security policy is sometimes conceptualised as being comprised of a *vital* core; a notion which has been invoked in a number of texts albeit in different guises. Takemi, for instance, spoke of it as a non-definitive yet “useful starting point for discussion” about human security:¹⁰⁴

The working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human Security, which was established in June 2001, states, “the objective of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long term human fulfillment.” While *this characterization is not definitive*, it is, I believe, a useful starting point for discussion.¹⁰⁵

However, the vital core has also been represented conversely; as actually *a part* of the definition of human security:

103 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

104 Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in *Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow*, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2002), 42, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf.

105 Ibid. emphasis added.

The [CHS] Report *defines* human security as “[the protection of] the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment”.¹⁰⁶

At the outset, three things are worth noting about these conjurations of the vital core: Firstly, that the status of the vital core in regard to the definition of human security is contested, even by Japan itself. As noted above, whilst the first excerpt presents it as a non-definitive point of departure for discussion, the second one situates the vital core as *part* of the definition of human security. Adding to its opacity, Takasu has presented the significance of the vital core in two distinct ways. In one he suggests that:

It would be sufficient to agree on a general operational definition as a base of collaborative efforts such as: e.g. "To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment" ("Human Security Now").¹⁰⁷

In this passage, a middle ground is taken between the positions of Takemi in the first excerpt,¹⁰⁸ where the idea is presented as *not* definitive but rather as a point of departure for discussing the concept, and the Commission on Human Security position paraphrased by Sumi and the Global Issues Cooperation Division in the second excerpt,¹⁰⁹ where it is definitive. In the exposition of Takasu, the notion of the vital core constitutes part of a somewhat temporary and imprecise definition, which is to function as a facilitator of collaboration in the name of human security. Thus, it is neither a catalyst for discussion, nor the kernel of a definition, but a heuristic or identity according to which collaboration and cooperative action can proceed. However, in a later text, he seems to weaken the position of the vital core as part of the definition of human security by presenting what had earlier been designated as the Commission on Human Security's (a) definition or (b) general operational definition, as merely

106 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 3 emphasis added.

107 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006.

108 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.

109 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 3.

a “working definition”.¹¹⁰ One can observe a transfiguration of the concept from a proper definition, to a general operational definition and then to merely a working definition. However it is not in reference to the Commission on Human Security's definition that Takasu repositions the vital core, as he is not an official representative of that organisation. Rather, the status of the vital core changes because of the way in which the Commission on Human Security definition's equivalence with Japan's official definition (or lack of it) is diluted throughout the course of three of Takasu's speeches. In other words, initially Japan's concept was relatively equivalent with that of the Commission on Human Security, whilst in later texts a distance can be discerned between the two definitions. Moreover, not only does Takasu appear to jettison the idea that the vital core is a part of Japan's definition of human security, he also places doubt as to whether a definition is needed at all for collaboration between agents of human security. Instead, he supplants a definition of human security with the idea of a “common understanding”, which is underwritten by the Commission on Human Security's *working* definition:

FHS¹¹¹ has come to the recognition that, rather than focusing on elaborating a legal definition of the concept, we should pursue concrete collaboration on the basis of a common understanding of the broad concept contained in the outcome document. This common understanding is in line with the working definition provided by the Commission on Human Security; “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfillment.” The absence of a legally defined definition will not deter concrete collaboration.¹¹²

With Takasu, the vital core is constructed in reference to a common understanding between human security agents, which he offers as a sufficient replacement for consensus on a definition on human security. This consensus is to serve as the foundation for cooperation in the realisation of human security policy. His proposal is based on a self-referential argument because at the same time as seemingly abandoning the need for an elaborate *definition* of human

110 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

111 Friends of Human Security.

112 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006.

security in lieu of a *common understanding* of the concept, he claims that the common understanding is “in line”¹¹³ with the definition of human security offered by the Commission on Human Security. The only way to resolve this apparently circular logic, in which a definition is rejected in favour of a common understanding based on that very definition, is to focus upon the kind of definition that Takasu rejects: a legal definition. It is a legal definition of human security which is not needed, rather than an outright one. However, neither Takasu's speech nor any other Japanese human security document has elucidated upon the difference between a legal definition and a non-legal one, leaving the matter of what constitutes a definition unresolved and ambiguous.

Whatever its actual status in regard to a definition of human security or the nuances of what is actually meant by the term *definition*, what can be gleaned about the vital core from Japan's texts is nonetheless quite impoverished. It is to be protected “in ways” that enhance human freedom and fulfilment¹¹⁴ in the long-term.¹¹⁵ Since the prescription is that the vital core should be protected in a particular way, the interpretive implication is that there may be other ways in which it could conceivably be protected; ways which are beneficial to the core's integrity but that are not consistent with long-term human fulfilment. And, even though one is left with the impression that the vital core does not of itself guarantee fulfilment in the long term, Japan's human security texts omit to explain or specify the nature of its apparent significance to human security, human life or human experience. As a result, the concept's invocation comes across as a rhetorical strategy which functions to legitimate human security practices through the promise of a way to positively affect some ostensibly hidden, fundamental and indispensable element that makes up the kernel of being human.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.

The Commission on Human Security's elucidation upon the vital core is also vague and only marginally more developed than what Japan has said about it. Despite the object of discussion being ascribed with a *vital* character, the Commission's report mentions it only twice:

The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be “vital”—what they consider to be “of the essence of life” and “crucially important”—varies across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be dynamic. And that is why we refrain from proposing an itemized list of what makes up human security.¹¹⁶

Health security is at the vital core of human security—and illness, disability and avoidable death are “critical pervasive threats” to human security.¹¹⁷

At best, the notion of the vital core looks ambiguous and the meanings ascribed to it in the two excerpts above are different if not contradictory. In the first example, a loose definition or set of boundaries for the concept is invoked; embedding it in the context of elementary rights and freedoms. However, it is also asserted that the vital core is about things which are the essence of life and crucially important, and that the content of these categories is dependent upon how individuals and societies construct them. In other words, on the one hand the vital core is said to be about rights and freedoms, but in the next sentence this assertion is put into doubt because it is also represented as being potentially different for every individual or society. The short treatment of the vital core in the first example is problematic because it seems difficult to reconcile the fixing of its meaning as a matter of elementary rights and freedoms, with the idea that its meaning depends on particular individuals' or societies' priorities; especially if one can conceive of an individual or society that would *not* consider either rights or freedoms to be vitally important in relation to other priorities or objectives.

116 Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 4.

117 *Ibid.*, 96.

Adding to the logical ambiguity, in the second example, the pseudo concept of the vital core is constructed not as a part of life itself, but rather as a part of human security. Whilst in the first example¹¹⁸ the vital core signifies a part of life which should be protected in order to realise human security, in the second example,¹¹⁹ it is not life which has a vital core but human security; and it is a matter of health. Despite the presence of the same signifier (i.e. *the vital core*), the signified brought up in the two excerpts is not the same. The representation of the vital core in the Commission on Human Security report is thus inconsistent because it claims to be all of the following things at the same time: something to do with elementary freedoms and rights, something that varies according to individuals and societies, something related to human life, and something constituting human security.

Aside from the aspects of life discussed above, one more trope running throughout Japan's human security texts is notable for its relative commonality. This is the association of the state of human security with that of health, as characterised prototypically by Sumi in his speech entitled *Human Security and Health*:

Fr. Akio Nemoto, a Franciscan priest, who has spent many years in a hospice in South Africa looking after HIV/AIDS patients, once told me a story of a patient. A mother who knew she was dying with HIV/AIDS wrote a letter to her beloved 3 year-old daughter. The letter had the condition that her daughter could read it when she became 16 years old, mature enough to understand the meaning of the letter in which her mother explained how she was affected by HIV/AIDS through her husband's adultery, how much she loved her daughter and she really wanted to see her daughter's first boyfriend. The story tells us that for all people health is always the primary concern and they are ready to sacrifice everything in order to get proper health care.¹²⁰

What is most remarkable about Sumi's statement is not so much the postulation

118 Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 2003, 4.

119 Ibid., 96.

120 Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

of health as a component of life under a human security regime, as much as the logical pathway he treads in concluding that health is indeed the primary concern for most people. In the passage above, one can discern a discursive strategy which takes the particularistic example of a mother/daughter plight in Africa as evidence of a generalised pattern across the entire spectrum of the world's population. Sumi does not moderate the breadth of his claim by speaking of health care as the primary concern of *most* people at *most* times, but gives it universal scope by claiming that it is the the primary concern for “all” people “always”.¹²¹ Underlying this excerpt is an incompatibility between medicine's self-representation in terms of rigorous scientific methodology, and Sumi's ability to make a broad general conclusion with only a sample population size of 1. Another notable leap of logic which can be discerned in the excerpt above, is the establishment of the mother/daughter case as evidence of *all* people's concern with health. In this case, the problem is not the presence of an unreflective move from the particularistic to the universal – as it was above – but that it is not clear how Sumi's anecdote actually proves that health is anybody's primary concern, let alone everybody's. If anything, from Sumi's account, the moral of the mother's story is only that adultery can lead to family tragedy. One may assume that the mother hoped to be healthy enough to continue living with her daughter – thus reinforcing Sumi's argument that health is everyone's primary concern in an indirect way – but the narrative he provides offers no *a priori* reason to do so.

In concluding this section on the representation of life and lifestyle under an imagined Japanese human security regime, a number of general observations can be made. For instance, despite theoretical imprecision, ambiguity, and omission Japan's discourse on human security takes into consideration a significantly wide cross-section of the elements of human life; ranging from the psychological, lifestyle and spiritual to the socio-economic, political and medical

121 Ibid.

realms. It also envisages life in various temporal dimensions, ranging from the period of a single day to that of the generation. Moreover, there is a discernible sensitivity towards the social context in which human life is ascribed with meaning. As such, in this regard Japan's human security discourse is fairly rich, at least in terms of scope and breadth if not detail and thus has the potential to help in the formulation of policies which are sensitive to people's lived experiences. However, the theoretical underdevelopment of the meaning of life under a human security regime and the dynamics between its various elements is problematic because the presence of a high number of relatively empty signifiers related to the conditions of human security can lead to various alternative and contradictory practices that may not prioritise the security of individuals, but which could still be justified rhetorically in reference to the broad theoretical base making up the core of Japan's human security discourse. An example of this exact phenomenon was reported by Pemunta, who found that *both* advocates and opponents of female circumcision in Cameroon appropriated the language of human security to legitimate and justify their opposing positions.¹²² Essentially, what seems to be necessary is a more precise attribution of meaning to the numerous subjective measures that are found throughout. Also, clearer prescriptions regarding the conditions under which concepts related to life are to be defined exogenously to the subjects of policy and when they are to be a matter of definition by human individuals themselves, would add clarity to the discourse and allow more lucid and precise policy measures to be determined.¹²³

122 Ngambouk Vitalis Pemunta, "Health and Development: HIV/AIDS and the Double Appropriation of Human Security Discourse by Practitioners of Female Circumcision and Development NGOs in Cameroon," *Journal of Human Security* 3, no. 1 (2007): 45–61.

123 It should be pointed out that there is support for a conceptualisation of human security which remains purposefully undefined. For instance, Bosold and Werthes see value in the use of the *phrase* human security as a political *leitmotif*; a "more or less coherent normative framework for foreign policy [which might] help to orientate, to coordinate, and to motivate a country's policy". Though Bosold and Werthes seem aware of the consequences – such as the kind of appropriation pointed out by Pemunta – of using the phrase *human security* as a kind of rallying call for action, they do not ascribe them with much significance, as their motivation appears to be "to help politicians to formulate and legitimize certain policies and concrete policy goals". Indeed, it is difficult to see how they could view human security in anything but such a rhetorical light, considering that the basis of their position is the idea that "human security is *not* a fixed foreign policy agenda, instrument or process whatsoever

Human security means protecting vital freedoms¹²⁴

Another commonly encountered element of Japan's representation of the condition of human security is that of freedom:

Human beings have encountered difficulties of every kind throughout history, but through their wisdom they have been able to overcome those difficulties. I believe that the source of that wisdom is the freedom of individual human beings to make choices and assume responsibility for their actions, and their abundant potential to live creative and meaningful lives.¹²⁵

In this except freedom in regard to human security is constructed in terms of one's ability to make choices and having the option of taking responsibility for one's actions. This form of freedom is also constructed in functional terms, in the sense that if it is realised, it will serve as a source of wisdom through which *all* humans can overcome all kinds of difficulties. Furthermore, it is conceptualised in terms of poverty; the relationship being one of cause and effect, such that poverty “strips human beings of [...] their freedom”.¹²⁶

A number of observations can be made in regard to this basic exposition of freedom. Firstly, to speak of the making of choices as a basis for the development of wisdom makes intuitive sense but it is not clear how the life

[but that] it is, like other political terms, exposed to continuous (re-)interpretation, (re-)construction and contestation, and only comprehensible in its (temporal and cultural) context”. Therefore, considering that for Bosold and Werthes human security *cannot* have any substantive meaning, that at best it can only be constituted by a loose set of principles, it is no wonder that they do not seem to be concerned with the possibility of it being used to justify the pursuit of the objectives of a wide array of political agents, through diverse and potentially contradictory means. See: David Bosold and Sascha Werthes, “Caught Between Pretension and Substantiveness – Ambiguities of Human Security as a Political Leitmotif,” in *Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas Changes, Concepts and Cases* (Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2006), 22,23.

124 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004.

125 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

126 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

experiences and experiences of individuals can contribute to the promulgation of wisdom at the level of the species (i.e. humankind), unless that wisdom were to be somehow shared with all other people and could be applied to the life experiences of others. Moreover, the text provides no specification regarding the kind of choices which are relevant for the accumulation of wisdom and which could thus serve as a solution to the problems of humankind. What is more, basing the notion of human security on the idea that individuals should be able to make their own choices may lead to a logical incompatibility that could compromise the pursuit of human security, if individuals chose not to accept the terms of policy or its objectives, or if they made choices which were incompatible with the concept of human security as defined by Japan. The point is not that people making their own choices is incompatible with the idea of human security *per se*, but that such a situation could be incompatible with a state role in the realisation of human security. This is because, if individuals were given the freedom to make their own choices regarding human security, they might conceivably choose to reject state definitions of human security or the state's role in realising it.

Secondly, to speak of the freedom to take responsibility for one's own actions or indeed to make one's own choices does not guarantee that people will indeed avail themselves of those freedoms; since freedom is about choice rather than compulsion, it is plausible that individuals might choose not make their own choice or take responsibility for their actions, even if given the freedom to do so. If this were to be the case, the provision of these freedoms would not be sufficient to realise the wisdom which is promised through human security policy.

Thirdly, if it were to be the case that individuals did indeed take up the freedom to make choices and assume responsibility for their actions, another form of state human security policy de-legitimation – aside from the one raised above – would materialise. Namely, that if people made the choice to take responsibility

for their own security, the state's self-ascribed duty for human security would be relegated only to those instances in which individuals requested its assistance. In other words, the postulation of freedom to take responsibility for one's self actually subverts attempts by a state such as Japan to establish itself or other non-human agents as providers of human security.

Another notable aspect of Japan's discourse on human security is that it asserts that people should be *provided* with the freedom to take responsibility for themselves. Such a prescription presupposes a body that can give freedom, but logically speaking, can potentially also take it away. The implication of presupposing such a body is that people are correspondingly constructed as being reliant on something beyond themselves for this broad notion of freedom; that they are free only so far as permitted by systems of governance and regulation from which they cannot separate themselves. As long as such a relationship of reliance ↔ provision is in place, people's freedom appears as being at the whim of changing definitions of both responsibility and freedom. Moreover, this kind of freedom is unstable since it does not rule out the possibility that under certain circumstances, such as martial law, the state might revoke or suspend it. Rather, to make sure that human security in the form of freedom is not reliant on the changing interests of non-human agents of human security, the relationship of reliance ↔ provision should be abandoned; such that people's freedom is not at the whim of bodies postulated as being the guarantors of their security, being based instead on individuals' own choices about whether they need human security assistance from a third party. In order for Japan's discourse to be more consistent with its own advancement of human security as contextually dependent and applicable at an individual level, people's freedom to make their own choices and take responsibility needs to be divorced from its reliance on the state. It is conceptually incoherent to promote a concept of human security which relies on personal freedom, and at the same time positions the state as having the final say in whether one can take advantage of this freedom.

***First, it is a human-centered approach in tackling global issues,
putting the livelihood and dignity of individuals and communities
at the center of our focus.*** ¹²⁷

The idea of livelihood as a component of human security was invoked by Takemi at the International Symposium on Development, although he did not elaborate on what was meant by the term, other than to say that it is threatened by poverty.¹²⁸ In other words, a state of poverty is implicated in negatively affecting one's livelihood. Insofar as livelihood involves the pursuit of the necessities of life, particularly through work, the direction of causality presented here is counter-intuitive, since it is the inability to make a livelihood which leads to poverty, rather than the opposite. Nevertheless, if poverty is a threat to one's livelihood, rather than being outcome of an inability to pursue one's livelihood, the implication is that, for Japan, livelihood is understood mainly in economic terms. Aside from this indication of the importance of the economic in Japan's understanding of livelihood, very little detail regarding this prominent aspect of human security is forthcoming from Japan's texts on human security. If, for instance, livelihood were to be defined simply as "a means of gaining a living",¹²⁹ measures aimed at affecting it would necessitate a discussion of – *inter alia* – the constitution of *a living* as well as thought about what it is not or should not be, how to measure it so as to determine when an intervention is to be undertaken, the conditions under which an intervention is warranted, and legitimate means for its manipulation. Overlooking such questions, Japan's discourse merely posits livelihood in relation to economic measures, insofar as poverty is itself only an economically constructed concept. The treatment of

127 Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security," May 22, 2008.

128 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

129 Robert Chambers and Gordon R. Conway, "Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century" (Institute of Development Studies, 1991), 5, <http://www.ntd.co.uk/idsbookshop/details.asp?id=35>.

economic factors as “first among equals” in the conceptualisation of poverty is a widespread occurrence,¹³⁰ and so in this regard Japan is not unique. If livelihood were to be conceptualised holistically and more in line with the activities undertaken by people in societies, as “a combination of produced, human, natural, social and cultural assets”,¹³¹ its measurement and control would necessitate further reflection, both within the realm of the economic and outside of it, which cannot be found in Japan's human security texts. To maintain parity with its promises of protecting the security interests of individuals, discourse on livelihood would need to include questions about how people themselves conceptualise their livelihoods: for instance, whether it is measured in exclusively economic terms or if other less tangible or non-financial income can be a part of it, its importance in relation to other aspects of lived experience, and how various elements of livelihood, such as those suggested above, affect each other and should be balanced in order to realise individuals' human security.

In concluding this second section of the chapter, the exposition and analysis above has shown that according to Japan's official discourse, the concept of human security is multifaceted, complex and touches upon a wide array of aspects making up the experience of human life. The discussion has attempted to show that the discourse can be problematised in reference to an under-theorisation of both the nature of, and interplay between, those things which are raised by Japan as the parameters of human security. It can also be problematised in regard to the consistency and coherence of representations of these parameters across the body of the texts examined. Furthermore, as was revealed throughout the interpretation of these texts, it is possible to discern the presence of unacknowledged and unexplored logical conclusions which have a questionable bearing on human security as viewed from the perspective of the

130 Andrew Sumner, “Meaning Versus Measurement: Why Do ‘Economic’ Indicators of Poverty Still Predominate?,” *Development in Practice* 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2007): 5.

131 Leo De Haan and Annelies Zoomers, “Development Geography at the Crossroads of Livelihood and Globalisation,” *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 94, no. 3 (2004): 352.

individual human being. The concept of human security as it appears in Japan's foreign policy speeches and publications is characterised by a detailed and fine postulation of elements which make up human existence, and these are often ascribed universally to all people despite numerous representations of policy at the level of the human individual. By constituting a form of life which “is amenable to an exercise of [a] form of sovereign power”¹³² that “claims the globe as its field of operation”,¹³³ the discourse makes thinkable complex interventions by agents acting in the name of human security; both in a myriad of human activities and in regard to an enormous population whose accessibility to regulation is not limited in traditional terms which prioritise sovereign and national categories. Indeed, Japan's construction of human security is exceptionally ambitious because, whilst most versions of human security are concerned mainly with “the basic sustenance of day-to-day life”,¹³⁴ it also encompasses longer term and more existential, philosophical and qualitative concerns like dignity, happiness, fulfilment, potential, hope, happiness and creativity. But, despite assembling a wide theoretical horizon for the conceptualisation of factors underlying human (in)security, Japan's texts are impoverished in terms of theoretical development of the metaphysics of these factors or their measurement and apprehension, the effects that factors have on each other when they are manipulated, and the potentially negative ramifications that manipulation of these factors might have on aspects of human life experience aside from those associated with human security.

The Idea of Human Security

In this section an epistemological perspective on human security discourse guides the analysis. The key question is that of how human security is

132 De Larrinaga and Doucet, “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” 2008, 518.

133 Ibid., 534.

134 Ibid., 530.

represented as an object, source, and field of knowledge.

Knowledge of Human Security and Threats to It

What is human security? This is the title of the first section of an official document about human security published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.¹³⁵ The act of asking the question works to establish the text, and thus Japan, as having the authority and knowledge to speak of the concept's essence, nature, or identity. Through its role as the narrator of the text, the speaking subject is situated in the position of telling or informing the reader about human (in)security. The speaking voice of this document does not assert that other answers to this question are impossible, but nonetheless its presence is underwritten by the presupposition that as the all-knowing, omniscient narrator, it *knows*. One way in which representation of Japan as an expert in human security is buttressed, is through reference to experience:

I believe that Japan's experience since the end of the Second World War in promoting prosperity and the well-being of its people through economic and social development makes it particularly well-prepared to advocate such a broad concept of human security.¹³⁶

The assertion that co-chair of the Commission on Human Security and former Japan International Cooperation Agency head Ogata Sadako¹³⁷ is the “mother of the very notion of human security”,¹³⁸ also works to connote the idea that Japan is in a privileged place regarding knowledge and expertise on human security,

135 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.

136 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

137 “Biography of Mrs. Sadako Ogata,” *United Nations News Service*, accessed April 9, 2009, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/hlpanel/ogata-bio.htm>.

138 Yasuo Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’” (Davos, Switzerland, January 26, 2008), <http://www.mofa.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html>.

through Ogata's status as an official of the Japanese state; despite, as discussed below, some inconsistency with the representation of origins in Japan's human security narratives.

The posing of the question – *what is human security?* – reveals a little about how human security is conceptualised; namely, as something which can be *explained* by one party to another, through the written language of English. To come to understand the idea of human security, one needs to be able to read not Japanese but English – as it is this language of publication which is privileged. This is despite the fact that most recipients of human security policy are unlikely to know that language, as most of Japan's human security policies are implemented in countries where English¹³⁹ is not the native language.¹⁴⁰ In other words, the text as a pedagogical instrument and the knowledge it purports to offer about human security, does not cater for an audience facing human insecurity unless it speaks or at least understands English. Moreover, considering the limited publication and dispersal of this text, it is unlikely to be read by anyone who has not visited Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any of the human security themed conferences or seminars that it has organised. The conditions of becoming knowledgeable about human security in Japan's understanding thus include a particular kind of education which has included the English language, and the position or resources which would allow one access to the places where the text was distributed; mainly the virtual realm of the Internet, the various symposia or conferences which Japan has held on the topic, or the diplomatic forums at which Japan has spoken about human

139 Moreover, the text presupposes knowledge of *American* English; e.g. *globalization* (cf. *globalisation*), *liberalization* (cf. *liberalisation*), working towards establishing American English as the international norm for the English language, at least as far as the dissemination of Human Security knowledge is concerned.

140 “Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance.html; “Other Assistances for Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance-2.html; “Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security Archives,” accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/archive.html.

security. None of these conditions are likely to be found at the local sites for the application of human security practices, considering that English speaking countries are practically the exception rather than the norm when it comes to the pursuit of human security for Japan.¹⁴¹ Reminiscent of Christie's charge that human security discourse only “*seemingly* works on behalf of the ‘silenced’, without actually giving them a voice”,¹⁴² one is left with the impression that, conversely, Japan's human security does not even speak to those who are postulated as (partial) beneficiaries of human security praxis.

In line with its self-ascribed expertise on the topic of human security, the discourse endeavours to answer a wide cross-section of questions which go beyond simply a discussion of human security's essential characteristics or nature. It represents its expertise through a number of forms of knowledge which work to underwrite the authority of its claims about the meaning of human security, what erodes it, why it should be pursued and how practices should be undertaken. These expressions of certainty are made in terms of:¹⁴³

Historical narrative:

*Since the end*¹⁴⁴ of the Cold War, the international community has experienced rapid globalization accompanied by the economic liberalization and a marked *progress* of information technology.

Theoretical elucidation and ethical rumination:

The traditional *concept* of “state security” alone, whose objective is to protect the boundaries and people of a state, is no longer sufficient [...] additional responses are necessary to address diverse threats comprehensively, *capturing the*

141 As discussed earlier in this chapter, human security policy is often represented as being about *all* people's interests, although it is also the case that developing countries are presented as being the focus of most activities said to be taken in the name of human security.

142 Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,” April 1, 2010, 187 emphasis added.

143 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2–15.

144 Emphasis added throughout.


interlinkages among them [...].

Normative prescription:

Each of us [...] *should* be respected as a human person [...] once threatened their survival, livelihood and dignity [...] people can hardly realise their potential and capabilities.

Quantitative social science:¹⁴⁵

Table 1: Approved Projects by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (as of February 2007)



One form of knowledge that is missing from Japan's human security discourse is that of experience; there being no mention, in any of the texts examined, of needing to have experienced human insecurity through one's own senses (i.e. empirically), or even through the senses of others who have directly experienced human insecurity, to understand the concept. However, as mentioned above, in other contexts, Japan presents its own credentials for the pursuit of human security in terms of its post-Second World War experience.¹⁴⁶ One can thus discern some tension in Japan's discursive treatment of what is necessary to be

¹⁴⁵ The table represents approved funding from the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security for various projects in different parts of the world. Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 7.

¹⁴⁶ Takasu, "Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World," May 8, 2000.

an expert in the field and qualified to act for human security. Whilst in the earlier discussion Japan's credentials were presented as a matter of personal experience, in this case the text¹⁴⁷ privileges a theoretical form of knowledge that does not seem to pay credence to the role of experience. Furthermore, the texts examined did not ascribe any significance to alternative modes of knowing in which representation is communicated not through language,¹⁴⁸ but through other mediums such as music, graphical art, or storytelling, and which could contribute to a deeper, multifaceted understanding and empathy for human insecurity. Similarly, Grayson has noted a tendency for human security discourse in general to prioritise “seeking precision, causality and universalism through measures of human (in)security” at the expense of “indigenous knowledge”, thus placing limits on the way the concept can be constructed.¹⁴⁹

Scientificity

Japan's human security knowledge and policy is ascribed with a social scientificity in which threats are represented as factors and parameters that can be rationally calculated, leading to the determination of appropriate responses:

In developing a concept for human security in the 21st century, it is important to consider *factors* that threaten security. Prime Minister Obuchi highlighted nonmilitary threats to security that have accompanied globalization, including infectious diseases, terrorism, and narcotics. In mentioning such nonmilitary threats to our security, Prime Minister Obuchi proved to be remarkably prescient. HIV and AIDS continue to cripple the development of many countries in Africa; tuberculosis is resurfacing around the world, in both developed and developing countries; and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, exhibited beyond doubt

147 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.

148 “A body of words and the systems for their use common to a people who are of the same community or nation, the same geographical area, or the same cultural tradition: the two languages of Belgium; a Bantu language; the French language; the Yiddish language” “Language,” *Dictionary.com Unabridged*, n.d., accessed April 5, 2010.

149 Kyle Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional Debate,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2008): 397.

the threat to human security posed by indiscriminate acts of brutal terrorism. It is vital that we all understand the diversity of the threat to human security.¹⁵⁰

Framing human security actions in reference to social science functions to legitimate policy by appealing to “the age-old idea that science is better, that science is good, and that science leads us to the truth and to an improved description of our universe and our future”.¹⁵¹ However, as discussed in chapter four, Japan's human security texts commonly invoke threats and dangers; phenomena whose manifestation is *not* certain and which thus destabilise scientific promises of certainty. Indeed, one is paradoxically reminded of this tension between certainty and uncertainty through the representation of human security knowledge in terms of statistics; an example of probabilistic thinking par excellence.

Measurement of human security in both relative *and* absolute terms

For Sumi the effects of globalisation on human security can be measured in two ways. He asserts that:

[Globalisation] accelerates the degree of interdependency of the world, having brought not only benefits to people, but troubles *by widening the gap between the rich and the poor nationally and internationally*.¹⁵²

Furthermore, he asserts that because of globalisation, “today, as many as 1.1 billion people are forced to live on less than one dollar a day”.¹⁵³ The two forms of measurement evident here are those undertaken in relative terms, where the gap between rich and poor has apparently widened, as well as in absolute terms

150 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44 emphasis added.

151 Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, “Neutrality Is Overrated,” *Post-Autistic Economics Review* 24, no. 2 (2005): 1, <http://www.paecon.net/PAERreview/issue24/PardoGuerra24.htm>.

152 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.

153 Ibid.

in which people are presented as being insecure when their income is below an arbitrary benchmark which reinforces the position of the United States as a measure of global economic health; *one dollar a day*.¹⁵⁴ The establishment of *one* dollar as the point dividing poverty from non-poverty is rhetorical and politically motivated because there is no *a priori* reason why the line should not be instead two dollars, fifty cents, or some other arbitrary sum. Moreover, it is questionable whether this line in the sand has any scientific utility either in predicting or explaining the effects of poverty. For instance, mortality rates from malnourishment for children living on one dollar a day can vary from 4% to 16% depending on the country, suggesting that the threshold of one dollar per day as an indicator can be insensitive to certain forms of well-being.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, reminiscent of approaches such as those of King and Murray which focus on quantitative measures of so-called “generalized poverty”,¹⁵⁶ the representation of human security policy in reference to numerical figures such as *one dollar a day* works together with the above mentioned scientificity, to portray human security practices as certain, quantifiable, and measurable; thus legitimising the pursuit through an appeal to the apparent truth-determining properties of science.

Japan's grounding of its claims to having expertise in the field of human security in relation to the spheres of knowledge indicated above, is in line with Grayson's assertion that, “as a specific discursive formation, human security has drawn upon security, medicine, psychology, economics, sociology, ethics, criminology, diplomacy, environmentalism, international relations, actuarial science and even humanist ethical modalities, in order to incite discussion and to invite the production of knowledge of ‘the human’ and of ‘security’, which are

154 'One dollar a day' as a measure of poverty was introduced by the World Bank in 1990 Sumner, “Meaning Versus Measurement,” February 1, 2007.

155 Adam Wagstaff, “Child Health on a Dollar a Day: Some Tentative Cross-country Comparisons,” *Social Science & Medicine* 57, no. 9 (2003): 1529–1538.

156 Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 4 (February 2001): 592.

necessary to engage in biopolitical management.¹⁵⁷ Another aspect of the way in which Japan has constructed the epistemology of human security can be discerned in Takemi's address to the "Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow", in which he spoke of the "evolution of the human security concept".¹⁵⁸ Of significance here is the characterisation of the presence of the concept as the result of an *evolution* and the connotations this mode of representation has for practices that are undertaken in reference to Japan's human security discourse. Firstly, to frame the concept in this way creates the impression that it is the result of a smooth, unproblematic and natural process. However, as Foucault's comparative analysis of the Renaissance, Classical, and Modern periods from an epistemological point of view suggests, changes in epistemes and regimes of truth can be the result of processes which are not smooth transitions, developments or evolutions, but contested, disputed, and violent dislocations or conflicts.¹⁵⁹ In terms of the politics of representation, to speak of an evolution – as Takemi has done in reference to the concept of human security – functions to hide the rifts or sutures between discourses which can be involved in the development of ideas, bodies of knowledge or policy shifts. It has the political effect of hiding schisms and contest from which current understandings of a concept have emerged and creates an image of harmony and natural inevitability.

Framing the introduction of new paradigms as smooth, evolutionary changes or developments can also work to ascribe them with the political legitimacy and sense of rightness, truth or common sense acquired by established and stable systems of thought. In this vein, and reminiscent of an approach to theorising about security advocated by Liotta that involves "distinguish[ing] between where interests and effects both overlap *and* where they conflict with each

157 Grayson, "Human Security as Power/knowledge," 2008, 388.

158 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002.

159 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things, World of Man: A Library of Theory and Research in the Human Sciences* (ed: R.D. Laing) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1994).

other”,¹⁶⁰ Japan has explicitly stated that human security is a complement to what it presents as a traditional and established concept – state security – rather than as a challenge or replacement for it:

To overcome these direct threats to people, the *traditional* concept of “state security” alone, whose objective is to protect the boundaries and people of a state, is no longer sufficient. Indeed, the importance of state security will not and should not shrink at all, but additional responses are necessary to address diverse threats comprehensively, capturing the interlinkages among them from a human perspective. “Human Security” is to represent such an aspiration.¹⁶¹

With the emergence of these individual-centered human problems, concepts of security have accordingly been evolving over the past decade, with the concept of state security increasingly challenged, or perhaps one should say *complemented*, by other concepts, namely, cooperative security and human security.¹⁶²

It is notable that, due to its representation of the relationship between state and human security in terms of similarity, Japan's human security discourse can be distinguished from other forms which are articulated through an “invitation to identify the inherent rupture that the concept and its practices mark in comparison to previous articulations of national security in terms of its referent object (the individual subject) and the phenomena to be securitized.”¹⁶³ Constructing the concept of human security in terms of an evolution indicates a particular approach to epistemology regarding the supposed way in which processes of knowledge production occur: in this case, as a natural procedure which involves an inevitable survival of ideas which are in some way the most fitting. Such a visage cloaks not only the political nature of the “business of

160 Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” December 1, 2002, 477.

161 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2 emphasis added.

162 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 43 emphasis added.

163 Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge,” 2008, 386 As indicated above, the distinctiveness of Japan’s human security discourse can also be discerned in the postulation of the individual as only one – and not always the primary – referent beneficiary of policy practices. .

science”,¹⁶⁴ but also its agonistic aspects: active contest and machination between political agents advocating different views;¹⁶⁵ observable when the boundaries, limits and taboos of a concept or body of knowledge are established.¹⁶⁶ In short, the image of an evolution of the concept of human security champions unity and simplicity whilst taking attention away from the possibility that numerous alternatives, nuances or details were marginalised, overlooked or silenced in the emergence of what now constitutes Japan's official human security policy. The point being made here is not in regard to whether the concept of human security discussed by Japan is *in reality* the result of a smooth development characterised by consensus and agreement, or alternatively whether it has come about through a number of violent dislocations or political upheavals. Rather, what is being highlighted here is that the representation of the concept of human security in terms of an evolution ascribes human security practices with consensus, stability and agreement, legitimising them insofar as these characteristics figure as normatively attractive signifiers in the communication between international relations agents.

With the preceding discussion in mind, it is notable that stability and agreement are both common tropes in Japan's human security texts. The presence of agreement can be observed in the following examples:

The [2005 World Summit] outcome document *agreed* that [human security] is to be defined based on a common understanding.¹⁶⁷

We should rather concentrate on achieving cooperation among interested countries, broaden areas of *agreement* and partnership rather than focusing on

164 Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method*, Third (London ; New York: Verso, 1975), 14.

165 For more on agonism and its relationship to the practice of politics, see: Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?,” *Social Research* 66, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 745–758.

166 For more on boundaries and limits of different disciplines and knowledge claims, see: Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” 1983.

167 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008 emphasis added.

different emphasis; practicing the concept, taking concrete actions, implementing joint projects and combining efforts and resources together, to improve the situation of vulnerable people who are under severe threats.¹⁶⁸

The Trust Fund for Human Security is managed in accordance with the Guidelines *agreed* between the Government of Japan and the UN Secretariat.¹⁶⁹

In regard to stability as a figurative device of the discourse, there are numerous examples throughout the corpus of texts asserting it as a goal of human security practices:

It is therefore incumbent on Japan to fulfill its obligations to the international community in helping all people to live free from want, with greater peace of mind, greater *stability*, and greater prosperity.¹⁷⁰

I believe it behooves us to make efforts in three areas if we are to realize our vision for Asia - "a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity" - upon the foundation of peace and *stability* and collaborative relations among the major countries.¹⁷¹

Indeed, it is my view that the further development of this idea of "human security" will lead to the rethinking of the international system itself, going beyond just responding to situations as they arise. Under the existing international order, the state has been the basic constituent component, and within this framework, international peace and *stability* as well as economic prosperity have been pursued, with the advancement of the national interest as the key motivating factor.¹⁷²

[The Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia], recalling their on-going beneficial cooperation on regional and global security challenges, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and human security concerns such as disaster relief and pandemics, as well as their

168 Takasu, "Towards Forming Friends of Human Security," June 1, 2006 emphasis added.

169 "The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009), 8, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html emphasis added.

170 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002, 46 emphasis added.

171 Obuchi, "Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia," December 16, 1998 emphasis added.

172 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999 emphasis added.

contributions to regional peace and *stability*.¹⁷³

Another common element of Japan's representation of human security is that of newness. For the most part the concept has been presented as a new one, with the notable exception of one speech in which it is said to be a traditional part of states' national policies. However, the newness aspect of Japan's human security policy has not appeared uniformly. For example, the object of newness varies between texts; at times it is the *concept* whilst at other times it is the *phrase* which is presented as novel. For example, Obuchi asserted that:

While the *phrase* "human security" is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats.¹⁷⁴

In this example, it is the *phrase* which is ascribed with newness, rather than the concept itself. However, in other sections of Obuchi's speech newness is ascribed to other aspects of policy, either implicitly or explicitly. For instance, he stated explicitly that it is important to “seek new *strategies* for economic development which attach importance to human security”. He also implied an attribution of newness to the *concept* by speaking in temporal terms and situating the necessity of human security policy in the present through the claim that it is “*in our times* [that] humankind is under various kinds of threat”.¹⁷⁵

Aside from the above mentioned economic development strategies, newness has also been ascribed to other policy practices said to have been mobilised for the realisation of human security. For instance, in a speech entitled “*New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century which Focus on the Dignity of the*

173 “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” 2009 emphasis added.

174 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998 emphasis added.

175 Ibid. emphasis added.

Individual”, the speaker claimed that he had “organized [the] symposium with the view of exploring the possibility of the concept of "Human Security" as a *policy* idea”, and that it was expected that the discussions there would serve as “an occasion to study a *new* form of international cooperation”.¹⁷⁶ Here – in distinction to examples discussed above in which the signified of newness was the concept or phrase *human security* – it is forms of practice such as development and cooperation which are explicitly signified as being new. Also, by speaking of “the possibility”¹⁷⁷ of creating policy based on the notion of human security, the image of a *new* policy or set of practices is once again connoted because the speaker suggests that the use of human security as a policy idea is yet to come.

Notably, there was one instance in the corpus of texts examined in which human security as a concept was characterised as *not* being new. In light of the presence of passages discussed above, in which newness figures clearly as an attribute of human security discourse, the characterisation of human security as a concept with a tradition in the practices of statecraft introduces an element of conceptual dissonance to Japan's human security discourse:

Human security is *not* a brand-new concept. While the ultimate responsibility of a state is to protect its territory and safeguard the survival and well-being of its people, sound governments have long pursued human security as part of their national policy. However, in my view, the level of attention and high priority accorded to human security internationally these days are a reflection of several developments.¹⁷⁸

Aside from situating the concept of human security in a historical context, this passage also represents human security as being particularly important in the present, through the use of the temporal indicator “these days”.¹⁷⁹ The present

176 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.

177 Ibid.

178 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000 emphasis added.

179 Ibid.

and the idea of now – discussed below – both appear as tropes in Japan's representation of human security and in this case they have been substituted for *newness*. Despite the presence of this one case, the majority of texts in the corpus of Japan's human security documents prioritise newness of the concept rather than its lineage, with the trend having continued despite the uncharacteristic turn in Takasu's text. For instance, an official publication on human security compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Takasu's speech announced that human security was a “new concept”;¹⁸⁰ whilst in addressing the audience at a Ministry of Foreign Affairs human security symposium, Tsuchiya implicitly ascribed the concept with newness in speculating that:

Perhaps many of us here today are already familiar with the term, “human security.” But there may be some among us who are hearing it for the first time, though they would instantly recognize the term, “state security.”¹⁸¹

Despite attributions of newness to a number of aspects of human security, Japan's human security texts do not actually specify what is new about either the concept or the practices associated with it. However, as Nuruzzaman has indicated, human security advocates' affirmations of novelty are problematic for a number of reasons.¹⁸² Firstly, the claim that the concept of human security can be distinguished from earlier concepts and approaches to security on the basis of its placement of the human individual, rather than the state, as the focus of security practice, is undermined by similar and earlier efforts to do this in Critical Theory and feminist approaches to international relations. This point of contest is not entirely applicable in Japan's case though, because it has not represented human security practices as being exclusively about the human individual. As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, for Japan the

180 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.

181 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003.

182 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict: The Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 41, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 285–303.

individual is merely one of a number of objects of security practice. The only elucidation regarding newness in human security thought, which exists in Japan's human security discourse, is in the form of the claim that it is threats which have diversified:

Japan believes that to overcome new and direct threats, the traditional concept of state security alone is no longer sufficient.¹⁸³

Nonetheless, the discourse omits to indicate what it is about threats to human security which makes them new. Nuruzzaman also problematises asseverations regarding the newness of human security thought and praxis by highlighting their relationship to certain elements of realist thought. Firstly, the concept of human security shares with Waltz's neo-realism a commitment to a “positivistic problem-solving approach”.¹⁸⁴ Japan's human security discourse also contains elements of positivistic thought, which aims to ascribe a scientific sensibility and rigour to the study of the social world,¹⁸⁵ because, as was discussed above, it is enunciated in terms of a scientificity which promises certainty and truth. Secondly, “in perfect consonance with the realist security paradigm”,¹⁸⁶ human security thought is characterised by a commitment to the *status quo* through the maintenance of social and political structures of power at both the national and international level. Indeed, Japan's human security texts also have traces of such conservative thought. They are noticeable in representations, discussed in chapter three, which invoke a religious imagery to promote the continuance of a structure made up of a polity and governing body. They can also be found in assertions, examined in chapters three and four, which imply that future generations will not differ significantly from current ones in regard to what they perceive as a threat.

As indicated above, temporality figures as a trope in Japan's representation of

183 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

184 Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict,” September 1, 2006, 300.

185 Ted Benton and Ian Craib, *Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought*, Traditions in Social Theory 1 (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001).

186 Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict,” September 1, 2006, 299.

human security. It is common to see policy and associated issues framed as existing in the present, even though in actual fact the idea of *now* is an imprecise, subjective, and constantly shifting point of reference. For example, Sato has claimed that the Commission on Human Security “report's call for human security is a response to the challenges of *today's* world”,¹⁸⁷ and Sumi's account of the relationship between human security and health, contains the claim that “*today* a new consensus on security is really needed”, that “*today*, as many as 1.1 billion people are forced to live on less than one dollar a day”, and that “tomorrow can be better than *today*”.¹⁸⁸ Considering that the period of time between the speeches of Obuchi and Sumi was around eight years, one can see that the temporal signifier *today* has been used in an imprecise way to point to a notably long period of time which is presented as *the present/now*.¹⁸⁹ The presence of this temporal signifier functions together with representations of human security as being new to ascribe policy with a sense of urgency, novelty, necessity and positive difference from an imagined past.

It is notable that the presence of the trope of newness in Japan's human security texts is intertwined with representations of the concept's origin. In general, Japan has rarely presented an image of itself in which it figures as the point of origin for the notion of human security, although, to an extent inscriptions of the newness of human security create the impression of a Japan that is particularly forward thinking and sensitive to the security needs of both people and states. Indeed, Takemi adds to this visage in his presentation of a synopsis of Japan's human security policies and practices, invoking the ghost¹⁹⁰ of Obuchi Keizo to highlight the apparently long period of time that had passed since

187 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004.

188 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.

189 It is understood here that the assertion that eight years is a long time depends on one's point of view, and the nature of the observer. For states, eight years is merely a moment in comparison to what that period represents for individual human beings.

190 Obuchi had died two years earlier in 2000. “Obuchi, Keizo,” *The Columbia Encyclopedia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), Credo Reference, http://www.xreferplus.com.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/entry/columency/obuchi_keizo.

Obuchi had been “remarkably prescient” in formulating a conception of human security in which non-military issues figured as significant sources of threat.¹⁹¹ However, for the most part, Japan has tended to situate the genesis of human security thought vis-a-vis the United Nations Development Programme, as the following excerpts show:

The epoch-making 1994 UNDP Development Report discussed the concept of human security in depth, and identified seven main categories of human security.¹⁹²

Japan's understanding of human security is very similar to the comprehensive and inclusive concept originally advocated by UNDP in its 1994 human development report.¹⁹³

From December 1998, therefore, the term “human security,” which had first been used in the early 1990s by the United Nations Development Programme, officially and irrevocably became a part of the lexicon of the Government of Japan.¹⁹⁴

The 1994 “Human Development Report” by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was the first to mention human security publicly in the international community.¹⁹⁵

As well as pointing to the United Nations Development Programme as the source of human security thought, these passages also position Japan's approach as particularly close to it; thus ascribing Japan's concept of human security with a significance that is based on the apparent “universality of the [United Nations'] 185 members and its wide-ranging authority over not only political security issues but also issues related to development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, the environment, and social development in general”.¹⁹⁶

191 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.

192 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

193 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

194 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.

195 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.

196 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

Interestingly, a close reading reveals that every one of these fragments also expresses the United Nations Development Programme's role vis-a-vis human security in noticeably different ways, thus correspondingly compounding the legitimacy of Japan's human security policy from a number of related perspectives: as a body whose detailed discussion of the topic was seminal and started a new epoch, as having been the first to advocate human security, as having been the first to use the term "human security", and as having been the first to speak of human security in the international community. This image of Japan garnering legitimacy for its human security policies by representing the United Nations as the initiator of the human security movement is reminiscent of Hook et al.'s characterisation of Japanese diplomacy as being of a "quiet" type, in which it "obfuscates" its own power or interests by appearing merely on "the periphery" of diplomatic designs and initiatives and "allowing established institutions to provide a cloak of legitimacy".¹⁹⁷

However, despite positioning the United Nations Development Programme, rather than itself, at the beginning of the human security narrative in the excerpts above, Japan's drawing of legitimacy from the United Nations for its own policy objectives is destabilised by Fukuda's characterisation of Ogata Sadako¹⁹⁸ as "the mother of the very notion of human security".¹⁹⁹ As such, Fukuda countered the images above by suggesting that human security is an idea which has its origins in Japan. Interestingly, whilst the invocation of the United Nations Development Programme as the source of the human security concept is common in human security discourse in general,²⁰⁰ Acharya gives

197 Glen D. Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, 2nd ed. (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 80–81 and 447.

198 Ogata, an official of the Japanese government, has been closely associated with the Commission on Human Security and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, as well as having served as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Biography of Mrs. Sadako Ogata."

199 Fukuda, "Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on 'The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action'," January 26, 2008.

200 Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," 2001. See also Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States," 1999, 269.

some credence to Japan's claim to originality by arguing that, “unlike other security concepts of the post-cold war era, human security can claim a significant Asian pedigree”, although he does not go so far as to give credit specifically to Japan.²⁰¹ On the other hand, insofar as the idea involves a “permissive or pluralistic understanding of security as an objective of individuals and groups as well as of states”, it has also been represented as “characteristic, in general, of the period from the mid-seventeenth century to the French Revolution” in Europe;²⁰² an argument which is problematic for the suggestion that human security had its beginnings in Asia.

In concluding this third section, the preceding analysis and discussion has revealed a number of points regarding Japan's representation of human security in terms of its epistemology. Firstly, the presence of human security as a concept has been represented as the result of an evolution. Representing human security in this way not only associates the concept with rationalism and scientificity, but serves to take attention away from the concept as a result of contest, converging political interests, and pragmatic compromises. As such the concept appears in a guise which highlights its robust intellectual pedigree and natural right of being. Secondly, the genesis of the concept has been framed as a matter of a consensus in an imagined international community. This image works to create and impression of human security as a solid norm of international activity. However, the idea of human security as a norm of statecraft is problematic because it is in tension with a common pattern of representing it as a new concept, which works to highlight human security policy as something which is apt in the present, in distinction to the apparently inadequate approaches of the past. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that texts focus more on the newness of

201 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001, 459. Acharya seems to advocate human security as consistent with so-called Asian values by undertaking a rhetorical strategy which effaces the apparent differences between East and West that might hinder the concept's acceptance in Asia. However, this strategy relies on an overly facile and uncritical use of the adjective '*Asian*'.

202 Sarka Waisova, “Human Security-the Contemporary Paradigm?,” *Perspectives* 20 (2003): 58 Presumably this apparently “characteristic” state of affairs was observable in Europe, although the writer did not specify a geographical delineation.

the concept than on its status as a traditional activity of statecraft. All of these representations function together to legitimate the idea of human security and thus give credence to Japan's human security practices.

This chapter has examined three aspects of Japan's official representation of human security. Firstly, the texts were examined in regard to the question of who is to be the beneficiary of practices taken in the pursuit of human security. It was found that three types of beneficiaries were invoked: the human individual, the human at the group level, and the non-human being. Whilst it is feasible to conceive of policy practices which aim at realising the interests of these three discursive subjects concurrently, the texts examined did not clearly specify how to resolve potential conflicts of security interests between them. As a whole, Japan's human security discourse is unique because it does not clearly prioritise the human being, at either individual or group level, as the primary concern of policy practice. Instead, texts fluctuate between numerous policy beneficiaries including, but not limited to, the human individual. Aside from the difficulty such indeterminacy poses for determining just whose security interests should receive most attention, the most obvious problem with such a posture is that it subverts the main tenet of human security: that of focusing on the security of the individual rather than of the state. This does not mean that human security practices should subvert the security of the state, but that if they are to be legitimately associated with the idea of human security at more than just a surface level, they should at least definitely work towards human security as a goal rather than as a means to realising the security or interests of the state. However, at the same time one should acknowledge that this indeterminacy regarding the beneficiary of human security practice is not entirely inconsistent with some other tendencies which were observed in the discourse. The most obvious one is the conflation of state interests with that of individual ones; or, to put it another way, the lack of acknowledgement that an individual might not identify with the interests and objectives of the state. If the state takes it as an *a*

priori assumption that individual's interests are in line with national ones, then the conceptualisation of human security as a means to ends envisioned in terms of state interests no longer seems so counter-intuitive. However, this kind of position destabilises the idea of individuality – which Japan has clearly announced as making up the core of its human security concept – and forces one to consider the question of whether Japan's human security practices are indeed *human* security practices and not merely a form of comprehensive security or enlightened self-interest.

Secondly, analysis was concerned with the core parameters of the condition of human security, as enunciated by Japan. It was found that the majority of Japan's official texts on the topic of human security invoked a core set of elements – livelihood, life, and dignity – whose position as key conditions of human security was buttressed by a large number of supplemental concepts which spanned social, psychological, economic, and biological aspects of human experience. In positive terms, Japan's broad conceptualisation of human security should be welcomed because the discourse opens up a wide horizon of possibilities for ways in which human security can be assessed, measured and thus affected. As such, the discourse represents a step forward for human security on the theoretical side. However, lack of elucidation on how different elements of human security might affect each other, not to mention the unresolved tensions and contradictions that are present in Japan's human security texts, do not allow one to move beyond a consideration of possibilities towards determining how a set of human security practices should be assembled in specific contexts of human insecurity. In negative terms, the postulation of such a broad range of aspects of human security can serve to justify and legitimate a broad range of interventions for cynical state policies which aim merely to promote state interests only in the name of human security, whilst leaving the individual human being's security interests unfulfilled or, in the worst case, eroded.

Finally, the discussion focused on human security as a body of knowledge. Japan was presented as particularly suited to the pursuit of human security on account of its experiences and the apparent key role of Ogata Sadako in the development of human security. However, neither of these representations was unproblematic because texts also privileged theoretical forms of knowledge rather than personal experience of human insecurity and represented the origins of human security thinking outside of Japan. The most obvious problem with disregarding personal experience of human insecurity is that the practices which are derived become divorced from individuals' particular needs, or that the *human* element of human security practice is supplemented with a non-human *scientific* or purely *theoretical* approach which does not take into account people's intangible emotions, feelings, desires or needs and which leaves closed the possibility for human empathy. It was also found that particular conditions were presupposed for becoming knowledgeable about Japan's version of the human security concept. These conditions include knowledge of American English and resources which would allow one to access the sites at which this knowledge is disseminated. Whilst these conditions would seem to pose minor, if any, problems for states or non-state agents working in the name of human security, it leaves those posited as beneficiaries of human security in a compromised, weak position because of their inability to express their human security needs in Japan's specific human security lexicon, to play a role in determining the agenda or aim of human security practices, or to express resistance to practices which they deem to be ineffectual or to be against their own human security interests. Official texts were found to have framed the concept and resultant policy in reference to notions of international consensus, newness, tradition, rationality and scientificity, and smooth evolution. Whilst this kind of framing certainly works to present human security practices as natural and warranted, it can also have the effect of marginalising the alternative or dissenting views which are vital for the continued presence of a healthy and self-critical body of knowledge. Similarly to texts' framing of the parameters making up the concept of human security, it was found that these notions were mutually problematic and existed in relations of theoretical

tension which subverted texts' self-representation in terms of authority and expertise.

The next chapter examines the way in which Japan's human security texts have explained and rationalised the pursuit of human security.

Chapter III: The Grounding of the Human Security Imperative

The previous chapter was concerned with an analysis of Japan's human security discourse in terms of the representation of its meaning, its beneficiaries, and its status as a body of knowledge. It was found that human security is defined in a complex way which goes beyond considerations of safety and biological well-being, but that the discourse contains significant tension based on representational ambiguity and contradiction, as well as theoretical underdevelopment. This chapter examines Japan's representation of actions taken in the name of human security, in regard to the explicit and implicit reasons which are put forward to legitimate those actions.

The texts examined presented a vast array of reasons and rationales for why actions said to be in the name of human security should be undertaken. Those reasons which are given can be delineated into two general types; those which see human security as a means to an end beyond the immediate needs or interests of individual human beings, and those which focus on human security as an end in itself. By far the most commonly given reasons are of the former category. There is also a third kind of category which can be distinguished from the other two because it is not comprised of rational reasoning;¹ rather it is characterised by appeals to beliefs or convictions regarding the aptness of human security as a policy pursuit. As such, legitimation in the corpus of texts examined can be conceptualised along two axes; one defined according to the beneficiary of policy (i.e. human ↔ non-human), and the other being based on

¹ It is acknowledged that to speak of rational reasons is somewhat tautological, insofar as reason is rational by definition. However, in contemporary language use one can discern an ascription of unconscious motive to the idea of a reason; a common occurrence in popular psychological discourses in which reason is conflated with *cause*, such that the reason for behaviour is said to be something which is non-rational or unconscious, such as reflex or unacknowledged desire. Thus, the term rational reason has been used simply in order to delineate it from a reason – in popular usage – which is closer to a cause than a reason in the traditional sense of the word.

the extent to which legitimation was rooted in reason and rationality rather than in pre-modern or non-rational sensibilities. In general, a correlation can be observed in regard to these axes. Specifically, legitimation which appealed to the non-human beneficiary tended to include reason, rationality, and pragmatism; three forms of thinking associated with the idea of a conscious and rational subject. On the other hand, legitimation of policy which worked by pointing out benefits to the human subject, were more likely to be couched in language which brought to mind non-rational modes of thought that appealed to conviction, belief and feeling. What could be taken for a third mode of expression of legitimation can also be discerned, although it could be categorised as a point of contact or overlap between the two groups; that is, calls for human security based on the concept of need. This is a concept which has a firm place in social scientific study such as psychology or medicine, but it is also closely related to the antithesis of rationality and thought; i.e. passion and desire.

A brief note on the use of the word *reason* is necessary here for clarification. In this thesis it has been used in two ways; initially, to refer to a text which functions to legitimate or justify policy irrespective of the level, register, or mode at which it functions. Secondly, it has also been used to refer to a specific kind of discursive formation which can fulfil the legitimation function; namely, it has been used to point to a sort of epistemology which is formed around the idea of a thinking, conscious being who operates in rational terms that can incorporate things like pragmatism, utility, calculation, or control to various extents. For the purposes of this dissertation, *reason* can be distinguished from *non-reason*, in terms of the extent to which motivation for actions taken in the name of human security emphasise consciousness, logic, utility, knowledge or science, or whether they fall beyond the realm of thought through their status as conviction, belief, feeling or passion.

***I believe we should make the 21st century
a human-centred century***

Japan's human security discourse legitimates policy in a multifaceted way, invoking numerous frames in order to construct rational and reasonable imperatives for the pursuit of human security. A number of texts in the corpus examined are remarkable because of their invocation of non-rational, intangible reasons for the pursuit of human security. Such representations continued sporadically throughout the entire chronology of documents examined. For instance, Obuchi asserted that “the 21st century for Asia *should* be a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity”,² but without specifying exactly *why* this should be the case. Similarly, in situating the so called “human-centered approach” in relation to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, he asserted the aptness of human security as an imperative through the use of the auxiliary verb *must*:

We *must* deal with these difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of "Human Security," and that we *must* seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security.³

Whilst both *should* and *must* fulfil the same role as auxiliary verbs, albeit with differing levels of urgency, neither contain an implicit reason which would explain why actions should or must indeed be pursued. Obuchi framed the imperative in non-rational terms; namely the “deepest *belief* that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired”, and that he “*believe[d]* we should make the 21st century a human-centered century”.⁴ In other words, the pursuit of human security was not represented in terms of reason or rational argument which might focus on – *inter alia* – economic, ethical, or security benefits; rather it was done in reference to the idea that human security was apt. A

2 Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” (Hanoi, Vietnam, December 16, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html>, emphasis added.

3 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow” (presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html> emphasis added.

4 Ibid. emphasis added.

similar imperative to act can be found in Takasu's 2008 speech at the United Nations General Assembly, in which the pursuit of human security was explicitly presented as a matter of conviction rather than rational argument:

Human security is, in essence, *the belief* that a human being, irrespective of where he or she is born, is entitled to live a healthy, dignified, fulfilling life, and should be allowed to develop his or her ability to the maximum extent possible.⁵

Another example of a non-rational grounding of the reasoning behind human security can be found in a speech by Sumi, where he invokes a parable-like narrative in which a "heavenly father" looks after his "flock".⁶ As far the legitimation of human security policy is concerned, the shepherd's (i.e. state's) mandate is tacitly divine; the pursuit of human security (defined here in terms of the interests of a stray sheep and its belongingness to the polity) is implied as being the volition of God,⁷ since "it is not the will of the heavenly father that one of these [sheep] is lost".⁸

Sumi's speech is exceptional in that it is the only example in the corpus examined of the representation of human security policy in terms of a heavenly mandate. To speak in religious terms where the impetus for action is divine is to speak in an unproblematic way about undertaking human security, insofar as religious precepts based on the will of a God are – similarly to beliefs – beyond question and beyond the reasoning of man. Whilst Japan's legitimation of human security practices is generally undertaken in unproblematic ways which demonstrates little reflectivity regarding their appropriateness, Sumi's

5 Yukio Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security" (presented at the The General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, United Nations General Assembly, May 22, 2008), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2008/uno805-6.html> emphasis added.

6 Shigeki Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html.

7 For the emergence and development of pastoral power, which represents the relationship between God, the sovereign and the population in terms of shepherds and flocks, see Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

8 Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

implication of the divine is particularly notable because it implies a lack, if not rejection of, a critical attitude to the aptness of human security practice due to its grounding in the unquestionable will of God.

***There is an urgent need that the objectives of a
human security agenda are fulfilled***

The pursuit of human security is often presented as a need or imperative, although the content of these categories is usually left unfilled. The presence of need as a justification for human security in the “Asia Pacific context” was observed by Acharya, who explained its presence in terms of the “aftermath of the regional economic crisis”.⁹ As far as Japan's discourse on human security is concerned, there is a speech by Takasu which is exceptional because it provides a reason for why human security policy is apparently a *need* and a *must*:

At the same time, with the promotion of democracy and good governance throughout the world, and with instant global communication, governments have had to become more accountable to the needs of their people. Some human security concerns can no longer be kept hidden from critical global scrutiny. The performance of governments will be judged increasingly by the extent to which they seriously and effectively deal with human security concerns. These are some of the reasons why the 21st century *must* inevitably become a human-centered century.¹⁰

At the outset, a number of presuppositions regarding the reasoning behind the pursuit of human security are evident here. Firstly, that the state is positioned as working for the benefit of its people. This idea of government pursuing the interests of its polity is discussed again below, in regard to similar claims that Japan's human security policy is a matter of political leaders' commitments to an imagined public. Secondly, the construct of *the people* is invoked as a

9 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” *International Journal* 56 (2001): 448.

10 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, May 8, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html emphasis added.

distinct, identifiable and bounded group; as if it was distinguishable in kind from the state which is said to serve it. It is this notion of the people which is ascribed with having *needs*. Needs are similar to the beliefs which were discussed above because they are also non-rational phenomena. They are often associated with processes of life which would not be possible without their satisfaction, but distinguishable from desires or wants; these latter two ideas being superfluous regarding physiological needs, although they may also be non-rational or unconscious.

Though Takasu does not provide an explanation regarding why people themselves might need to have human security, he does assert that human security needs to be realised by the state. In other words, he is not speaking about people's need for human security, but rather – in the words of Newman – the state's need to pursue it because the “international legitimacy of [its] sovereignty rests not only on control of territory, but also upon fulfilling certain standards of human rights and welfare for citizens”.¹¹ From the way in which Takasu has expressed this idea of “conditional sovereignty”,¹² one is left with the impression that the necessity of pursuing human security is based on the self-interest of government in maintaining its position via positive assessments by other states, rather than being a response to the needs of people *per se*; as if it was more important *to be seen* to be promoting the interests of individuals, than actually promoting them for their own sake. Whilst it is somewhat perplexing to come across the representation of human security – an idea which ostensibly prioritises individual human interests, rather than those of the state – as a way by which to realise the needs of the state, one should keep in mind that by Japan's own account, human security practice is not – as was discussed in chapter two – exclusively focused on the human. Indeed, the use of the idea of human security as a way to pursue state objectives is not exclusive to Japan;

11 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 358.

12 *Ibid.*

Canada having “used the idea [...] to distinguish itself as a progressive middle power” at the United Nations Security Council, and Norway to strengthen its bid for a seat on there.¹³ As an aside, Takasu's exposition of this imperative is self-serving, in the sense that the underlying presupposition which is reinforced here unproblematically and without elucidation, is that it is the responsibility and role of the state to undertake human security policy; a position at odds with other expressions by Japan – taken up in chapter five – in which human security practices are expressed as involving non-state actors. Moreover, following McDonald, such facile presuppositions are problematic because this kind of reification of the state as the most legitimate provider of security is a problem which “Human Security sought in part to address”.¹⁴ In actual fact, Takasu's discussion of this role in terms of the apparent new level of transparency, accountability and democracy that is said to be pre-eminent in the context of human security – albeit with no indication as to when these levels are supposed to have risen and where – functions not as a reason for why states should undertake human security policy, but rather as a reason to propel them to *return to it* or raise their standards in its pursuit.

A somewhat more rational grounding for the pursuit of human security can be found in Sato's invocation of a 14th century description by the traveller Ibn Battuta of “a very high level of human security for children, women and men in the Mali Empire, where the rule of law, justice and mutual respect among people were the basis of prosperity and glory”.¹⁵ Of note in this instance, is the implication that human security can serve as a foundation for benefits measured

13 Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (1999): 266–267. In his assessment of Canada's apparent “use” of the concept of human security, Suhrke asserts that, indeed, “an interest-based interpretation [...] again seems persuasive. Ibid.

14 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” *Global Society* 16, no. 3 (2002): 280.

15 Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network” (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html.

according to the economic and political notions of prosperity and glory. The representation of human security policy in reference to prosperity is something which was present in the earliest human security texts examined. For instance, Obuchi framed policy in terms of his belief that “the 21st century for Asia should be a century of peace and *prosperity* built on human dignity”.¹⁶ However, the construction of the human security concept which Ibn Battuta is said to have described in the past, only partially corresponds to the way in which Japan has conceptualised it in the present. The point of convergence is in regard to *respect*, even though for Japan this figures as something which should be a part of the non-human attitude to the human, rather than as a property of human behaviour vis-a-vis each other. In other words, whilst Ibn Battuta was said to have spoken of mutual respect between people, in Japan's case the realisation of human security is premised on the state respecting individuals. For example, the realisation of human security is said to necessitate policy which involves “respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations”,¹⁷ that “each human being be fully respected as an individual”,¹⁸ and that “each human being [...] should be respected as a human person”.¹⁹ However, none of these prescriptions clearly states the perspective from which respect is to be measured nor who should be taking on a respectful attitude, and the texts do not specify how a situation in which people can be manipulated into respecting each other might be realised. What can be discerned then, is that despite dealing with significantly different notions of respect, the rhetorical strategy employed here is one of comparison, with the aim of promoting contemporary human security policy as a way to realise prosperity and glory. Moreover, in this particular instance there is no specification as to who would be the beneficiary of this glory or prosperity, although taking into consideration other expressions

16 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998 emphasis added.

17 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004.

18 Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html.

19 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

of prosperity in Japan's human security documents which situate the state or region as beneficiary, it is possible to conclude that in this instance prosperity and glory are also conceptualised from a non-individual, non-human point of view.

In order to justify the pursuit of human security as a need, in the following excerpt, Takemi constructs a logical connection between his characterisation of human security in reference to the Commission on Human Security, and then recent events associated with United States' foreign and security policy:

The working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human Security, which was established in June 2001, states, “the objective of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long term human fulfillment.” While this characterization is not definitive, it is, I believe, a useful starting point for discussion. *Indeed*, as the terrorist attacks in the United States and recent events in Afghanistan have demonstrated, there is an urgent *need* to ensure that the objectives of a human security agenda are fulfilled.²⁰

Legitimation of policy functions through the use of the logical sentence connector adverb *indeed*, to construct an image in which these events speak for themselves as proof of the necessity of human security policy. In other words, the impetus to pursue human security is represented as being warranted by the apparently obvious significance of “terrorist attacks in the United States”.²¹ This attempt at legitimisation comes across as rhetoric because there is no way in which the apparent logic can be seen in the structure of Takemi's statement. The events he has invoked are imprecise, particularly the ones said to be occurring in Afghanistan, and therefore there is no way to determine what the relationship between those events and human security might be. The ambiguity of the link is

20 Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in *Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow*, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2002), 42, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf emphasis added.

21 *Ibid.*

also confounded by the leap from speaking of the present lack of a *definitive* characterisation of the concept, towards an attempt at proving the necessity of policy. It is doubly difficult to see how the events which Takemi invoked could function to legitimate policy when by his own words, a definition is lacking.

In the following example, need for the pursuit of human security is constructed via the idea of consensus and the representation of human security policy as an existing, legitimate pursuit:

Recent international cooperation efforts in the area of health care, have been done to ensure the provision of adequate health care services to individuals who are considered socially vulnerable segments of the population such as poor people, women, and children. These efforts include, when necessary, ensuring the services are located in accessible locations. In this regard, I get a strong sense that the human security viewpoint really is *needed* after all.²²

Here, an impression of international consensus regarding the aptness of pursuing human security is implied through the use of the adjective *recent* to invoke a historical context for policy. By presenting certain international efforts as being recent, it is logically reasonable to assume that there have also been efforts which are *not* recent; i.e. events which happened earlier.²³ As such the pursuit of human security comes across as being an activity with pedigree and tradition, since it has apparently been happening longer than since just recently. Moreover these efforts are also signified as being both cooperative and international, thus contributing to the construction of an external source of legitimacy by implying the existence of numerous states, aside from Japan, acting in the interests of human security since sometime in the past. This implication of tradition and international norms is made despite a significant

22 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999 emphasis added.

23 As discussed in regard to the use of the *future* in legitimating human security policy, expressions of temporality in the discourse are problematic because no grounds are offered by which one might be able to clearly distinguish between the past, present, and future. Similarly the use of the term *recent* is problematic because the discourse does not indicate the temporal boundaries of what is *recent* and what is *not* recent.

measure of resistance to the pursuit of human security among states, on the grounds that it “provides a pretext for developing countries to meddle in the domestic affairs of the developing world”.²⁴ Cuba, for instance, has asserted at the United Nations General Assembly that, regarding human security, it “reject[s] attempts by some to impose and implement ambiguous concepts, which are not clearly defined, for that could turn them into easily manipulated instruments to justify any action and attempt against the sacred principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states”.²⁵ Nevertheless, to speak of *recent* efforts works to imply that not only is the pursuit of human security based on a precedent at the international level, but also that it is *still* legitimate, since it has apparently been occurring lately. As such, this example of policy legitimation is related to texts which invoke human security as a traditional and normal part of statecraft, as well as those which frame policy as a matter of consensus regarding the concept of human security. Moreover, that these efforts are said to be *recent*, works to legitimate human security further by presupposing a difference between earlier and current actions, thus implying a continuing development of human security policy.²⁶ As such, the excerpt functions to legitimise human security practices by bringing to mind existing norms of policy as a basis for action, rather than presenting them as totally new forms of foreign policy.

Another instance of representing actions to be taken in the name of human security as a matter of need was undertaken and reinforced by Takasu when he paraphrased an earlier speech by Obuchi:

Prime Minister Obuchi delivered a policy statement in Hanoi in which he stressed

24 Paul M. Evans, “Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning.,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 272.

25 Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz, “Statement by Ambassador Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz, Permanent Representative of Cuba, at the Thematic Discussion of the United Nations General Assembly on Human Security,” May 22, 2008, 1, <http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/humansecurity/statements.shtml>.

26 Insofar as development and change are similar to evolution, they function in a similar way. As discussed in the second chapter, the representation of the human security concept in terms of evolution works to ascribe policy with consensus and natural (scientific) processes.

the *need* to make the 21st century an age of peace and prosperity grounded on human dignity. In other words, we must make it a human-centered century.²⁷

Takasu represented this apparent need as being logically connected to the imperative of pursuing human security, by using the phrase *in other words*. As such, the argument was constructed along the lines that *since* human security is a *need*, it *must* be pursued. However, it is worth pointing out that such logic only applies if one establishes a responsibility for one's self in this regard. One *must* only intervene in the presence of a responsibility to do so; otherwise needs on their own do not constitute an *a priori* imperative to act.

***We must seek new strategies for economic development which
attach importance to human security***

The pursuit of human security is variously legitimated through reference to regional, economic, or human development. The presence of development as a trope in Japan's human security discourse was found in the earliest texts examined. For example, a 1998 speech by Obuchi at the "Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow" functions to associate human security with development through the assertion that, "the process of development is not primarily one of expanding the supply of goods and services but of enhancing the capabilities of people".²⁸ The enhancement of people's capabilities or capacities has been presented as a way in which to realise human security in a number of Japan's human security texts, such as in the following excerpt:

In order to ensure human security and create a new international order in the 21st century, the efforts of citizens, particularly NGOs, made on their own initiative, are indispensable. This will require that the capabilities of each individual be raised.²⁹

27 Takasu, "Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World," May 8, 2000 emphasis added.

28 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

29 Keizo Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century" (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html.

However, this juxtaposition of development and human security is ambiguous if not problematic. It implies an instrumental role for the latter in the realisation of the former, despite the presence of statements within the same speech in which Obuchi expresses a belief in the aptness of pursuing human security as an end in itself.³⁰ Ambiguity results because it is not clear whether development is presented as being synonymous with the pursuit of human security – as defined in terms of capability – or whether it is being implied that human security is a prerequisite for the successful realisation of development objectives.

Ambiguity is compounded when one examines Obuchi's further elucidation upon the relationship between human security and development:

An unavoidable fact is that Asia's remarkable economic development in recent years also created social strains. The current economic crisis has aggravated those strains, threatening the daily lives of many people. Taking this fact fully into consideration, I believe that we must deal with these difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of "Human Security," and that we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region.³¹

Indecisiveness, regarding the question of whether priority should be ascribed to human security or development, appears to have been resolved here in favour of latter. Because Obuchi advocates human security as merely a consideration in the search for new economic development strategies aimed at enhancing long term regional development, the impression is that whilst human security might be an important aspect in determining the best way to go about undertaking development, it is nonetheless in a subordinate position to development itself.

30 As discussed above, Obuchi framed the pursuit of human security in terms of his "deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired". See Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

31 Ibid.

Similarly to Obuchi,³² Takemi's postulation of development as a process which primarily involves the enhancement of people's capabilities was attributed to the work of economist and Commission on Human Security Co-Chair Amartya Sen, although neither document indicated the source of this idea via reference to Sen's work:

Professor Amartya Sen, the winner last year of the Nobel Prize in economics, observed that "the process of development is not primarily one of expanding the supply of goods and services but of enhancing the capabilities of people."³³

Takemi's framing of the pursuit of human security in terms of Sen's theory of development – as the enhancement of people's capabilities – thus worked to reinforce the connotation made by Obuchi that human security was at least in part a means to an end, rather than a goal in itself. However, there is a difference between Obuchi and Takemi's speeches in regard to how the invocation of Sen's theories on development work to legitimate actions taken in the name of human security. Obuchi spoke of the pursuit of human security in the context of dealing with problems ascribed to economic crisis in the Asian region, and his reference to Sen, regarding economically and developmentally driven enhancement of people's capabilities, was related to the economic and financial crisis of which he spoke. On the other hand, Takemi invoked Sen in the context of a wider discussion of human security, in which the notion of enhancing people's capabilities was presented as a blanket approach for dealing with various human security threats, rather than ones predominantly associated with the economic sphere or economic crisis.

Justification of policy practice through the representation of human security as a means to economic development came up again in an explicit form in a 2002 speech by Uetake Shigeo:

It is important to adopt an approach that places people at the center. The

³² Ibid.

³³ Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

foundation for nation-building is "human resource development." Human resource development is essential if a developing country is to assert ownership of its own development. Even when the time comes at some point in the future when a developing country no longer needs aid, it will still be true that people are a country's most valuable asset. We have a duty to strengthen and enhance human resources - so important for a country's economic and social development.³⁴

Uetake mixes terms which have been used in the context of human security elsewhere. For example, he seems to delineate *human security* from "an approach that puts people at the center", by claiming that such an approach is necessary and that "*at the same time*, the concept of human security [...] is growing".³⁵ This is despite the fact that at other times human security itself has been spoken of as a *human* or *people-centered* approach.³⁶ Indeed, he himself goes on to characterise *human security* as an approach "which calls for greater importance to be attached to each individual's viewpoint", thus adding more ambiguity to the text whilst taking away from its conceptual clarity.³⁷ Imprecise language notwithstanding, Uetake's speech creates an image in which whatever the merits of the realisation of the state of human security for people might be, its achievement is primarily motivated by its utility in the service of nation building and economic/social development, through the conceptualisation of the human individual as a resource. To speak of human beings as resources in state development functions to make the condition of human security an instrument in the realisation of non-human aims, and is reminiscent of legitimation which works through the ascription of human beings with *value*, as can be discerned in the assertion that "all measures aimed at human security are based on the premise that each individual human should be valued".³⁸ As such it is the apparent intrinsic value of people which serves as the reason for pursuit of

34 Shigeo Uetake, "Statement at the International Conference on Financing for Development" (presented at the International Conference on Financing for Development, Mexico, March 22, 2002), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/svm/uetake0203.html>.

35 Ibid. emphasis added.

36 For example Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 28, 2004.

37 Uetake, "Statement at the International Conference on Financing for Development," March 22, 2002.

38 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002, 45.

policy. However, as discussed in chapter two, the postulation of humanity in terms of value is problematic because none of the texts encountered specified the meaning of this value or how it might be measured.

As was also discussed in the previous chapter, one of the consistent characteristics of Japan's human security discourse is a vacillation between a number of different implied beneficiaries of policy. In the following example, there is a distinct sense in which the pursuit of human security comes across as praxis from which the state is to benefit, with people implicitly positioned as resources in the realisation of objectives conceptualised in reference to it:

The Japanese notion of human security is to complement traditional state security by being people-centred and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats.³⁹

Here the impetus for the pursuit of human security is expressed in terms of the relationship between the concepts of human security and state security; a relationship defined in terms of complementarity, where the former is to support the latter. By speaking of a complementary relationship directed towards state security, the pursuit of human security policy comes across as being constructed in terms of the objectives of state security, insofar as the idea of complementarity implies a hierarchical relationship in which the existence of the complementary element is defined according to its supporting role in the realisation of the agenda of the dominant element.⁴⁰ Whilst Sato's characterisation of the human security imperative includes the representation of people as the *centre* of policy, thus giving the appearance that the relationship

39 Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 28, 2004.

40 McDonald has identified a similar problem: that "If states supplement traditional security concerns with Human Security, there exists the potential for the mechanisms and priorities of security to remain fundamentally untouched [with] states [benefiting] from positive perceptions of Human Security without seeking fundamentally to institutionalise Human Security concerns". In Japan's case, the potential is particularly noticeable as – according to the excerpt above – human security comes across as being an instrument which prioritises state security. See: McDonald, "Human Security and the Construction of Security," 2002, 281.

between human security and state security is not strictly constructed in terms of a relationship between subordinate and superordinate elements, the significance of the *people-centered* trope is ambiguous because there is no specification as to the purpose of having people as a focus, and thus there is no way to make a conclusion as to the envisioned balance of interests between human and state security concerns. Whilst to speak of people as the centre of policy concern does contain a rhetorical prioritisation of their interests, in actual fact without a statement of purpose and in light of the characterisation of the relationship between state and human security in terms of complementarity, there is no *a priori* reason to exclude the possibility that to focus upon people reflects more of an emphasis on developing and exploiting them as resources, rather than placing their interests at the top of the policy agenda.

A similarly ambiguous expression of human security interests in relation to development is visible in the following excerpt, where policy is represented as promising both peace *and* development at regional and global levels:

Japan will steer its way towards becoming a country with high aspirations that does not hesitate to toil for the common interests of the region and the world, playing its role as a "Peace Fostering Nation" that contributes to peace and development in the world.⁴¹

As can be seen in this excerpt, Fukuda has formulated legitimation of the will to human security through the image of peace and development, conceptualised in terms of common interests at both the global and regional level. The legitimation of human security in terms of either global or regional interests is problematic as far as the pursuit of human security at the level of the individual is concerned, simply because it creates a conflict of interest between individual interests on the one hand, and group level interests on the other.

41 Yasuo Fukuda, "Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on 'The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action'" (Davos, Switzerland, January 26, 2008), <http://www.mofa.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html>.

The representation of human security in terms of “[the] concept that a small interest of one stray sheep will not be sacrificed in the name of state security but rather that one sheep's care is all sheep business”,⁴² reveals a communitarian element to the discourse, even though neither the nature of these cares nor the interests that might be served for individuals who consider themselves as having a stake in the security of others, is detailed in Japan's human security texts. Furthermore, this representation is related to the earlier point regarding the realisation of state security through actions signified in terms of human security, working towards the security of the state by re-emphasising its right to exist. As discussed above, the communitarian element can be found in relation to the presentation of human security as having a heavenly mandate; namely, that “it is not the will of the heavenly Father that one of these [sheep] is lost”.⁴³ As such, the idea that human security interests are a matter of mutual concern for individuals comes across as being a precondition for the maintenance of the integrity of the polity. In other words, the reason for undertaking policy implied here is a conservative idea regarding the necessity of sustaining a structure consisting of a polity and a body that governs it. Actions to be taken in the name of the human security of individuals, in this case expressed as their “interests”,⁴⁴ are legitimated through the idea that the integrity of the flock should be maintained by preventing or discouraging members' departure. But, insofar as those individual interests have to be weighed in accordance to the interests of the group, there is a limit regarding the extent to which the interests of the individual can be realised without impinging upon those of the group. A similar conservatism can be observed in the legitimation of human security practice according to the argument that in the wake of a lack of human security, “even the future of a society as a whole could be at risk”;⁴⁵ or in the assertion that the pursuit of human security is to be undertaken in the interests of future

42 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2007), 2.

generations.⁴⁶ In the latter case a conservative vision can be seen when one considers the discursive construction of future generations' concerns as being the same as those of current generations; that the concerns, worries, and agendas of future generations will remain unchanged in the future.⁴⁷ In the former case, to speak of the risks to the future of society associated with human insecurity, is to promote the continued existence of society in its current form, without allowing for the possibility that future generations might want change or that they may become accustomed to new forms of society by overcoming adversity.

Continuing with the theme of justification in Japan's human security discourse, Sumi also spoke about "small interests of a stray sheep [being] a core value and [deserving] to be given careful attention".⁴⁸ What is of note here is the invocation of *core* values, reminiscent of the idea of the vital *core* that was discussed in the second chapter on the meaning and parameters of human security. As discussed in that chapter and brought up again above, the idea of the pursuit of human security expressed in terms of its value is problematic simply because Japan's human security texts contain no elucidation as to the nature of that value in terms of political interests, or indeed in reference to anything at all. Aside from the idea of *intrinsic* value, value is a notion which exists in relationship to something else; it is a relative notion just as when speaking of size, largeness is conceptualised in relation to smallness.⁴⁹ To speak of value necessitates a consideration of the perspective from which it is constructed (i.e. *value for whom?*), and what can be exchanged for the interests

46 For example, Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998; Ryuzaburo Sato, "Statement at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations Commission on Population and Development" (presented at the The Fortieth Session of the United Nations Commission on Population and Development, United Nations, New York, April 10, 2007), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/uno704.html>.

47 Issues relating to the trope of *future generations* are taken up again in chapter four, which deals with the representation of threats to human security.

48 Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

49 "Value," *Dictionary.com*, accessed September 18, 2012, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/value?r=75&src=ref&ch=dic>.

of individuals in an economic system of production and exchange. Even though there is no specification as to how value might be measured – either in relative or absolute terms – essentially the argument which is implied through the use of this trope runs along the line that, human security should be pursued because individual human interests (i.e. a component part of human security), are intrinsically valuable.

The idea of value comes up not only in reference to people, but also in regard to the pursuit of human security in general. For instance, Takasu frames practice in reference to the notion of “added value [...] to address global challenges”, thus appealing to opportunism but without resolving questions about priority that are implied.⁵⁰ Specifically, the problem is that in advocating the pursuit of human security in terms of added value, there is a risk that those things which are ostensibly at the core of human security come to be compromised due to prioritisation of elements which were initially conceptualised as unplanned benefits. In other words the danger for the realisation of human security is that those things which are only of cursory and added value begin to figure as the primary drivers of action. As was discussed earlier, there is an antagonism in Japan's human security discourse regarding prioritisation of human security goals defined in the interests of humans, in distinction to goals defined in terms of non-humans like the international community, regions, or individual states. In his statement to the United Nations General Assembly, Takasu speaks of the added value that comes from the human security approach in reference to pursuits such as the Millennium Development Goals, which are also represented as being a matter of measurement at the level of the individual.⁵¹ The Millennium Development Goals and human security policy are related in regard to their determination, at least in part, according to the agendas and interests of the

50 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

51 United Nations Development Programme, “Millennium Development Goals | UNDP,” *Millennium Development Goals*, accessed September 17, 2012, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html>.

human individual rather than the state. However, the two are also significantly different. For example, in Japan's case human security is commonly said to be about the individual interests of *all* humans, albeit with a focus on the vulnerable. Alternatively, the Millenium Development Goals are focused upon a particular *subset* of people, identified by their citizenship of developing or under-developed states. Just as the legitimation of human security policy in reference to *both* human and non-human bodies comes with the risk of prioritising one over the other in the wake of unresolved conflicts of interest, the problem with justifying human security objectives in relation to any added value that may result from human security practice, is the potential for conflicts of interests between human security and the added-value policy objectives.

Similarly to examples discussed above in which human security practices were framed and defended in relation to development, in 2004 Sato Keitaro spoke of hope as being a constituent part of the notion of human security, situating it as a necessary component for the realisation of developmental goals:

I am confident that the glory of Tombouctou or Gao of ancient Empire of Mali will return to the banks of the Great River Niger, where the HOPE of the ordinary people will enhance the resilience of each and every individual, thus advancing forward socio-economic conditions for their life and helping to realize sustainable development.⁵²

Furthermore, in this case human security policy is also framed in normatively attractive terms: the advancement of socio-economic life conditions. However, the pursuit of human security is not only legitimated on its own terms, but again in regard to promises regarding development aims. However, this excerpt speaks of development objectives conceptualised at the level of the region – Africa – which corresponds to instances in which development was said to be in the interests of the Asian region,⁵³ rather than benefiting people or individuals.

52 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004.

53 That human security practices are represented in reference to various beneficiaries, including regions, was discussed in chapter two.

On the other hand, the following excerpt brings up a form of development conceptualised in reference to humans:

The concept of human security has been already put into practice. In these difficult times of crises and uncertainties, Japan believes human securities (*sic*) offer hope. Hope is a key for *the development of people* who are under severe conditions. This is a concept that a small interest of one stray sheep will not be sacrificed in the name of state security but rather that one sheep's care is all sheep business. Partnership, protection and empowerment are key words for human security and Japan hopes that this new security concept will be widely accepted to meet new challenges.⁵⁴

As in Sato's exposition above, Sumi incorporates hope into the definition of human security and localises it as a precondition for the development of people, rather than economies or regions. Whilst Sumi's human development refers to selective subsets of populations signified as those *under severe conditions*, it is also the case that human security policy promises development for *all* people, through the use of the all-inclusive signifier *mankind*:

The development and prosperity of mankind have been sustained with the accumulation of creative ambitions of people themselves. Once threatened their survival, livelihood and dignity, either individuals or group of people can hardly realize their potential and capabilities.⁵⁵

As discussed in the second chapter, Japan's human security texts situate a number of different discursive objects as beneficiaries of policy. This section has problematised the legitimation of human security policy in reference to development, by pointing out how development is conceptualised in reference to a number of non-human as well as human beneficiaries, and how human security policy comes across as a means for the realisation of development goals, rather than being primarily concerned with the achievement of human security.

54 Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

55 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 2.

In a similar manner as the legitimization of actions taken in the name of human security through signification in terms of prosperity or development, the idea of modernisation also appeared in the discourse, functioning to create an image of policy as natural and desirable, particularly though appeals to the economic and material benefits implied as stemming from the realisation of human security. Modernisation appeared explicitly only once in the corpus of texts examined, but it is symptomatic insofar as many of the goals to which human security policy is said to lead are also associated with modernity. These include the ideas of growth,⁵⁶ progress⁵⁷ and improvement,⁵⁸ inherent in things such as development and the construction of international order, the idea of humanism and the unproblematic inviolability of its corporeal boundaries, science as expressed through appeals to evolution, natural processes, and knowledge of “man” in – *inter alia* – the realm of the psyche, humanitarianism, egalitarianism, and the imposition of order on chaos:

Reading, writing, and arithmetic--the three R's--are the most fundamental skills

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- 56 For example Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Shinako Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “Human Security - Its role in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html; Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html; Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
- 57 For example Yoshihiro Mori, “Keynote Speech” (presented at the Palm 2000 (Second Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting), Miyazaki City, Japan, April 22, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2000/palm-summit/seika/keynote_mori.html; Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People,” May 18, 2007; Katsuya Okada, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, At the Open Debate of the United Nations Security Council on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” April 16, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/fm_state1004.html.
- 58 For example Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

that a person needs in order to enhance his or her capabilities and potential. In Japan, from long before the beginning of its *modernization* in the middle of the 19th century, it was not only the elite samurai class that could read; basic education covering the three R's was diffused throughout the country even among the ordinary people. It is said that from the beginning to the middle of the 19th century, there were more than ten thousand small schools for the common people. Japan's *modernization* was achieved based on this widespread diffusion of basic education.⁵⁹

Notably, Japan's own modernisation in the 19th century was presented as the model for this visage of human security policy as leading to change, newness, progress, and the rejection of an antiquated past.

***The 21st century for Asia should be a century of peace and
prosperity built on human dignity***

In a similar vein to the promise of modernisation, Obuchi framed the pursuit of human security in terms of working towards something that is yet to come and promising a change for the better in speaking of the “future outlook of Japan and East Asia”:⁶⁰

What kind of Asia should we build in the 21st century? I believe the 21st century for Asia should be "a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity". People should lead a creative life infused with individuality without their survival threatened and dignity violated. The state and the market must contribute to that end.⁶¹

To speak in terms of *the future* functions to ascribe policy and the agents of policy with a sense of vision and planning, thus working towards conjuring up a semblance of order and certainty. Moreover, in framing proposals as being in the interests of East Asia, which here is said to include Japan, the idea that

59 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.

60 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

61 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.

human security policy might be about the parochial interests of Japan is de-emphasised.

The following excerpt shows that the trope of the *future* does not function only to frame policy as a matter of shared interests and foresight:

In our times, humankind is under various kinds of threats. Environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for *future* generations.⁶²

To speak of policy in terms of a concern for *future generations* brings a filial, generational element to the discourse which appeals to the idea that parents have a responsibility for the well-being of their progeny. In this case, the category of parent is a metaphor for the role of government and politicians, whilst the polity and people are signified as children. In other words, the pursuit of human security is justified in terms of the prevention of problems for future generations to whom the metaphorical parent has a responsibility, similarly to the shepherd/flock metaphor discussed earlier. Such use of this trope can be contrasted with the idea of human security contributing to *a better tomorrow*:

I am confident that Human Security will give HOPE to ordinary people, and I would most humbly like to point out that HOPE is what gives us courage to work towards the realizations (*sic*) of a better tomorrow.⁶³

These two forms of legitimation that utilise the idea of a future which is distinguishable in some unspecified way from the present, differ in that their beneficiary is different. In the former case, it is primarily those people who are yet to be born, although the current generation can also be said to benefit insofar as they are gratified in knowing that their children's future is secure. In the latter case the equation is reversed, with focus being on the benefit of a better future for those currently living, although future generations will also

62 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

63 Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 28, 2004.

benefit, insofar as their lives are better than those of their parents due to the improved conditions in which they will live. Missing from these invocations of the future is an indication of the things which are to be better or how such improvements might be measured; considerations which could aid in determining when an intervention is necessary or justified. Also, one wonders whether future improvement is conceptualised between individuals or groups of people (e.g. populations or sub-populations such as *the vulnerable*), or whether comparison might be undertaken in a longitudinal manner in relation only to the particular, individual unit of interest.

The following excerpt demonstrates another variation in the functioning of the future trope to implicitly legitimate actions undertaken in the name of human security:

But it is extremely difficult for individuals to realize their potential and capabilities when their lives and livelihoods are threatened and their dignity is trampled. In such circumstances, the future of individuals, indeed the future of entire societies, is at stake. For people to achieve their own potential, societies must first enable them to live in dignity. This is the goal of human security.⁶⁴

Whilst in the previous example human security was said to presuppose the realisation of a better future, in this passage human security is said to be necessary for the *maintenance* of present conditions beyond the present and into the future. Furthermore, whilst it is the human-security-as-potential-and-capabilities of individuals which is presented as the object of concern, the object which is to *benefit in the future* is not the individual. Instead it is an object which is only in part made up of individuals or groups of people; i.e. society.

As discussed in the first analytical chapter, the texts examined vacillated

64 Tsuchiya, "Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 'Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community'," February 25, 2003.

between a number of discursive objects as beneficiaries of the objectives and promised benefits of actions taken in the name of human security. The discussion above shows that in a similar manner, talk of the future is embedded in a context which shifts in terms of the implied beneficiary. The individual, societies, generations, and ordinary people are all situated at the receiving end of policy actions.

Related to Takemi's ideas about building a new international order through the development of people's capabilities,⁶⁵ encountered earlier in this chapter, is his speech which represents the pursuit of human security in Africa as a prerequisite in "efforts [...] to build a global community toward the 21st century".⁶⁶ Besides the presence of a promise for an improved future, this passage also offers the same policy beneficiary as texts – discussed below – which promise a new international order: an imagined international community. However, there is a difference between the idea of a new order and a future community. Whilst the former construct creates an impression of orderliness and hierarchy, the latter one brings to mind harmony and shared interests. For Takemi, this community is conceptualised at the non-human level, since his talk of a global community was made in the context of Japan's apparent efforts to "engage *Africa* as a (*sic*) equal partner in the global community".⁶⁷ In other words, irrespective of what human security might mean for human beings, it is implied here that the condition is a means to an end; that of the African continent taking on the role of an equal partner in the global community. If it were otherwise – that the objectives of human security policy were an end in themselves – there would be no need to assert that the pursuit of human security in Africa was being done *in order to* engage Africa as an equal partner. Logically speaking, it would be enough to express the pursuit of human

65 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

66 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

67 *Ibid.* emphasis added.

security in Africa on its own terms by simply stating, for example, that human security *should* be pursued there, without adding that it is so as to have Africa join the global community. Nonetheless, in this instance one is informed that the realisation of human security, at least in Africa's case, serves as a precondition of joining the global community. As such, the impression created in this text is that the ultimate objective of policy is that of bringing the African continent into a system of international relations, rather than that of realising the human security of individual people.

The representation and justification of human security policy as a way towards building a new international order or global community relies on the imagery of harmony and single-mindedness between various international actors. The following example similarly rests on the assumption of like-minded consensus in the international community. Specifically, it constructs Japan's participation in international politics, in particular the pursuit of human security, vis-a-vis an apparent expectation by the international community that it do so:

Japan is expected to play an ever increasing role in the global community as international society progresses towards the 21st century and the building of a new international order. In assuming this role, Japanese diplomacy will strive towards a fundamental objective of securing the confidence of neighbouring and other countries. It is vital for Japan to express our ideas in a clear manner and to undertake the implementation of concrete policies which are founded on the basis of these ideas. One such idea that we can cultivate is the concept of "Human Security."⁶⁸

The text's unproblematic invocation of a monolithic international community which is presented as being in consensus regarding a larger role for Japan, functions to legitimate the quest for human security as *international* policy, whilst downplaying the possibility that there might be a multitude of positions held by states regarding Japan's role in international politics or the desirability of a more assertive or influential Japan. The construct of an international

68 Ibid.

community is present throughout the body of Japan's human security discourse and its usage in this example is consistent with the trend of using it to frame Japan's actions as being in line with some implied, though unspecified norms of international politics and diplomacy. Notably, there is a conspicuous tension implied in expressing an international expectation for a larger Japanese role, whilst at the same time representing policy as being in part about building trust; namely that the claim of an expectation for a larger Japanese role presupposes a measure of trust and confidence. In other words, to assert that policy is about building confidence actually works to undermine the claim that a larger role for Japan is widely supported.

The following excerpt shows another instance of the representation of human security policy in terms of the ideas of creating *a new order* or *international system*:

Indeed, it is my view that the further development of this idea of "human security" will lead to the rethinking of the international system itself, going beyond just responding to situations as they arise. Under the existing international order, the state has been the basic constituent component, and within this framework, international peace and stability as well as economic prosperity have been pursued, with the advancement of the national interest as the key motivating factor. However, in coping with these many new problems, it has become apparent that this kind of framework is no longer a panacea. That is to say, non-state players--for example, international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, and so on --are beginning to play a much greater role in every aspect of efforts to solve these problems--from information gathering and the enlightening of public opinion to the mobilization of resources and activities in the field. For example, I believe everyone is well aware of the tremendous role that the UNHCR, in collaboration with NGOs, is playing in providing assistance to the Kosovar refugees.⁶⁹

The passage above – conspicuously omitting to indicate who exactly is to benefit most from the new order promised by human security practices – is notable for

69 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

two reasons. In the first instance, the new international system invoked by Takemi is characterised in terms of *going beyond just responding to situations as they arise*. This expression is consistent with the presentation of human security practice in terms of prediction, control and prevention of undesired occurrences or phenomena, as was indicated above. However, characterisation of policy vis-a-vis a new order says little about whose interests that order will prioritise, conspicuously omitting to reveal the perspective from which order is to be conceptualised. Secondly, Takemi shifts from characterising the new order as a matter of new norms of action (i.e. preventative activities), to hint at the possibility that state actors cannot deal with certain, so-called *new* problems without the assistance of non-state actors. In other words in the second instance the new order is characterised not in terms of norms of behaviour, but in regard to the question of legitimacy or right of being and participation in international affairs. It is notable that at the same time as Takemi seems to support the idea that non-state actors should be allowed on to the world stage, he implies that the resolution of problems towards which non-state actors are also working, are to be determined and defined by states. It is as if he were allowing non-state actors a place on the stage, but leaving the tasks of writing the script and directing the actors exclusively to states. As such, this new order of which Takemi speaks creates the impression that there is to be an increase in the number of participants involved in the realisation of an agenda determined prior to the arrival of those new participants; in short, working in the interests of state derived goals.

The idea of a new order is also used to promote human security policy specifically in relation to a human beneficiary, such as when Takemi asserts that “efforts [...] from the perspective of human security [...] offer a vision for a new order of existence for *humankind*”, which “humankind is seeking” itself.⁷⁰ As such, the pursuit of human security comes across as a response to the desires of

70 Ibid.

all humans; as, indeed, a form of “foreign policy that moves hand-in-hand with the people”.⁷¹ The invocation of the need for a new order, due to the apparent desires of humankind, is notable because this form of argument is an extension of typical acts of legitimation in which political actors claim to be working in the name of *the people*. This strategy is often heard in the sphere of domestic politics, where *the people* is for the most part taken to mean *citizens*, or at least those within the sovereignty of the state in which such slogans are used. With the claim that policy is being undertaken for *humankind*, legitimation of human security practice is extended to function beyond the national limits of the meaning of *the people*; limits established according to sovereignty and citizenship, and the oft invoked demarcation within international relations discourse between the domestic and international realms.⁷² A similar example in which the pursuit of human security is legitimated in reference to the nebulous notion of *the people* can be observed in the following example:

In the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005, our political leaders committed themselves "to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly." By meeting here today, we are honoring our commitment and availing ourselves of an important opportunity to initiate that discussion.⁷³

Whilst in this excerpt a public is not explicitly invoked, it is implicit in Takasu's assertion that the pursuit of human security is a result of the commitment of political leaders.

The idea of a *new global order* appears in different guises in two speeches delivered by then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Takemi Keizo in 1999. In the following excerpt, the *new global order* does not figure so much as an objective which is to be realised through the pursuit of human security policy, as

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (January 1991): 67–85; Steve Smith, “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (2004): 499–515.

⁷³ Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

much as it seems equivalent to at least a partial definition of human security; that of human dignity:

Now, as we approach the turn of century, we are struggling through a whirlwind of fundamental change. That change is reflected in the substantial transformation which the international society is experiencing. In the midst of such changes, humankind is seeking, from an array of positions and perspectives, a new global order in which human dignity is protected. Out of this search there is emerging the profile of such an order. In Japan, the Obuchi Government is cultivating the concept of "human security" as a new element in its foreign policy with a view to enhancing this new international order.⁷⁴

Insofar as human dignity is a defining characteristic of Japan's notion of human security, the pursuit of a new global order is not so much the motivation enacting human security practices, as much as it equates with a partial condition of human security. However, the following excerpt implies a different relationship between human security and a new global order:

Japan is expected to play an ever increasing role in the global community as international society progresses towards the 21st century and the building of a new international order. In assuming this role, Japanese diplomacy will strive towards a fundamental objective of securing the confidence of neighbouring and other countries. It is vital for Japan to express our ideas in a clear manner and to undertake the implementation of concrete policies which are founded on the basis of these ideas. One such idea that we can cultivate is the concept of "Human Security."⁷⁵

The difference in the way that *a new global order* is treated in these two examples hinges on a distinction between human security as a means, and human security as an end. In the second excerpt from June 1999, human security policy is associated with obtaining the confidence of other countries so as to facilitate a larger role for Japan in the project of building a new international order. On the other hand, in the first excerpt from September 1999

74 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

75 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

human security makes up an element of the *new global order*, and the actual legitimation of the pursuit of security is not confidence building but *humankind's* apparent search for this new order and Japan's response to the wishes of *all* humans.

Similar to the rationalisation of policy through a vision of a new and better order or future, is the idea that the pursuit of human security will lead to a *new era*. As discussed earlier, for example in reference to the rationalisation of human security according to the accumulation of wisdom and freedom, Japan's human security discourse contains numerous examples of the use of temporal signifiers which are problematic because of a lack of indication as to when changes from the past, the present or the future are to have happened or are to occur. The discussion above, regarding the accumulation of wisdom in the interests of all people, was characterised by the presence of a monolithic and imprecise notion of history. In a similar manner, Takemi's assertion that "it is the actions of free-thinking individuals that open the door to *a new era*",⁷⁶ invokes the idea of a future which is better than the present, albeit without specifying when this new era is supposed to begin, or what its characteristics are.

In the following excerpt one can discern an indirect but imprecise declaration of the benefits of pursuing human security defined in relation to freedom, which is part of a legitimation repertoire that highlights the importance of human security for the future:

I would like to now stress the importance of "Human Freedom." Human beings inevitably possess a rich potential to live creative and meaningful lives. The wisdom of human beings comes from this potential. This wisdom can only be realized if human beings are provided the freedom to live their lives in a manner where they can assume their own responsibilities. This necessitates that each human being be

76 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999 emphasis added.

fully respected as an individual. In this regard, the Government of Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, has elected to make human security one of the essential principles for the conduct of Japanese foreign policy, with the intention of making the 21st century a truly "human-centred" century.⁷⁷

Namely, it is said that by making sure that people are able to assume their own responsibilities, they will be able to develop wisdom. That is to say, the generation of wisdom depends on two factors; firstly, a *rich potential to live creative and meaningful lives* and secondly the freedom to live life in a way in which one is able to assume one's own responsibilities. The second factor is intuitively straightforward to understand because according to Takemi it is a matter of fact that in the absence of this particular freedom, wisdom cannot be generated. However, the first factor is somewhat ambiguous as the text does not specify whether it is enough just to be endowed with the *potential* to lead a creative and meaningful life, or whether this potential actually needs to be fulfilled. Furthermore, it is the case that a life led in congruence with a state of human security is presented as the basis for the continuation of both the "development and prosperity of mankind", as well as "the future of society".⁷⁸ In other words, the justification for human security policy is expressed in terms of its necessary role in the development of human wisdom, which is itself a precondition of benefits measured in terms of humans at the group level, as well in regard to society. This legitimization trope is a theoretical elucidation on justification offered in relation to economic prosperity and a better future, both of which function by making human security appear as beneficial not only to the human individual, but to all people, as well as non-human entities such as states.

With the assumption of one's own responsibilities as a prerequisite, wisdom is said to come from humans' potential to live creatively and in a meaningful way,

77 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

78 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 2.

but it is not clear how anything can spring from the *potential* for action except for the action, rather than from the *action* itself. Potential is an unfulfilled state related to the notion of probability; something may happen, but with the caveat that even in the apparent absence of factors which might prevent the realisation of the event, there is no guarantee that it will in fact manifest itself. Similarly as with the case of *threat*, potential refers to a state prior to action or something happening; a possibility or theoretical space, rather than assurance. It is not easy to marry the idea of wisdom as a form of knowledge based on personal experience, with the notion that it can also come not from action, but from an unfulfilled freedom to take action.

In another invocation of the wisdom/freedom/potential equation as a vehicle for the legitimization of policy, Takemi presents human security as a timeless concept applicable to all contexts and societies and one which makes up a vital condition for the entire history of humanity:

Human beings have encountered difficulties of every kind throughout history, but through their wisdom they have been able to overcome those difficulties. I believe that the source of that wisdom is the freedom of individual human beings to make choices and assume responsibility for their actions, and their abundant potential to live creative and meaningful lives.⁷⁹

In this instance, legitimization functions through an equivocal reference to a construction of history which is both monolithic and imprecise. It ascribes humans' apparent historical ability to overcome difficulty as a function of a two step equation, in which having security leads to the freedom to take responsibility for one's self, thus leading to the accumulation of a kind of wisdom that permits overcoming all sorts of difficulties. Takemi's statement is notable for the level of generality which underlies the argument. The history which he invokes appears homogeneous and inexact, since there is no indication as to exactly *whose* history he has in mind, what the object of that history might

79 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

be, or what time frame is under consideration. If it is the case that in speaking of history a narrative of overall, all inclusive human existence was being put forward, then the so-called difficulties that *all* humans throughout *all* of time have experienced could only be conceptualised in such a broad way that no theoretically pertinent conclusions could be drawn, other than the recitation of truisms regarding the difficulties experienced by all people throughout all of human existence. Indeed, it seems that this is exactly what Takemi has done; and whilst in principle it is generally valid to assert that humans have historically encountered all sorts of difficulties, to do so says nothing about what those difficulties might have been, whether they are comparable across people or contexts, what the ramifications of *not* overcoming them might be or what actions are necessary or superfluous in dealing with specific issues. The representation of policy in such general terms can be useful as a way of persuading audiences about the positive attributes of human security as an idea or policy objective, but it offers little analytical or pragmatic value for understanding human (in)security or determining appropriate responses to it.

A form of legitimation which is similar to the invocation of wisdom – insofar as it refers to a property or attribute of people – can be discerned vis-a-vis the idea of fulfilment:

Human security aims to protect people from critical and pervasive threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity, *and thus* to enhance human fulfillment.⁸⁰

Here legitimation functions in relation to the human as a beneficiary, rather than the non-human. Importantly, the meaning of fulfilment is left undefined, except for the implication that there are a number of forms of fulfilment which can be distinguished in temporal terms:

The working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human Security, which was established in June 2001, states, “the objective of human

80 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2 emphasis added.

security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with *long-term human fulfillment*.”⁸¹

In other words, the kind of fulfilment to be pursued with reference to human security can be identified by its status as *long-term* fulfilment; which is presumably different from fulfilment conceptualised in other temporal terms, though in the texts examined there is no evidence of conceptualisation of either the units of measurement, or criteria for distinguishing between them. Fulfilment takes two different positions in regard to human security: in the first excerpt above, human security has a causal relationship with it, since the realisation of the former – through the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats – promises to “enhance” the latter.⁸² On the other hand, the second excerpt above implies a different relationship between fulfilment and human security, because measures aimed at realising human security are defined only in terms of a lack of a negative correlation; but without the invocation of a positive one. In speaking of “consistency”⁸³ between human security and human fulfilment, the relationship comes across not as a causal type, but as one of congruence; where the two states are to exist side by side but without necessarily influencing each other.⁸⁴

This notion is to be defined based on a common understanding

As mentioned earlier, human security policy has been represented as something which is *already* being pursued legitimately, thus revealing another instance of the situation of policy vis-a-vis temporal markers and norms of international

81 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42 emphasis added.

82 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.

83 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.

84 Similar examples of the representation of human security in this way can be seen in Yukio Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security” (presented at the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bangkok, Thailand, June 1, 2006), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0606.html; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

behaviour. Consider the following excerpt:

A large number of NGOs, some of them representing Japan's younger generation, are *currently taking action* on a number of fronts. This includes assistance for the refugees from Kosovo as well as other humanitarian and development-related causes, all in an effort to pass along the task of providing assistance down to the individuals who are (*sic*) truly needs it, and propelled by the initiative of individuals. The sort of finely detailed activities required from the standpoint of human security would be impossible without the involvement of such NGOs. I am convinced that it will be utterly essential to make full use of the knowledge and powers of NGOs in order to pave the way for tomorrow's world.⁸⁵

Human security is said to be an existing pursuit of both *many* non-governmental organisations – although the number is left unspecified – as well as the youth of Japan. As such this excerpt is an example of the representation of human security in a way which functions to build up its legitimacy through an appeal to consensus between various non-state actors, with the implication of an established and unproblematic level of legitimacy of human security practice. The argument is simple and runs along the lines that, *it must be a good thing, considering how many people are already doing it*. A reference to youth is also included, which functions to suggest that human security practice is something which is wanted not just by elder generations or government, but by young people; giving the appearance of a wide base of popular support. As such youth is ascribed with the role of a barometer or measure of what is appropriate for the actions of government. At the same time one can also see another example of a general tendency for Japan's human security discourse to ascribe importance to the actions of non-state actors by highlighting their initiative or participation, whilst also implying that their role is limited to the implementation of concepts and agendas determined exogenously to them. This can be discerned if one considers how the realisation of human security is positioned as being “impossible” without the participation of non-governmental organisations, that are concurrently conceptualised

85 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’.”

merely as objects whose knowledge and powers it is “essential to make full use of”.⁸⁶ Additionally, whilst some texts build up consensus in regard to the pursuit of human security by arguing – *inter alia* – that “the concept of human security has continued to develop and grow in importance within Japan and among the countries of the world”,⁸⁷ thus using the idea of an international community of *states* as a reference, in this example consensus is constructed vis-a-vis the activities of non-governmental organisations; functioning to disassociate policy from charges of state parochialism by expanding the visage of agreement about the aptness of human security efforts to a larger group of international relations actors.

Whilst outlining the meaning of human security and Japan's credentials for pursuing it, Takasu asserted that Japan is “confident, moreover, that this is the direction in which the world will be heading in the 21st century”.⁸⁸ This statement also functions to add legitimacy to the pursuit of human security in reference to international norms and consensus in an imagined international community, and it also creates an image of a forward oriented, social scientific Japan able to predict the future. Whilst the statement does not explicitly provide a rationale or reason for the pursuit of human security, it does so implicitly in line with the above mentioned trope regarding consensus; namely, that if the whole world thinks human security is a good idea, then it must be legitimate. Indeed, this form of argumentation` was continued in reference not just to *the world*, but also to a particular agent: the United Nations.⁸⁹ The following statement posits the pursuit of human security as based upon a United

86 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

87 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.

88 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

89 Similarly, the derivation of legitimacy for human security practice through an “*apparent* consensus it appears to have amongst the states of the world” was noted by Ngoma in relation to the discourse of the United Nations General Assembly. See: Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In Southern Africa,” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 2 (2006): para. 9 emphasis added.

Nations mandate:

We are gratified that the Secretary-General of the United Nations takes a similarly broad view, as described in his recent Report for the Millennium Summit. Although he does not specifically use the term human security, the Secretary-General accords equal priority to measures to achieve freedom from want and those to achieve freedom from fear. He declares that we must put people at the center of everything we do. As he stated, "No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to make their lives better."⁹⁰

This association of Japan's policy with an apparent acknowledgement of its legitimacy by the United Nations Secretary General, although ironically, "he does not specifically use the term human security", works to urge on policy practices by signifying them as a "noble calling" and "great responsibility".⁹¹ As such, the responsibility is underlined through the figurative, rather than literal words of the United Nations. To speak of policy as a *calling* brings with it a sense that it is something which *must* be done, almost irrespective of the desires of the actor; bringing to mind the idea of martyrdom and self-sacrifice in the pursuit of goals larger or more important than the individual interests of the self. The legitimation evident here is similar to expressions of the pursuit of human security as a belief, need, or want; in the sense that these representational drivers of human security action are beyond rational thought and argument, appealing instead to emotion, spiritual conviction or unconscious desire, rather than opportunity or rational calculation.

Takasu adds impetus to the pursuit of human security as a normal and unquestionable activity in the *international* realm,⁹² by ascribing an

90 Takasu, "Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World," May 8, 2000.

91 Ibid.

92 Human security discourses' transference of human security issues "from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international political agenda" has been pointed out by Duffield. See: Mark Duffield, "Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror," in *New Interfaces Between Security and Development* (presented at the 11th General Conference of the EADI, Bonn, 2005), 1.

anthropomorphic sense of responsibility to the state and asserting the presence of a change in the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War; justifying practices in the name of people rather than non-human beneficiaries such as the state or the international community:

Changes in the nature of conflicts -- from inter-state to intra-state conflict -- in the post-cold war era and break down of government authority have seriously threatened human security in many parts of the world. When a conflict breaks out in a country where no single government authority is in place, it is meaningless to appeal to the sovereign state's sense of responsibility to protect the lives and dignity of its people.⁹³

Whilst the idea of a change in the nature of conflicts since the end of the Cold War is a common theme in human security discourse in general, it is questionable both on quantitative and qualitative grounds. For instance, in quantitative terms, Duffield and Waddell assert that “[having emerged] at the same time as the idea of human security, this ‘changing nature of conflict’⁹⁴ refrain has since become an established truth monotonously recycled in policy documents, academic works and the media [even though] it is a matter of statistical record that during the Cold War the majority of all conflicts were internal”.⁹⁵ Qualitatively speaking, the changing-nature-of-conflict argument does not address the issue of why a relative increase in civil wars should automatically warrant the pursuit of human security beyond one's own sovereign borders. The argument which Takasu puts forward, is that this apparent change in the nature of conflicts results in “a break down of government authority”, and it is for this reason that “the level of attention and high priority accorded to human security internationally these days” should be increased.⁹⁶ As such, the argument presupposes a certain *esprit de corps*

93 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

94 For example: Mary Kaldor, “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror1,” *International Politics* 42, no. 4 (December 2005): 491–498.

95 Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, *Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage* (University of Lancaster, 2004), 13.

96 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

between states; according to which the inability of a government to carry out its duties is supplemented on its behalf by other agents. Human security is constructed as being based on a measure of trust between states that are not exclusively self-interested; posing a problem for realist and neo-realist traditions of international relations which posit that states are either aggressively predisposed to each other or are in relations of mutual distrust and insecurity.⁹⁷ A similar presupposition is made by Tsuchiya, who speaks of situations in which “individuals cannot be protected solely by application of the concept of state security”, because of the inability of “state functions [to] operate reliably under major transformation of political and economic systems [and] economic stagnation [with] social upheaval”, such as those which occurred at “the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union”.⁹⁸ Such assertions of an understanding between states, are themselves based on the idea that international relations are at least partially characterised by the presence of consensus on how states should handle their affairs and what those affairs are. On the one hand, the suggestion of such an international sense of spirit is consistent with common expressions within Japan's human security texts, which appeal to an imagery of international *community*. Nonetheless Takasu's argument is circular in the sense that by *a priori* defining the pursuit of human security as a normal activity of sound government, the idea of states taking on other states' responsibilities in the case of internal conflict appears to be unproblematic and facile. However, a warrant for why increased internal war or conflict should result in more efforts at realising human security, is not provided. In other words, one is not told just *why* the inability of a government to keep authority in the wake of civil war should result in any more human insecurity than in the case of inter-state/international war. Whilst civil war might result in a decrease in human security due to a government being preoccupied with challenges to its hegemony or position, it is plausible that a

97 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Seventh (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).

98 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’.”

similar level of insecurity might arise in cases where said government diverts resources to inter-state war efforts at the expense of domestic human security practices.

Takasu's representation of the imperative to pursue human security was once more couched in relation to the notions of international norms and consensus, when he spoke of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document as having “affirmed the importance of relevance of human security and [that member states] have agreed to discuss further and define the notion of human security in the UN”.⁹⁹ As discussed in chapter two, whilst on numerous occasions Japan has represented itself as a pioneer regarding the pursuit of human security, there has been some ambiguity regarding this point, particularly in regard to the apparent genesis of the idea of human security. Nonetheless, for the most part the majority of Japan's human security texts highlight its role, commitment and importance regarding the idea. For instance, in the following example Takasu reproduces the image of Japan as a leader and facilitator in the realm of human security; moreover this role is presented as an established fact and common knowledge:

As far as I am aware, Japan is the only country that has appointed a full-fledged Ambassador in charge of Human Security. This is another testimony to Japan's strong commitment to promote human security, which is widely known in the world: Japan has taken and is taking many initiatives to promote human security.¹⁰⁰

As it constructs an image of Japan as being relatively autonomous and forward thinking in regard to the pursuit of human security, Takasu's talk of international affirmation¹⁰¹ of the relevance of human security functions less as a reason for beginning to pursue human security, as much as a reason for *continuing* to pursue it more vigorously; thus presupposing the prior existence

99 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

of human security norms. Considering that his speech, entitled “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security”, was presented in the context of a forum which represents itself as already committed to the pursuit of human security, such a conclusion seems logical, as justifying the pursuit of human security to a diplomatic forum which defines its activities in terms of human security – as the Human Security Network does¹⁰² – would have been, speaking figuratively, a case of preaching to the converted. At the same time as implying that human security is *already* a legitimate pursuit – at least for the Human Security Network - the invocation of the United Nations, as a marker of international consensus and legitimacy for the pursuit of human security, works to legitimate human security praxis for *all* states.¹⁰³ This, in turn, makes the proposal for the establishment of an alternative forum, for the “many countries that are interested in some aspects of human security but do not necessarily wish to become members of the HSN”, come across as a fairly facile and matter-of-fact undertaking. Notably, this particular example of legitimating human security activity through the invocation of the United Nations as a marker of international orthodoxy – undertaken in 2006 – appears as an example or pro-active construction of discursive reality by Japan, if one considers that only two years earlier, Timothy had argued that “various efforts have been made to establish a human-security discourse but it has not yet been aggressively promoted by the UN nor widely embraced by the international community.”¹⁰⁴

The following excerpt is notable because it brings to mind the rationalisation of actions taken in the name of human security in a way which is similar to their legitimation in relation to international norms and consensus which was

102 The Human Security Network has “the common goal of identifying concrete areas for collective action in the area of human security”; “Human Security Network,” *The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa*, accessed March 19, 2012, <http://www.emb-norway.ca/Embassy-and-Consulates/norwaycanada/Initiatives1/humansecurity/>.

103 Japan is not a member of the Human Security Network, and thus cannot appeal to its legitimacy in the pursuit of Japanese human security objectives.

104 Kristen Timothy, “Human Security Discourse at the United Nations,” *Peace Review* 16, no. 1 (2004): 19.

discussed above:

On August 17th [1999], a powerful earthquake inflicted serious damage on Turkey. The number of casualties has reached more than 39,000 so far. In response, the Government of Japan promptly sent a rescue and medical crew of the Japan Disaster Relief Team as well as a team of experts for rehabilitation of life-lines, and decided to extend emergency and humanitarian aid of approximately three million dollars, composed of funds and materials such as medicines, tents, blankets, generators, and carpenters kits [...] In so doing, Japan *recalls with appreciation* the assistance it received from the United States and other countries at the time of the earthquake in the Kobe area a few years ago.¹⁰⁵

The contextualisation of Japan's human security practices in reference to *appreciation* of similar assistance that it had previously received from other states creates the impression that the behaviour of states can in part be attributed to anthropomorphic emotions that are also beyond those usually attributed by theories of international relations which have emerged from the realist tradition and emphasise insecurity complexes or aggression.¹⁰⁶ In other words, the impression created is one in which Japan's actions are the result of a human-like reciprocation which is a *normal* aspect of international relations practice and the relations between states.

Another form of implied rationalisation for policy which is related to that of international norms, is the idea that the pursuit and realisation of human security is a matter of responsibility:

I firmly believe that it is crucial for Japan to help people in all countries and regions, regardless of differences in basic conditions in social, economic, technical, health, and hygiene aspects, to elevate their capabilities and realize their full potential. It is therefore incumbent on Japan to fulfill its obligations to the international community in helping all people to live free from want, with greater peace of mind, greater stability, and greater prosperity. *As a responsible member of the international community*, Japan must start to give serious thought to how to

105 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

106 Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*.

respond to the challenges posed by human security issues. It accordingly follows that in establishing a firm future oriented concept for Japan's peace diplomacy in the 21st century, human security is of vital significance.¹⁰⁷

In this excerpt, obligation is said to be incumbent on Japan in particular, rather than on states in general, and it is to be manifested not in relation to human individuals themselves, but in regard to the international community. The actual reason as to why Japan should be obliged in this way more than other countries is left undisclosed in this speech. At the same time as obligation and responsibility towards the international community are presented as reasons for the pursuit of human security, it is also stated that human security is a condition for the realisation of Japan's peace diplomacy. As such, here human security policy is expressed as something which is to constitute the realisation of state objectives in international relations. What is also of interest in the excerpt above is the use of the connector *therefore*, to situate the preceding paragraph, in which the reason for pursuing human security is expressed in terms of *belief*, as a warrant for the assertion that Japan has the obligation and responsibility to pursue human security. In other words, the argument appears to be that, *because* Japan believes it should help people to realise their potential and elevate their capabilities, it is incumbent on it to fulfil its obligations to the international community by helping all people to be free from want and fear and to realise other elements of human security. The use of this connector functions to establish the first paragraph as proof or evidence of what is asserted in the following one, but to speak of *belief* in the aptness of human security policy as evidence of Japan's mandate to pursue it, is a circular, self serving and illogical argument. In other words, Japan's human security practice is warranted only in terms of its *belief* that it has a responsibility to do so.

The benefits of globalisation have not been extended to the more

107 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002, 46 emphasis added.

vulnerable members of the global village

As the following excerpt demonstrates, egalitarianism and fairness are also legitimation tropes in Japan's discourse on human security:

While economic globalization has certainly brought about a higher standard of living for many people in many different countries, it has also enlarged the gap separating its beneficiaries from the people and countries that have been left behind. Poverty is a force that strips human beings of their potential and this applies as well to human survival, human well-being, and human freedom.¹⁰⁸

In this excerpt, Takemi has invoked economic globalisation as a positive force, albeit one which has not spread evenly, thus leading to inequality amongst its beneficiaries. The presence of this legitimation trope is in agreement with Acharya's¹⁰⁹ assertion that the pursuit of human security is often presented as a matter of offsetting the inequities of globalisation.¹¹⁰ The passage functions to support the pursuit of human security by appealing to the idea of egalitarianism or equality between people in economic terms. The inequality which is expressed in this text is measured in relative terms, and can be contrasted to the absolute measure of inequality that is present in the Trust Fund for Human Security Pamphlet, which explains that "today, as many as 1.3 billion people are forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day".¹¹¹ As discussed in chapter four, globalisation has a somewhat ambiguous, although generally positive image, in Japan's human security texts. However, the discourse is silent in regard to Ahmed's charge that not only "national, [but also] human security has been fundamentally undermined by policies promoted by the key institutions of globalization".¹¹² Not only is this critique of globalisation problematic for

108 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

109 Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," 2001.

110 As the speeches of Obuchi Keizo demonstrate most clearly, Japan's rationale for the pursuit of human security is also consistent with Acharya's claim that human security is also often said to be about dealing with economic crisis. For example, see Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

111 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 2.

112 Nafeez M Ahmed, "The Globalisation of Insecurity: How the International Economic Order Undermines Human and National Security on a World Scale," *Historia Actual Online* no. 5

Japan's positioning of the process itself as being congruous with human security, it also creates an unresolved tension for its pursuit of human security through economic development together with the simultaneous promotion of globalisation. This is because one of the pillar's of Ahmed's critique is the idea that globalisation fosters uneven economic development and thus erodes human security.

Takasu also invokes the idea of an uneven spread of “the benefits of globalization”,¹¹³ to argue for the pursuit of human security as a matter of egalitarianism in reference to the realisation of one's potential; in contrast to the idea of egalitarianism in the economic sphere, which was highlighted above:

Moreover, while globalization has given many individuals unprecedented opportunities for realizing their potential, the benefits of globalization have not been extended to the more vulnerable members of the global village.¹¹⁴

As with other texts in which egalitarianism is evoked in relation to globalisation,¹¹⁵ there is an ambiguity in regard to whether the uneven spread of the benefits of globalisation is of most concern to humans or non-humans. The excerpt above indicates that, whilst on the one hand globalisation is said to have been of benefit to many *individuals*, it is also said to have bypassed certain *members of the global village*. In terms of the logic of the level of the sentence, *individuals* and *members of the global village* represent the same object; i.e. those postulated as actual or hypothetical beneficiaries of the benefits of globalisation. However, in consideration of the context of the speech and the

(Fall 2004): 113.

113 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.

114 For instance: Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.

115 For example Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

hegemony of an international relations discourse which tends to recognise predominantly, non-human state bodies as legitimate international actors, charges of conceptual dissonance would not be out of place if it was indeed the case that the term *member of the global village* was meant to indicate individual humans rather than nation-states. The point is that it is difficult to determine whether members of the global village are posited as people or states. As discussed in chapter two, Japan's human security discourse is ambiguous across texts in regard to the the object which is envisaged as a beneficiary of human security practice, and Takasu's invocation of a global village is another example of this. Moreover, Takemi's assertion of a need for human security practice due to a lack of egalitarianism is also ambiguous and indecisive regarding the actual object of concern, since in the one sentence he speaks of both “people *and* countries that have been left behind”.¹¹⁶

In a related vein to legitimation based on the idea of egalitarianism, Sumi's conjuring up of the claim that “today, as many as 1.1 billion people¹¹⁷ *are forced* to live on less than one dollar a day”,¹¹⁸ associates the pursuance of human security with the idea of standing up for the benefits, rights or interests of the Other in line with an altruistic impetus. Passive voicing of the verb *to force* – i.e. *as to be forced* – functions to present Japan's proposed actions as a response to the plight of people who are living on less than one dollar per day against their will; who are in a situation which is imposed on them by a nameless and faceless cause of human insecurity. That is to say, the implied vision is one of Japan standing up for those who have no choice but to live in conditions whose negativity is measured in economic terms, due to the malevolence of unspecified others.

116 Ibid. emphasis added.

117 Interestingly, an excerpt discussed earlier indicated that it is 1.3 billion rather than 1.1 billion people who are said to be living on less than one dollar per day. See: Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.

118 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.

Insofar as the form of egalitarianism implied in Japan's human security texts is associated with a concern for the Other, it is related to the promotion of policy through the idea of humanitarianism; a trope which also appears in the discourse, albeit not without a measure of haziness:

A symposium entitled "Health Initiative in Asian Economic Crisis --A Human-centred Approach--" [...] which was co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, brought together representatives from developing countries, NGOs, and international organizations, as well as officials in charge of economic cooperation policies from donor nations and other people involved in these matters. In recognition of the fact that the Asian economic crisis was adversely affecting health conditions for socially vulnerable segments of the population, which, *for humanitarian reasons*, could not be ignored, vigorous discussions were held to try to determine means and ways to respond to the problem.¹¹⁹

This example shows how justification of a response to the Asian Financial Crisis, contextualised in reference to human security, is made on humanitarian grounds. Whilst in this excerpt humanitarianism is brought up unproblematically to promote and justify the pursuit of actions in the name of human security, is it also the case that in other texts humanitarianism plays a role in de-legitimising actions signified as humanitarian intervention. Namely, in some instances humanitarianism is represented as being an *inappropriate* justification for intervention, and humanitarian intervention itself is represented as a "deeply troubling concept for a number of developing nations",¹²⁰ and spoken of as a "double-standard approach" which has "nothing to do" with human security:¹²¹

I would like to sound a note of caution on another issue, however. Recently, the concept of human security has been equated or associated with acts of

119 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999 emphasis added.

120 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002, 49.

121 Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 28, 2004.

humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is a particularly individual-centered activity, allowing as it does for the international community to intervene into the sovereign affairs of a nation, from the viewpoint of supporting the rights of the individual or a group of individuals within that country. The concept of human security combined with humanitarian intervention has been particularly promoted by Canada and its allies in North America and Europe. However, humanitarian intervention—and I stress here humanitarian intervention, and not human security—is a deeply troubling concept for a number of developing nations, which are still embroiled in the process of nation building, the leaders of which are concerned that humanitarian intervention provides a passport for developed nations to meddle in the internal affairs of weaker developing nations. We should be careful that the true meaning of human security is not confused with the more controversial issue of humanitarian intervention.¹²²

The idea of humanitarianism thus occupies an ambiguous position in Japan's human security discourse because it both legitimates and prohibits certain practices associated with human security. The ambiguity is a result of the indeterminacy of what is meant by humanitarian intervention; since it is said to “take various forms, ranging from persuasion, good offices, public expression of concern, sanctions, to intervention by use of force.”¹²³ Japan's invocations of humanitarianism seem to suggest not that humanitarian intervention as part of human security practice is illegitimate *per se*, but that it should not include the use of force or military instruments of foreign policy, as these are a breach of state sovereignty.

The conflict could probably have been avoided

As was discussed in the third analytical chapter, conflict is presented as something which threatens human security. However, conflict prevention is also brought up as a general benefit in the pursuit of human security in a way which is reminiscent of Takasu's justification of human security practices in terms of

122 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 49.

123 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

their “added value”, as was discussed earlier.¹²⁴ In other words, whilst the presentation of conflict as a threat to human security functions to justify actions taken to prevent or stop conflict, the pursuit of human security in general is said to be justified because its realisation can have “positive contributions to conflict prevention” and “strengthen the foundations of the peace process”:¹²⁵

If the international community and the developed countries had extended to Somalia economic cooperation based on the idea of human security ten years earlier, the conflict could probably have been avoided.¹²⁶

A number of points are of note regarding the representation of human security policy in regard to its preventative effects on conflict. Firstly, the social scientific notion of probability as a foundation for action is conveyed through the statement that conflict “could *probably* have been avoided”. As discussed in the fourth chapter, probabilistic thought in the discourse can most clearly be discerned in regard to the invocation of threats and dangers; phenomena which are defined by potential, rather than certainty, of manifestation. Secondly, this excerpt indicates the presence of the idea that problems should be prevented *before* they become manifest, rather than being addressed after they become real issues. The idea of prevention has some pedigree in Japan's security policy at the domestic level, having been found within the notion of comprehensive security.¹²⁷ In fact, Acharya explains Japan's advocacy of human security as a continuation and development of comprehensive security.¹²⁸ Indeed, Takemi explicitly speaks of the possibility of incorporating prevention in human security policy, claiming that “further development of this idea of “human security” will lead to the rethinking of the international system itself, going beyond just responding to situations as they arise”.¹²⁹ In other words, the discourse works to

124 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

125 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

126 Ibid.

127 Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001.

128 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001.

129 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in

represent human security policy not just as something which will alleviate already existing problems, but also as a way to prevent certain phenomena such as conflict, from turning into concrete problems for human security.

In summary, the objectives of this chapter have been to bring to the fore, and problematise, the various forms of legitimation that are present throughout Japan's corpus of texts on human security. A very wide repertoire of discursive strategies functioning to naturalise, add impetus to, and unproblematically facilitate actions taken in the name of human security, are evident throughout the texts examined. Over twenty analytically distinguishable discursive strategies, working to make policy seem warranted and matter-of-fact, were encountered through the discourse.¹³⁰ Whilst it is possible to separate these constructs on an analytical level, in practice they usually appear together and constitute a more or less coherent narrative, depending on the text under consideration. However, as the analysis and discussion has shown, not only are there contradictions both within *and* across texts regarding the tropes and ideas invoked to spur on policy, there are also significant theoretical omissions, silences, tensions, and ambiguities regarding the representation of reasons for why human security should be pursued. From the perspective of the state, the vast repertoire of legitimating strategies and tropes which are evident in Japan's human security discourse are certainly effective because of the way in which they associate human security practices with a large cross section of established and normal pursuits of states such as development, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, economic development or cooperation in the international sphere. Japan's human security texts promise the realisation of these objectives

the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

130 Normative imperatives, peace and prosperity, development, a better future, need, consensus, egalitarianism, wisdom, humanitarianism, global community, expectations of a greater role, confidence building, conflict prevention and peace, a new order/structure, a new era, modernisation, responsibility, value, state security, the integrity of the political community, fulfilment.

either as direct results of the realisation of human security or as added benefits of pursuing it. However, if one takes the perspective of the human whose security is ostensibly the point of human security practices, a number of problems come to the fore. Firstly, even in cases where alternative pursuits such as conflict prevention are deemed to be merely added benefits, the discourse leaves open the possibility that human security objectives can become marginalised if the alternative pursuits receive higher priority on foreign policy agendas than does human security. Secondly, tying human security to state level objectives can lead to regressions in levels of human security due to changes in human security practice that may come about when the agenda or objective of these other practices are redefined. Thirdly, pursuing human security in unison with other pursuits is problematic in relation to the realisation of human security because the end goals and methods of practices such as development, conflict prevention or economic growth are not always entirely complementary, nor do they utilise means which have the same relationship to human security. Indeed, these so-called added benefits of human security do not have the same kind of relationship to the conditions of human security and thus there is no guarantee that their pursuit will, in the aggregate, enhance human security.

As a result, if human security practices are indeed supposed to realise the security of humans, then they need to be announced and justified on their own terms rather than in reference to other activities which are more related to the interests of states than individuals. Japan needs to determine whether it really is interested in human security as a goal rather than as a means. However, as indicated in the previous chapter, human security is potentially compromised in Japan's case because of the conflation of state interests with those of private individuals. As such, unless a firmer understanding and engagement with the idea of individual rights and interests is given credence in Japan's political discourse, one is left with the lingering question of whether human security, particularly at the level of the individual, can indeed be a real pursuit of the Japanese state. As it stands, and from the perspective of the framing strategies Japan has employed in its human security texts rather than in terms of who and

what it has explicitly announced as being the beneficiary of human security practice, Japan's human security discourse clearly prioritises pursuits related to national, rather than human security, interests.

Having discussed textual justification, rationalisation and legitimation for the pursuit of human security, the next chapter is concerned with an exposition, analysis and problematisation of the discursive representation of threat, problems and issues positioned in a relationship of antagonism with the condition of human security.

Chapter IV: The Corrosion of Human Security

The previous chapter was concerned with Japan's representation of human security policy from the point of view of legitimation and justification. As such, analysis was focused upon the rationale and reason given explicitly or implicitly for why actions ostensibly taken in the pursuit of human security should be undertaken. This chapter aims to explore, reveal, discuss and problematise Japan's representation of phenomena which are said to have, or are implied as having, an adverse effect on human security.

Japan's human security discourse is theoretically impoverished in regard to the things which are said to have a negative effect on human security. Whilst texts frequently recite lists of phenomena which are said to either threaten or directly affect human security, there is little discussion of the mechanisms by which human security might be eroded, the conditions under which this is most likely to happen, measurement or assessment of these antagonistic phenomena, the dynamics and interplay between them, or the criteria for prioritising responses to them. This chapter begins with an introductory discussion about the implications of signification in the construction of discursive reality and the idea of securitisation. Focus then turns towards the representation of threats and problems in Japan's human security texts. Analysis is particularly concerned with the discursive construction of these objects in terms of their characteristics and effects. The final part of the chapter deals with discursive ascriptions of agency in the creation of human insecurity.

The Significance of Signification

There is a notable point to be made about the discursive signification of issues which are said to be associated with human security; that little attention is paid

in Japan's human security texts to the ramifications of signification of discursive objects in different ways, even though, “policy makers [...] function within a discursive space that imposes meanings on their world and thus creates reality [thereby making] various practices possible” and some less likely or even unthinkable.¹ For instance, certain texts speak of human security as *problems*, whilst others invoke human security *challenges*,² but without clearly distinguishing between them or indicating whether they differ in any way; as if *challenges* were interchangeable with *problems*. Whilst remaining unacknowledged in the texts examined, the significance of such a seemingly facile act of signification can be discerned when one considers the differences in actions which are implied when thinking in terms of *issues-as-challenges*, as compared with thinking in terms of *issues-as-problems*. These differences can be vast, considering that whilst *challenges* point to phenomena which are positive insofar as they contain the potential to bring about self-improvement through their successful resolution and might thus be desired, *problems* point to things which are undesirable since they highlight the potential for bringing about harm, rather than good. As a result it is conceivable that a response to *challenges* will be drastically different to a response to *problems*. Thought directed by the idea of *challenges*, in distinction to *problems*, can be found in regard to the idea of agonism³ or martialism;⁴ where opponents are respected and held in high regard because of the opportunity that battle, conflict and

1 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 303.

2 Inter alia: Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” (Hanoi, Vietnam, December 16, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html>; Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in *Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow*, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2002), 42–51, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf; “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html; Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html.

3 Stephen Metcalf, ed., *Hammer of the Gods: Selected Writings by Friedrich Nietzsche* (London: Creation Books, 1996).

4 Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

fighting provide for the improvement of the Self. Insofar as challenges can provide opportunities for self improvement in a discursive hegemony marked by martialism, to signify issues associated with human security in this way comes with the potential that those issues will not be removed in their totality; that a modicum of value will be seen in their continued presence. Indeed, there is a sense in Japan's human security texts whereby the signification of actions to be undertaken in the pursuit of human security as *management* meets paths with the idea of human security *challenges*; that skilful management of these issues will allow the retention of the potential inherent for self improvement, through the tackling of *challenges* to human security.⁵ A similar form of thought can be discerned in popular arguments supporting the existence of military forces, which focus upon the necessity of their participation in conflict for the sake of maintaining, if not honing, their skills and capabilities. The risk for the human in thinking of these issues as *challenges*, is that they will not be removed in totality because their continued presence will be seen as having value, despite the subsequent result of keeping people in a constant state of managed threat.

Not only is Japan's human security discourse characterised by an insensitivity or silence to the nuances of signification and its consequences, it is also the case that categorisation of things which are explicitly or implicitly presented as hindering human security occurs without a significant measure of reflection regarding the question of how inclusion of disparate phenomena within one

5 The *management* of threats was invoked in a number of texts; most notably Keizo Obuchi, "Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium" (Singapore, May 4, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html>; Keizo Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'" (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html; Keizo Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century" (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html; Yukio Takasu, "Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World" (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.

category might be justified:

[Human security] problems include poverty, environmental degradation, and international organized crime, including illicit drugs and trafficking. Additional problems brought about by regional and domestic conflicts have also emerged, such as the danger from antipersonnel landmines and the proliferation of small arms and the involvement of children in armed conflicts.⁶

In examining the representation of human security in regard to the various problems which are said to threaten it, there is the lingering question of whether there is a substantive relationship between them such that it would make sense to speak of them all in relation to human security, and to undertake a course of action which is said to be founded upon the concept. For it seems that there is meaning in categorising a set of objects under a single heading only if there is something that links those objects, aside from their arbitrary inclusion under one heading. Indeed, as Newman has pointed out, such a “broad approach to human security [...] has attracted the greatest degree of criticism” primarily because “in considering potentially *any* threat to human safety [...] as a concept it becomes meaningless [and thus] it does not allow scholars or policy makers to prioritise different types of threats, it confuses sources and consequences of insecurity, and it is too amorphous to allow analysis with any degree of precision”.⁷ Newman's observations regarding human security in general, are clearly also applicable to Japan's interpretation of the idea, which shows a tendency to categorise a wide range of issues as threats to human security, speaking of them as “interrelated” or “interconnected”, but without rumination upon whether there is anything that actually links these phenomena together at a conceptual level other than their apparent, hypothetical effects on human security.⁸ This difficulty seems to have been inherited from the 1994 Human

6 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

7 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 01 (2010): 82.

8 For example see: Kenzo Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III” (presented at the General Assembly, United Nations, New York, April 19, 2005), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2005/un0504-3.html>; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for

Development Report; a key source for human security discourse in general.⁹ Roland Paris has characterised the concept of human security in a similarly critical manner:

The scope of [the] definition is vast: Virtually any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort could conceivably constitute a threat to one's human security [...] this list is so broad that it is difficult to determine what, if anything, might be excluded from the definition of human security. Indeed the drafters of the report seem distinctly uninterested in establishing any definitional boundaries. Instead they make a point of commending the "all-encompassing" and "integrative" qualities of the human security concept, which they apparently view as among the concept's major strengths.¹⁰

As Paris observes, such conflation of disparate phenomena under one rubric is undertaken without theoretical elucidation regarding the relationships between these elements, thus making it difficult to formulate a clear policy approach or agenda based on the concept. For Pettman, the solution to the problem raised by Paris and encountered in Japan's human security texts, is to invert the relationship between human security and strategic studies; so that the latter is considered a subset of the former, contrary to traditional thinking.¹¹ Whilst Pettman's argument certainly makes sense in terms of a wider attempt to develop human security as a concept, it does not explain the conceptual indeterminacy found in Japan's texts, because for Japan human security does not clearly stand above strategic or security studies in hierarchical terms. Rather, it is often constructed as a supplement to theories which promote the

Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2007), 2; "The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," 2009, 1; Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

9 Amitav Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," *International Journal* 56 (2001): 442–460; Edward Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism," *International Studies Perspectives* 2 (2001): 239–51; Des Gasper, "Securing Humanity: Situating 'Human Security' as Concept and Discourse," *Journal of Human Development* 6, no. 2 (2005): 221–245.

10 Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 89–90.

11 Ralph Pettman, "Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2005): 137–150.

security of the state.¹² The question of inter-linkage is important, because a side effect of joining together potentially disparate phenomena under the category of *threats to human security*, when or if the pursuit of human security becomes a normal activity of international and domestic agents, is the legitimization of increasingly broad intervention in, and regulation of lived human experience. As Ferks has pointed out, the extreme end of such acts of categorisation, in which an overly wide range of “normal” and “non-politicised” issues are “securitised”, is the opening up of ever wider aspects of human experience to so called “extraordinary measures” which are outside of legislative frameworks.¹³ Moreover, in Japan's case this “risk of securitisation”¹⁴ is compounded by what Gilson and Purvis have called Japan's “political pragmatism”; the development of a “safe umbrella” of human security by which Japan can overcome constitutional constraints on its participation in international affairs.¹⁵ This *safe umbrella* consists of nothing more than the conscious categorisation of previously non-security elements of social reality under human security so as to make room for a Japanese role in the resolution of such human insecurities.

Threats or Problems?

The introductory discussion above has pointed out the general lack of reflectivity regarding the signification of events, practices, and phenomena posited as being in an antagonistic relationship with human security, that is present in Japan's human security texts. In this section, analytical emphasis shifts to textual representation of events, issues, problems, or phenomena which are said to erode human security.

12 See for instance Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002.

13 Georg Frerks, “Human Security as a Discourse and Counter-discourse,” *Security and Human Rights* 19, no. 1 (2008): 13.

14 *Ibid.*, 13.

15 Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, “Japan’s Pursuit of Human Security: Humanitarian Agenda or Political Pragmatism,” *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 193–07.

As discussed in chapter two, Japan's human security texts contain a measure of ambiguity in regard to the representation of the origin of the idea; with both Japan *and* the United Nations Development Programme being alternatively situated in this position across different texts. In a similar vein, the following excerpt works to establish an intertextual relationship between the meaning of threat in Japan's human security discourse, and the approach of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe:¹⁶

Next, in addressing security challenges, the OSCE has placed importance on adopting various perspectives inclusive of economy, environment and human rights rather than focusing only on political and military aspects. This approach coincides with the concept of Human Security that Japan is advocating.¹⁷

In other words, threats to human security are presented and paraphrased in reference to an older text in which threats to security – and by extension human security – can be found in the fields of economics, environment, and human rights, rather than only political and military aspects.¹⁸ Aside from situating human security threats in a wide sphere of social relations and phenomena, the excerpt works to link Japan's approach to that of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and thereby to garner legitimacy for itself by referencing an established definition of the spheres in which security threats are said to exist.

The range and scope of events and phenomena represented in Japan's human security texts as being in an antagonistic relationship with human security is

16 Similarly, Acharya also points to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe as a precursor to human security thought; see: Acharya, "Human Security - East Versus West," 2001.

17 Yutaka Banno, "Remarks by Mr. Yutaka Banno, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the OSCE Summit (2 December, 2010)," December 2, 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/osce/state1012.html>.

18 Specifically, most recently the OSCE presents its security mandate as being comprised of three "dimensions": the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human. See: OSCE, "What We Do," *Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 2011, <http://www.osce.org/what>.

extensive, but the following example shows how the notion of threat actually takes a mediating position between the invocation of problems on the one side, and erosion of human security on the other:

This globalization has helped to bring about economic growth and higher standards of living. But it has also had negative effects, and has brought forth an awareness of *problems that threaten the dignity of people*--problems such as poverty, environmental degradation, international organized crime, including illicit drug use and trafficking and human smuggling, and so on. Additional problems resulting from regional and internal conflicts have also emerged, *such as dangers* of antipersonnel land-mines and small arms and the involvement of children in armed conflicts. These conflicts inflict severe suffering on civilian populations, particularly women and children.¹⁹

Whilst remaining unacknowledged in the text, this elucidation on human insecurity positions problems not as being a definite *cause* of the erosion of human security, but as a *threat* to it. The invocation of threat covers up significant under-theorisation of how various problems might lead to a change in human security, in either positive or negative terms. Instead, problems are ascribed with only the *potential* to affect human security, albeit in an unspecified manner or direction. As far as the exact meaning of threat is concerned, this is also left to the reader's imagination; as to whether the concept points to the presence of something which has the potential to (a) merely impinge upon or damage some or all components of human security (such as livelihood, life or dignity), or (b) destroy them totally. Indeed, the conditions under which threats transform into tangible problems are for the most part left undisclosed in the entire corpus of texts, as is specification of the degree to which human security – either in totality or in reference to its constituent parts – should be affected before a response or intervention is warranted. Furthermore, there is ambiguity in regard to the position of the line between the destruction of some or all elements of human security, and a mere erosion of them. Judging from the passage above, Japan's human security discourse does

19 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999 emphasis added.

not offer any criteria which could be used to establish when materialised threats have not just damaged human security or its elements, but destroyed them. Finally, it is not clear whether threats are postulated as subjective feelings intrinsic to the individual human, the human at the group level, or the non-human beneficiary of policy such as the state. Alternatively, in light of this omission regarding just who is to be the actual perceiving, feeling subject of threat, the discourse implies an objective conceptualisation of threat perception which does not give credence to the idea that what constitutes a threat for one sentient being, might not do so for another.

As indicated above then, a significant majority of the issues associated with human insecurity are mediated by threat, albeit with little theoretical elucidation on matters such as the mechanisms of cause and effect or how to distinguish between threats and problems. However, the relationship between some of these apparent problems or threats and the conditions of human security is at times represented in a more detailed manner. One exception to the conceptual paucity can be found in regard to *conflict*, which is treated with a modicum of detail in regard to its effects on human security, although its effects are still conceptualised in potential terms, due to its signification as merely a *danger*. Similarly to threats, dangers are things which have the potential of leading to a negative effect, although by definition it cannot be claimed with certainty that the potential will be realised before the event takes place.²⁰ According to a text by Takemi, for example, conflict is said to threaten human security by “[inflicting] severe suffering on civilian populations, particularly women and children”.²¹ As discussed in the first chapter, the beneficiary of policy takes various guises in Japan's human security texts; in this instance it is in the form of a subset of the population rather than the individual. What can be gleaned from this expression of human security policy, is that *severe* suffering

20 “Danger,” *Dictionary.com Unabridged* (Random House, Inc.), accessed July 30, 2012, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/danger>.

21 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

has a *potentially* negative impact on dignity, although as is typical of Japan's human security texts, there is seemingly no way in which to determine the exact situation in which such threats may materialise or impinge upon human security in the negative, how to determine when suffering can be legitimately quantified as *severe*, or as discussed in the first chapter, how effects might be discerned or their magnitude measured.

To speak of dignity as something which is threatened, if not directly eroded by severe suffering – as Takemi does in the above mentioned document – reflects a particular conceptualisation of dignity; one which does not incorporate the idea that it could actually be accumulated through one's ability to deal with suffering, hardship or insecurity. Instead, writing about dignity this way prioritises the notion that it is enhanced, or at least maintained, by the ability to avoid dealing with problems, or having a third party such as the state deal with them. From the texts under examination, it is unclear whether Japan is asserting that it is the infliction of suffering *per se* which is incompatible with human security, or whether it is only a certain level of suffering which can potentially affect people's dignity. This is not a trite point as conceptual imprecision is a distinct characteristic of Japan's human security discourse, as indicated throughout this thesis, and this example of imprecision regarding the relationship between suffering and dignity is therefore symptomatic and typical. In terms of the legitimisation of actions taken in the name of human security, conceptual imprecision is a strategy which allows freedom and the adaptation of rhetorical resources to various policy scenarios whose interconnectedness is contested or not established upon a firm theoretical foundation. At the same time, conceptual imprecision leaves the possibility of manipulating policy to serve interests which are at odds with those of human individuals, through *ad hoc* redefinition of imprecise terms such as *severity*, whilst leaving unspecified the conditions under which action is to be taken.

As the preceding discussion about the difference between challenges and

problems indicated, Japan's discourse on human security has a tendency to lack precision and continuity regarding signification of discursive objects. Another case of this inclination can be discerned in the following case, where *threat* comes across as being interchangeable with *danger* in the same paragraph:

In our times, humankind is under various kinds of threats. Environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for future generations.²²

Conceptual imprecision aside, as discussed above, one can see that by speaking of humankind being under *various kinds of threats and dangers*, policy comes across as being concerned with phenomena which have only the *potential*, in contradistinction to a *certainty*, of impinging upon human security. Whilst specific problems are invoked – including global warming, transnational crime or infectious diseases²³ – their relationship to human security is not expressed clearly in terms of causality or an empirical, observable effect; the implication being that the concern of policy is more with probability and perception rather than with issues whose corrosive effect on human security can be ascertained with certainty. The matter of threat perception is made more complex when one questions the position from which perception is meant to occur. The texts examined did not discuss, explore or even mention the question of whether determining which phenomena are to be signified as threats, is to be undertaken by the very people whose security is at stake, or whether other forms of human security agency such as states or non-governmental organisations are to have a voice in this matter.

Whilst *threats* are merely potential phenomena whose realisation is not certain, there is certainly a tradition in scientific theorisation which aims to accurately predict the conditions under which potential might manifest itself into

22 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow” (presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>.

23 Ibid.

empirically verifiable effects, and thus Japan's human security discourse can be contextualised in reference to such a research tradition. However, the signification of events or phenomena as threat is not only a matter of objective potential or probability. Even though absent from the corpus of texts examined, it also necessitates a consideration and theorisation of the attitudes and perceptions of the individual observer, insofar as policy is at least in part about the interests of the individual human.

In the following excerpt, Obuchi invokes impairment; a metaphysical object which, unlike threat, is more closely aligned with certainty than probability:

It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity *impaired*.²⁴

This passage implicitly invokes the spectre of things which can both *threaten* as well as *impair*. In the former case, the discussion revolves around just the *potential* for a negative impact on human survival, whereas in the latter case, by speaking of impairment Obuchi has impinged into the world of *certainty*. To clarify: to state that a phenomenon *threatens* human security is not the same as saying that it *impairs* human security; since impairment is a matter of certainty, constituted in part through the ability to empirically assert its presence, whilst threat is a matter of probability or potential. In other words, if one were to state that a phenomenon *threatened* their human security, it may indeed eventuate that the threat would become manifest and that the phenomenon did in fact result in an erosion of one's human security. However, it is also conceivable that by virtue of the phenomenon being just a threat, it might not realise itself or have a tangible, negative effect on human security. On the other hand, if one were to say that the phenomenon *impaired* one's human security, then this would be a matter of certainty; a conclusion made after the observable and verifiable occurrence of an impairment in human security because of that phenomenon. In making the assertion that the phenomenon had a corrosive

24 Ibid. emphasis added.

effect on human security, its status changes from being something which might happen (i.e. a threat), to something which *did* happen (i.e. an impairment). In summary, although unacknowledged in Obuchi's human security discourse, aside from the various kinds of problems which are invoked in relation to the erosion of human security, one can discern the presence of two kinds of metaphysical objects, whose effect on human security differs in regard to whether it is a matter of certainty or only probability.

The postulation of uncertainty regarding threats to human security functions to promote policy through an appeal to the idea that in the lack of certain knowledge, a wide and encompassing response is more appropriate than what might be necessary if there was actually certainty about what is corroding human security in the present, or will definitely do so in the future. This wide net approach, one that invokes the idea of considering all contingencies, is consistent with persistent representations throughout the corpus of the discourse which invoke a diversity of threat,²⁵ pervasive problems,²⁶ and a multitude of victims,²⁷ since these images work to form an impetus or necessity for the realisation of human security, essentially through sensationalisation and the construction of a sense impending danger and inadequacy of current security practices.

Aside from *threats*, which have an ambiguous relationship to the conditions of human security due to the uncertainty of their manifestation, texts also invoke

25 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002; "The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," 2009.

26 Keitaro Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network" (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 2008).

27 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

“*problems* affecting human security”.²⁸ In other words, Japan's human security policy is not only concerned with phenomena which have a negative albeit unspecified *potential* in reference to human security, but also with events whose effect can be more directly specified, at least in principle, because of their construction as things which do indeed *affect* human security. As an example, whilst Obuchi did not clarify which discursive objects directly and demonstrably have impinged upon human security and are certain to do so again in the future,²⁹ in distinction to those which merely have a *probability* or *potential* of impinging upon it, he did specify that problems which affect human security have the characteristic of being able to cross national borders, and that they “directly affect the lives of human beings”.³⁰

In a similar manner, Takemi drew a distinction between what is certain and that which is merely probable when he asserted that:

In the context of human security, the issue of development is extremely important. Especially in the three basic areas of health care, poverty-eradication, and African development. These areas, which are today's sub-themes, are the most basic issues from the standpoint of "Human Security." The area of health care bears directly on human survival, the most fundamental of the three elements that together constitute human security. Poverty, meanwhile, is a problem that lies at the root of a whole range of threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity.³¹

In speaking of phenomena related to human (in)security, health care is presented as standing out in relation to various other problems which are regularly invoked as threatening human security, since the effects of its absence

28 Ibid. emphasis added.

29 Obuchi's omission also hides the complexity of the matter; namely, that to speak of phenomena which will definitely affect human security in the future – this difference between certainty and probability being the key point here – one needs also to consider whose security will certainly be impinged and in what way. Of course, Obuchi's speech did not deal with these questions because they only become significant when the difference between potential threat and certain erosion is dealt with in depth.

30 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

31 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

are *not* said to be mediated by threat. Instead, it is said to *bear directly* on human survival, rather than being the cause of a threat which may not be perceived, or may never become manifest. A lack of health care is thus presented as something which has definitely caused, or causes erosion of human security directly; either in the past or in the present, rather than just threatening to do so in the future. In general the notion of threat is characterised not only by uncertainty in manifestation, but also by specific temporal delineations. *If* threats are to materialise, they will do so in the future, or they may have materialised in the past under particular circumstance, but by definition and unlike things which have a direct relationship with human (in)security such as the presence of absence of health care, they do not have a corrosive effect in the present.

In asserting that “health care bears directly on human survival [which is] the most fundamental of the three elements that together constitute human security”,³² the implication is that human security is conceived of as a condition in which survival is premised on the existence of a body which will protect the individual, insofar as health care practices are presupposed as being undertaken by the state, rather than being left to the agency of the individual. In this vein the continued existence of the state is justified, as long as human survival – a key component of Japan's human security discourse – is deemed appropriate. As a consequence, a form of human existence in which people are self-reliant for their own survival is de-emphasised. Adding to the theoretical incoherence however, the discourse *also* emphasises the necessity of people taking on their own responsibilities,³³ despite the lack of a discussion as to what those responsibilities might be. However, if one is to ascribe cohesion to the discourse, at least in this context, a logical solution to the tension between reliance and self-responsibility is to conclude that whilst one might have certain unspecified

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.; Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

responsibilities in reference to one's own human security, these responsibilities do *not* include personal health or survival. Nonetheless, the line between reliance and responsibility is unclear. For instance, it is not possible to conclude from Japan's human security discourse whether it is up to the individual to determine when they should consult a medical practitioner, or whether this should be regulated by the state or some other non-human agent of human security. Similarly, the text does not indicate whether individuals should be empowered in regard to determining the kind of health care which they can access, or whether such decisions should also be relegated to regulation by non-human, non-individual agents acting in the name of human security. That which is clear, is that this discourse functions to legitimate the continuing existence and expansion of the health industry, promoting longevity and continued participation in work and economic relations.

The postulation of problems which impinge *directly*³⁴ upon the security of humans is problematic because Japan's human security texts do not specify what it would mean for phenomena to affect human security *indirectly*. Moreover, if one were limited to reading only Japan's official human security lore, it would not be possible to ascertain how to distinguish between discursive objects which have a direct bearing on human security and those whose effects are only indirect. Another reason why the under-theorisation of the direct/indirect dimension is problematic can be discerned if one considers it in relation to causality and the scale of human security erosion. Specifically, there is no *a priori* reason to assume – at least according to Japan's human security discourse – that the extent of human security erosion attributed to direct causes should be either greater or smaller than that caused by indirect causes. Consequently, the postulation of a direct/indirect dimension is analytically superfluous in regard to the actual level of human insecurity experienced by either individuals or groups of people. This is because it does not help in

34 For instance, Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

distinguishing which phenomena are more or less certain, or likely, to have a corrosive effect on human security, or what the extent of those effects might be. Furthermore, the texts examined did not provide any evidence which would indicate a greater erosion of human security by direct causes than by indirect ones.

Representation of Threats and Problems

Causes and Sources

Although an exact causal mechanism is not brought to light, the apparently recent increase in problems that have at least the potential to erode human security, is represented in association with the end of the Cold War and the assertion that “the structure of international relations has changed in a drastic manner” since that moment in time, which is implied as being singular and unproblematically identifiable.³⁵ The connotation of causality occurs despite the apparent irony in the claim that a state of global war was more secure – at least for humans – than the conditions since its end, and in spite of a lack of detail regarding just what constitutes international structure, or in what ways it has changed. Indeed, the end of the Cold War is itself represented unproblematically, as if it came about at a single point time and as if rivalries based upon political ideology were no longer relevant.³⁶ In terms of a politics of representation, these images function to legitimate action in the name of human security through the promise of order and structure, and as such appeal to the

35 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

36 The lack of normalised diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States on the one hand, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other, is a reminder that the Cold War is not entirely over for everyone. One of the reasons for continued antagonism between Washington and Pyongyang is related to the United States' policy of refusing normal diplomatic relations with states it categorises as communist. See Dianne Rennack E., *North Korea: Economic Sanctions*, Report for Congress (US Library of Congress, 2003), <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31696.pdf>.

trusted, if not myopic, certainty of structuralism,³⁷ as well as modernist myths regarding man's triumph over chaos and nature.

One facet of Japan's representation of the end of the Cold War, is as a moment from which international order changed, resulting in a number of empirically verifiable changes, such as an increase in intrastate war and advances in technology and economic liberalisation.³⁸ As such, the period of the Cold War ironically appears as a marker of a better, partially idealised past, since after all it was “the *collapse* of the Cold War order [that] has triggered off numerous civil conflicts”.³⁹ On the other hand, insofar as the Cold War was indeed a war, it was perpetuated by participants, but to speak of an *order* is to take attention away from the order being not so much the presence of peace, but rather a perpetual stalemate, whose maintenance was not the desired objective of either side, according to the logic of war. Instead, the order of the Cold War was a result of the very strategies that both sides utilised in their pursuit of a preponderance of power to overcome the other side. These strategies involved the support, by both sides, of client states, allies and friends through judicious trade, aid, and military cooperation, as well as nuclear deterrence. In essence, Japan's human security discourse presents the idea of *order* in contradistinction to *disorder*; that the former is necessary to prevent conflict and other forms of human and state insecurity, glossing over the fact that this order was itself the unplanned result of unsuccessful military strategy. The very peace and stability of that international *order* – spoken of by Liotta as a “balance of terror”⁴⁰ – was the result of an ongoing war.⁴¹

37 Richard K Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225–286; Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism And Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

38 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.

39 *Ibid.*, 2.

40 P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 477.

41 This association of the Cold War with a higher level of peace than in the post-Cold War period is shared by Foong Khong, who argues that the “nuclear deterrence” of the Cold War “has been critical in maintaining general peace, however insecure it made individuals and

However, at the same time as it is associated with an increase in conflict, the end of the Cold War is presented as little more than a catalyst that “triggered” the violence that has apparently ensued in the post-Cold War world.⁴² The real, “root causes” of conflict are said to lie elsewhere; with a disembodied, nameless agency which is identified only through its association with so called “religious, racial and ethnic contexts”.⁴³ An important element of this representation of the Cold War order, is the idea that it is only *now* that there is a need to establish and maintain some kind of order, as a goal rather than as a means, for the sake of peace and security. As was discussed in chapter three, temporality and appeals to the present are prominent discursive tropes in Japan's human security texts. The significance of the Cold War in Japan's human security texts lies in its legitimising effect on the politics of human security; through the connotation that it is this particular concept – human security – which will provide the foundations for the order found to be absent in the post-Cold War world.

The end of the Cold War also figures in Japan's human security discourse as a theoretical marker of structural realist reductionism. In the same way as the Cold War trope – as an expression of bipolarity – serves as a reductive principle by which all international relations phenomena of the Cold War period can be deductively explained or justified, the post-Cold War version of the trope works to explain phenomena in terms of an absence. In other words, whilst Cold War international relations can hypothetically be explained by reduction to the principle of bipolar East/West competition, post-Cold War events are, according to Japan's human security lore, explainable in terms which emphasise the lack

states”. However, in distinction to Japan's essentially legitimising human security texts, Foong Khong's invocation is part of a critique showing that, in part, human security is based on “false causal assumptions”. Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (2001): 234.

42 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.

43 *Ibid.*

of bipolarity and its associated myth of stability and structure. Thus, in the same way that theoretical arguments based on the existence of the Cold War privileged a US-USSR-centric bipolar and neo-realist view of international relations, the presence of the end of the Cold War trope suggests the same: that all can be explained in terms of the lack of competition between East and West. In both cases there is an implicit recourse to a conception of the world based on bipolarity. In this context, the interests, motivations, and policies of other state agents are implied as having only secondary importance, if they are discerned at all.

In Japan's human security texts, the end of the Cold War is presented as a unitary, observable, and quantifiable moment in time; as if its ending was experienced or known to all observers and participants in the same way regarding – *inter alia* – its ramifications or consequences. Moreover, the discourse implicitly establishes itself in the position of having the knowledge of this unitary end. It states that there was just one end to the Cold War, and it happened in *this* particular way. The discourse does not say that perhaps *the end* may be significant in different ways, for different reasons, depending on the observer. In other words, the text does not consider its own subjectivity by asking, 'for whom did the Cold War end in this way?' The domain of the noun *end* has numerous semiotic meanings, and on an emotional level these can range from lament to joy. Furthermore, postulating *the end* does not take into consideration the prospect of changes occurring in waves, rather than watersheds - at one moment - and that for some the Cold War is not over,⁴⁴ as was mentioned earlier in reference to the lack of normalised relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It therefore seems that the end of the Cold War as a trope in a narrative of human security does not serve the purposes which a first reading of the text might imply. Presented as a single historical moment, the end is less of an explanatory

44 Paul M. Evans, "Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning.," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 263.

concept for global, varied political change, as much as it is an expression of the text's authority and knowledgeable status. It is even less useful in providing insight into local political struggles, insofar as it can even discern these.

The preceding discussion has pointed out that, in Japan's human security discourse, the end of the Cold War is said to have “brought numerous civil conflicts whose root causes lie in religious, ethnic and economic contexts”⁴⁵, which are implied as having some kind of relationship to human security, albeit an unspecified one. As discussed in the second chapter, the fact that the beneficiaries of human security policy are numerous and that the factors making up human security and the conditions under which it can be said to be satisfied are under-theorised in regard to – *inter alia* – conflicts of interests between various beneficiaries at both the group *and* individual level, as well as between measures of human security, according to Japan's texts it is by no means a given that the *contexts* which are spoken of above have a clear effect on human security or even a negative one in the aggregate.⁴⁶ It is however clearly stated that “each of these challenges has a complex inter-linkage to one other”,⁴⁷ though typically of Japan's human security discourse, few details are forthcoming. Despite such omissions and theoretical oversights, to speak of an increase in conflict despite the collapse of the Cold War structure and a complex inter-linkage between these so called *challenges*, clearly functions to legitimate a role for agents said to be working in the name of human security. The logic is simple, and works along the lines that since a lack of structure, albeit one which was characterised by an unacknowledged state of war, is a cause of conflict that is eroding human security, then a new structure should be put in its place. Indeed, this idea of the installation of a new structure has come up numerous times in the discourse in the form of *a new order*; as discussed in chapter three.

45 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

46 Indeed, even considering human security in terms of an aggregate is problematic, in light of the presence of an individualist point of view often said by Japan to be integral to human security policy.

47 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

Moreover, in postulating a complex inter-linkage between problems that affect human security negatively, together with the apparent need that “we all understand the diversity of the threat to human security”,⁴⁸ the discourse functions to legitimate a wide ranging, all encompassing role for agents who can convincingly present themselves as acting in the name of human security. In fact, Japan has made tacit acknowledgement of this legitimation function through assertions that human security is a “long term challenge that stretches from preventative activities before the outbreak of a conflict to post conflict reconstruction and development”.⁴⁹

Japan's human security discourse also presents threats to human security in relation to development processes. Specifically, Obuchi characterised some threats as being a partial result of “social strains [created by] remarkable economic development [...] aggravated” by economic crisis.⁵⁰ At the same time, he spoke of the necessity of “seeking new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of [the Asian] region”,⁵¹ thus situating the pursuit of human security in the context of the objectives of development. A such, economic development figures as both a positive and negative force in the human security narrative, with its representation being similar to that of globalisation, which also has an apparently mixed role to play in regard to problems associated with human security. On the one hand, it is in part because of rapid economic development that human security threats have come to the fore; on the other hand, development is nonetheless to be continued, albeit in a way which gives “due consideration” to human security.⁵² However, the meaning and extent of

48 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.

49 Yasuo Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on “The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action” (Davos, Switzerland, January 26, 2008), <http://www.mofa.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html>.

50 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.; also paraphrased in Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human

that due consideration is left unspecified, and so potential conflicts of interest between human security goals and development goals remains under-theorised and open to manipulation by those acting with perceived legitimacy in the name of human security. Social strain itself was left undefined by Obuchi, and as per the discussion above, its relationship to the condition of human security appears as ambiguous, because it is postulated as being a threat, rather than a cause of insecurity.

According to this first of three following excerpts, knowledge of problems which are said to threaten human security is represented as being a result of globalisation:

Although globalization has helped to bring about economic growth and higher standards of living, *it has also engendered an awareness* of the existence of problems that threaten human lives, livelihoods, and dignity.⁵³

In other words, it is thanks to globalisation that knowledge about relationships between these problems and their corrosive effect on human security has come to be perceived and understood. As mentioned above, globalisation is constructed in a somewhat precarious way in Japan's human security discourse. Whilst it is not always presented as a negative force *per se*, the role of globalisation in regard to human insecurity comes across as ambiguous, because it is associated with negative events (for example, apparent problems relating to human security threats, as well as the effects it is said to have had on the international community in general),⁵⁴ whilst at the same time featuring as a source of enlightenment in regard to human security problems. However, the positive representation of globalisation in terms of human security knowledge which is evident in the excerpt above, contrasts to a negative one in which

Security Concept,” 2002; “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” 2009.

53 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.

54 Globalisation appears in the guise of an uncontrollable wave, which has engulfed the international community: for examples see: Ibid.; Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 43.

globalisation is implied to be not a source of knowledge about what needs to be done in the pursuit of human security, but an actual cause of human insecurity, as is evident in the following two excerpts:

This globalization has helped to bring about economic growth and higher standards of living. But *it has also had negative effects*, and has brought forth an awareness of problems that threaten the dignity of people--problems such as poverty, environmental degradation, international organized crime, including illicit drug use and trafficking and human smuggling, and so on.⁵⁵

This process [of globalisation] has significantly deepen (*sic*) interdependence of the world, having brought substantial benefits to many people on one hand, *widening the gap between the rich and the poor both nationally and internationally on the other*. Today, as many as 1.3 billion people are forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day. The massive and rapid movement of people, goods, money and information encouraged transnational problems to spread, including the smuggling of persons, arms and drugs as well as infectious diseases. The economic expansion has worsened global warming and other environmental degradation and energy problems.⁵⁶

In all three fragments above, globalisation is ascribed with positive influence, primarily in terms of its apparent role in facilitating economic growth or raising living standards. However the second two examples also ascribe negative characteristics to it. The first of these two speaks of them in an imprecise manner, saying only that globalisation has had negative effects as well as positive ones. The last example is marginally more specific in terms of the mechanism of its negative operation; that it has widened the gap between rich and poor, connoting the idea that it is inequality and lack of economic well-being which causes people – in ways left unspecified – to undertake

55 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999 emphasis added.

56 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 2 emphasis added.

behaviours which lead to the erosion of human security.⁵⁷ However, in general Japan's human security discourse presents globalisation in positive terms, and even though there are passages in which this positivity is put into doubt, texts did not deal with the charge that for some “globalization and the international economic order, over the last several decades, have systematically generated human insecurity throughout the world”.⁵⁸

In speaking of problems associated with human security, Tsuchiya stated that:

Rapid advances in information technologies have led to a surge in the globalization of human and economic activities. Globalization has enhanced world economic growth and raised living standards, but these benefits have been offset by increasingly severe global problems, including the widening gap between the rich and the poor, environmental degradation, conflicts, landmines, refugees, transnational organized crimes, and the spread of deadly infectious diseases.⁵⁹

This selection represents the emergence of human security problems vis-a-vis globalisation in yet another way. Namely, globalisation is ascribed with only positive characteristics, whilst the issues said to be threatening human security are implied as originating from some other unspecified source and counteracting the positive tendencies of globalisation. The difference between

57 One way in which economic well-being might impinge on human security would be if lack of economic well-being were to cause conflict. However, the relationship between human security and conflict is itself problematic because, whilst conflict could cause some elements of human security to be compromised, certain forms of conflict – such as revolution or rebellion – may ultimately bring about changes which result in an enhancement of human security. For a systematic, quantitative exploration of the relationship between economic well-being and forms of conflict accompanying rebellion and civil war, see: Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 563–573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 563–595.

58 Nafeez M Ahmed, “The Globalisation of Insecurity: How the International Economic Order Undermines Human and National Security on a World Scale,” *Historia Actual Online* no. 5 (Fall 2004): 124.

59 Shinako Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “Human Security - Its role in an era of various threats to the international community,” Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html.

this representation of globalisation and the ones discussed above, is that here it has been conceptualised in contradistinction to things which cause human insecurity. Previously discussed invocations of it were ambiguous in the sense that it was attributed with causing or contributing to both positive *and* negative changes.

Sumi's talk of globalisation as “having brought not only benefits to people, but troubles by widening the gap between the rich and the poor nationally and internationally”,⁶⁰ shows yet another slight variation in the way that Japan's human security texts represent changes associated with globalisation; without specifying an embodied form of agency or cause. Rather than its effects being the result of the actions of a body such as the state, the population or non-governmental organisations, they are presented in terms of natural processes, having come in “rapid waves”, radically affecting international norms of behaviour by “shaking the fabrics of the traditional approach of sovereign nations”.⁶¹ Reminiscent of the social strain metaphor discussed earlier, the wave metaphor is employed in a way which paints the international community as powerless and helpless in the face of impending, natural processes of change. Besides deflecting charges of responsibility for human insecurity away from the international community or particular states, this picture functions to validate policy by opening up a space in which action – namely human security practices – comes across not only as warranted, but necessary for the entirety of an imagined international community.

Another form of representation of the source of threat to human security can be found in a speech by Sumi, where he speaks of security threats as traditionally having come from “outside of boundaries”, but that “in recent years many dangers have not come from outside boundaries”.⁶² He cites “poverty, environmental degradation, suffering from infectious diseases, transnational

60 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

organized crime and terrorism [as] a few examples” of this.⁶³ This characterisation of human security threats is notable because it is different to ones in which threats have been represented as transnational,⁶⁴ and it also brings with it two connotations. Firstly, that insofar as human security policy is a *foreign* policy, it implies intervention in the *internal* affairs of other states, since the concern is with problems that do not originate from *outside boundaries*; logically speaking, if the problems did not come from outside, they must have originated, at least in part, from within sovereign borders. Secondly, that human security praxis is, among other things, a matter of securitising phenomena which have as yet not been considered matters of security. Indeed, regarding this second point, Sumi admits that “the concept of human security is a viable framework to bring human-centered approach to the values of political leaders by making the interests of individuals a priority for governance and politics”.⁶⁵ In other words, in the context of Japan's human security discourse, securitisation refers to a process which involves a conscious⁶⁶ attempt at changing global policy agendas. As Foong Khong explains:

The purpose of securitizing certain issues, while leaving others alone, is obvious. Once an issue like drug trafficking is securitized, its status in the policy hierarchy changes. It becomes an urgent issue, worthy of special attention, resources, and fast-track or immediate amelioration or resolution, perhaps even by military means.⁶⁷

The conscious policy of securitisation, which is raised in the excerpt above by Sumi, runs the risk that once issues related to the everyday lived experience of individual people are made into matters of security, this very lived experience

63 Ibid.

64 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.

65 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

66 It is notable that in regard to securitisation, Japan's position is somewhat different to that of the United Nations Development Programme. Whilst in the latter, “elevation of issues [...] to the realm of security” for the sake of changing prioritisation is merely an “implicit assumption”, whilst for the former the assumption is clearly announced in explicit terms. For a critical analysis of the human security discourse of the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 *Human Development Report*, see: Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” *Global Society* 16, no. 3 (2002): 277–278.

67 Foong Khong, “Human Security,” 2001, 231.

can become marginalised in comparison to the pursuit of policy objectives made in the name of state security and thus become an object of military instruments of foreign policy. In Japan's case, it is not entirely clear if the realisation of human security should include the use of the military. Despite constitutional⁶⁸ and social limitations⁶⁹ on its deployment in offensive combat roles, Japan's Self-Defence Forces have undertaken non-combat, humanitarian missions⁷⁰ and, what is more, an explicit, outright rejection of military approaches to human security was not encountered in the corpus of texts examined. Even though Takemi has asserted that “in Japan’s case, the process of developing a concept for human security was built on [...] Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan’s focus on *nonmilitary* education-based methods”, one should keep in mind that this statement refers to Japan's human security concept in the past tense⁷¹ and thus does not rule out the development of human security practices in the future which do indeed incorporate the military.⁷² It is perhaps because of the potential for the marginalisation of human security interests in relation to state security ones that Buzan decries the tendency of human security approaches, in general, to “idealize security as the desired end goal”, instead supporting the idea that “the desired end is some form of desecuritization down into normal politics”.⁷³

68 Article 9 of Japan's Constitution asserts that: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”. See: “The Constitution of Japan,” 1946, art. 9, <http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>.

69 “Japan Marks 66th Constitution Day Amid Protest Against Law Revising,” *Xinhua News Agency*, March 5, 2013, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8232035.html>.

70 Yutaka Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); *Japan’s Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf>.

71 Takemi said that for Japan the process of developing a human security *was* based on non-military methods, rather than it *being* based on them.

72 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44 emphasis added.

73 Barry Buzan, “A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 369–370.

In one of the passages discussed above, poverty was said to be “a problem that lies at the root of a whole range of threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity”.⁷⁴ As such, the relationship between poverty and human security can be classified as tertiary, since it is only the cause of something whose effect on human security is not actually certain; that is, it leads only to a *threat* to human security, rather than being associated with a certain erosion of it. However, as the following excerpt shows, poverty also figures in a secondary position in relation to human security, because its absence is conceptualised as a partial constituent of the condition of human security:

No doubt, there are differences of emphasis on various aspects of human security. Every county, every community, every individual will have [a] different sense of [the] most serious fear and insecurity, reflecting the condition and circumstance under which they are placed. For some, it may be violence, or conflict, or landmines. *For others, it may be poverty, or unemployment, or health problem.*⁷⁵

In speaking of human security as a fluid notion that depends on context for its meaning, poverty is not presented as something which causes *problems* that might have a corrosive effect on human security under conditions left unspecified, as it was in the first excerpt from Takemi,⁷⁶ but rather as something which *directly* threatens human security. However, because it is mediated by notion of threat, the relationship between poverty and human (in)security can be characterised as secondary.

The corpus of Japan's human security texts (re)presents little detail on the exact mechanisms through which poverty might affect human security as a whole, or its constituent parts such as dignity, livelihood, potential, freedom, wisdom,

74 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

75 Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html emphasis added.

76 “Poverty [...] is a problem that lies at the root of a whole range of threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity. From Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

fulfilment or survival. Whilst it seems quite obvious that poverty is a direct cause of malnutrition, deprivation and preventable illness or death,⁷⁷ Japan's texts themselves do not allow the reader to come to such a conclusion nor do they warrant the belief that Japan shares such a view. Furthermore, whilst the effects of poverty on the health and economic aspects of human security are intuitive almost by definition, its relationship to the less quantifiable aspects of the concept such as dignity, wisdom, fulfilment, freedom or potential are not as obvious. However, this is not to say that there is no detail at all in Japan's human security texts. For instance, it has been said that poverty together with "other factors" has a negative influence upon the health aspects of human security, by preventing "the vast majority of people in developing countries" from obtaining medical services.⁷⁸ Here the health aspects of human security are presented as being reliant on *obtaining* medical services, thus situating the concept of human security in relation to both psychological factors and economic systems in which services are provided to consumers. The psychological element can be discerned if one considers the construction of the objects of human security services in terms of *obtaining*, rather than say, *receiving* or being *provided* with medical services. To speak of people as being prevented from *obtaining* services, imbues them with a kind of agency, motivation, or initiative which is absent when they are spoken of in terms of being *provided with*. One needs to be more pro-active in order to obtain a thing than when one is provided with it, although receiving does of course presuppose a measure of initiative as well; i.e. the act of accepting that which is provided. However, to construct people as having a kind of motivation or desire to *obtain* medical services, is to imply that the *provision* of such services is necessary. As a result, policy comes across as a response to the desires of people, rather than as the creation of systems in which the provision of health services might involve the marginalisation of alternative concepts of medical care, or the limitation of choice to prioritise the interests of a particular cross-section of the

77 I am grateful to one of the examiners for raising this point.

78 Takasu, "What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People," May 18, 2007.

medical industry. However, such an ascription of agency is problematic, because at the same time as policy is depicted as being a matter of providing services to people who *want* them, it is represented in terms of a necessity to “strengthen the total system [...] including health care education for the people in order to enhance their awareness of availability of various health care services”.⁷⁹ So, whilst on the one hand people are positioned as wanting the health services of which Takasu speaks, on the other hand the strength of this want is undermined when one is told that it is necessary to advertise those services to people, so that they can avail themselves of them. Obviously, both kinds of human subjects can exist side by side: those who *want* health services of their own accord, as well as those who do not yet know about them. The theoretical problem is that the discourse offers no way by which to determine the proportions between the two kinds of people, nor a way to determine when the *enhancement of awareness* becomes *indoctrination*.

In distinction to the preceding representation of the relationship between poverty and human security in secondary and tertiary forms, the following excerpt speaks of poverty as having a primary or direct effect on human security:

While economic globalization has certainly brought about a higher standard of living for many people in many different countries, it has also enlarged the gap separating its beneficiaries from the people and countries that have been left behind. Poverty is a force that strips human beings of their potential and this applies as well to human survival, human well-being, and human freedom.⁸⁰

In distinction to excerpts discussed earlier, where poverty was either something which *caused problems* that threatened human security, or which *threatened* human security directly, here one is told in no uncertain terms what the effects of poverty on the entirety of the hard-core of the human security concept are: a

79 Ibid.

80 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

force which *strips* people of potential, ability to survive, well-being, and freedom; rather than merely threatening to do so. The text's presentation of all this in reference to a metaphor which brings to mind violence, abruptness and the powerlessness of the human (that is, *to strip*), is undertaken unproblematically. There are apparently no doubts as to the existence of a causal mechanism by which poverty is said to dramatically erode human security. Nor does the text question the presupposition of the ontological stability of poverty as a force, nor how this characterisation might influence thought or policy. One can see that it in this excerpt, poverty is brought up in a way which is clearly distinguishable from other human security problems which do not have concrete manifestations occurring in the present, but rather are said to pose merely a threat or danger to human security. However, as discussed earlier poverty takes various forms throughout Japan's human security discourse, and thus overall it has an enigmatic or fluid status in regard to the condition of human security.

Characteristics of Threats and Problems

Various kinds of threat

In regard to humankind as the object of human security practices, Obuchi situates a number of discursive objects in a relationship of antagonism with human security. These threats are represented as being of “various kinds”, with the implication that they are relatively new, since they are things which exist “in our times”:⁸¹

In our times, humankind is under various kinds of threats. Environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for future generations. In addition, transnational crimes such as illicit drugs and trafficking are increasing. Problems such as the exodus of refugees, violations of

81 The invocation of temporal markers, particularly *the now*, was discussed in chapter 2.

human rights, infectious diseases like AIDS, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines and so on pose significant threats to all of us. Moreover, the problem of children under armed conflict ought never to be overlooked.⁸²

As can be seen in the excerpt above, policy is to deal with threats to humankind and these are categorised in a number of ways. One kind is that of trans-generational threat, which is characterised by its corrosive effect on not only the human security of living humankind, but also on that of generations yet to come. A number of implications follow from this representation of threat. Firstly, the postulation of threats which function in regard to those yet unborn reveals a conservative construction of human nature whereby things which are considered problematic by people in the present, will also be considered as such by those in the future. Secondly, if future generations are expected to have to deal with the same problems that current generations are facing, it must be the case that the threats of which Obuchi speaks are particularly grave, significant and metaphysically stable; because in the future they are still likely to be thought of as threats, rather than as less dangerous or drastic things like problems, challenges, or nuisances. Thus, a static and conservative position can be discerned here not only to the idea of threats themselves, but also in reference to different generations who are presupposed as having to engage with these threats at some point in the future.

Aside from phenomena which are said to have a cross-generational effect, Obuchi's typology of problems which threaten human security also includes the following categories: things which cross national boundaries and are of increasing prevalence, those things which are characterised by their potential to negatively impact upon the human security of *everyone*, and things which should never be overlooked. This typology brings to mind Foucault's apparent laughter at the categorisation he discusses at the beginning of the Order of Things, and brings to the fore questions about the categorisation of objects in

82 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

ways which are seemingly incompatible, yet nonetheless have a logic for the compiler:

[The Order of Things] first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought [...] breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continued long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) *et cetera*, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies'. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking *that*.⁸³

With the above in mind and irrespective of the logic of the categorisation scheme in which the various threats and problems associated with human security are included together, to represent the category of threat as so broad and varied carries out the political function of blatantly and explicitly justifying a congruently expansive set of interventions in the name of human security. There is a difference between characterising threats as *various* rather than *diverse*; Japan's human security discourse does both. Whilst the former term points towards *kinds* of threats and brings to mind generalised categories, the latter one highlights specific examples and differences between them. These representations work together to paint a picture of a world in which the human is surrounded by peril from all sides. However, one also gets the impression that it is also a world that is known and understood; attested to by the very possibility of not only listing in detail what makes up *the diversity of threat*, but also categorising it in different ways.

83 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, World of Man: A Library of Theory and Research in the Human Sciences (ed: R.D. Laing) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1994), xv.

The breadth of threats

In light of the preceding discussion about the representation of human security threats as being of *various kinds*, it is interesting to consider that in speaking of a “framework [that] would guarantee the security of all”,⁸⁴ the implication for the construction of human security is that either the palette of phenomena listed as threats or causes of insecurity is so vast that it can cover *all* of the things that are considered to be security threats by *all* individuals, or that the conception of security is so narrow that it is indeed possible to speak of every individual's security meaningfully, because the threats which are of interest in policy are particularly narrow. The former implication seems to be more likely if one takes into consideration the wide breadth of Japan's representation of the meaning of human security as well as assertions such as, “it is vital that we all understand the diversity of the threat to human security”.⁸⁵ However, the discourse does not deal with the problem that this “diversification of threats”⁸⁶ and the postulation of beneficiaries of security policy at the level of the individual human, can lead to a dilution of the human security concept in terms of the elements which can be included within it, unless it is an *a priori* assumption that there are none or very few significant differences between the human security needs of particular individuals. Such an assumption would be problematic in regard to the claim that human security practice is at least in part about the interests of individuals, who must differ in significant ways for their categorisation in terms of *individuality* to be meaningful. In other words, it would not make sense to speak of the human security of individuals if these subjects of policy were conceptualised as being homogeneous in regard to their perception or understanding of threat.

84 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 43.

85 *Ibid.*, 44.

86 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

Threats as critical and pervasive

Another way in which human security threats are painted is in terms of their “critical and pervasive” nature.⁸⁷ To speak of threats in this way is problematic when it is juxtaposed with the idea of threat understood in terms of potential rather than certainty. This is because in the absence of certainty that a threat will manifest itself, there can also be no certainty of its critical or pervasive nature, except in hypothetical terms. Whilst there might be sense in speaking of uncertain and only potentially occurring phenomena as pervasive, if their presence had been perceived for a particularly long time, it is problematic to speak of them as critical. This is because the characterisation of a phenomenon's effects as critical can only be stated in certain terms after the fact, rather than prior to its manifestation; unless one relies on theory or assumptions to assert the critical nature *by definition*. Nonetheless, in terms of political function, framing threats in this way creates an image of dangers which touch the essence of the human experience deeply beyond an imagined superficial level, thus legitimating policy by an appeal to the undesirability of change and the spectre of doing nothing. To be exact, it appeals to a particular form of conservatism which rejects the presence of factors which might bring about the kind of fundamental change that could be characterised as *critical* or *pervasive*. What is left only to the reader's imagination however, is elucidation upon what constitutes a critical or pervasive threat or human security problem. A similar resistance to change can be discerned in the discourse's implicit characterisation of threats as cross-generational, which was discussed above;⁸⁸ connoting a conservative vision of future generations that will conceive of the meaning of phenomena – specifically regarding their status as threats – in the same way as do current generations.

87 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.

88 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow,” 1998.

Problems as interrelated, transnational, and existing in the present

The following excerpt presents threats as being interrelated, transnational, and existing in the present. As such, it works to construct the pursuit of human security as necessitating the role of a coordinator of the international community because of the apparent shared nature of human security threats, hinting at a looser conception of sovereignty, whilst underlining the necessity of prompt action:

Given the various interrelated problems that now transcend national borders, there has never been a greater need than today to strengthen and coordinate the roles of donor nations, developing countries, and international organizations, in addition to individuals acting as players in their own right.⁸⁹

The tropes of interrelatedness and particularity to the present were discussed earlier, especially in regard to the presence of the trope of *newness* that is discernible throughout the corpus of texts and its functioning to spur on policy by separating the past from the present to construct a sense of haste and danger. Speaking of problems as transnational appeals to the protection of the national self-interest, working together with the idea that even though each individual national-Self is at risk, no one unit can protect itself adequately because problems apparently “transcend national borders”,⁹⁰ and thus affect *all* the units making up the international community. These characterisations of human security related problems function to challenge older ideas about the obligations and rights of states, promoting instead what Paul Bacon has called “late-Westphalian” norms of sovereignty according to which “solidarist international actors endorse the principle of sovereignty but balance this with a commitment to universal moral principles that address injustices suffered by individuals or groups”.⁹¹

89 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

90 Ibid.

91 Paul Bacon, “Community, Solidarity and Late Westphalian International Relations,” in *The United Nations and Human Security*, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver P. Richmond (New

Complexity of problems

Another way in which problems associated with human security are presented is in relation to the notion of *complexity*:

The problems relating to human security are becoming increasingly complex, and in responding to these problems it is absolutely essential to provide assistance by means of a comprehensive approach within a framework of an equal partnership among recipient countries, donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs which address the so-called gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance and so on.⁹²

Complexity, as a characteristic of human security threats, appears in a dynamic form; since it has apparently been increasing over time. Presumably an element of this complexity is the interrelatedness discussed above, since the reader is also told that human security challenges have “complex *interlinkages* to each other”.⁹³ In general, the discourse has little to say regarding the nature of the complexity attributed to human security problems. Instead the details are left to the imagination of the reader, thus allowing for a significant measure of flexibility for the appropriation of human security legitimacy through the use of human security language to frame a wide ranging palette of policy practices. In this particular excerpt one can see the utilisation of the trope of complexity to argue for an approach signified as *comprehensive* and *cooperative*. Complexity functions to legitimate the extension of practices undertaken in the name of human security into a wide range of fields of human and non-human existence and experience, as well as invoking the necessity of establishing a leader or coordinator of the international community of states, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations.

York: Palgrave, 2001), 83.

92 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

93 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.

It is interesting to note that while complexity is presented as a feature of problems associated with human security, an ambiguity regarding the meaning of that complexity was discernible throughout the body of texts examined. Specifically, the text by Takemi speaks of *increasingly* complex problems related to human security, thereby connoting that it is the problems themselves which are defined by complexity.⁹⁴ As pointed out above, complexity is invoked in dynamic terms; problems must already have been complex in order for there to be meaning in the claim that they are becoming *increasingly* complex. However, to speak of complex *inter-linkages* between phenomena which are in a relationship of antagonism with human security, implies that it is the relations between those phenomena which are complex, rather than the phenomena themselves. As such, some ambiguity results because on the one hand complexity is ascribed to certain discursive objects *themselves*, whilst on the other hand it is said to be a property of the *relations* between these objects.

The ascription of increasing complexity to the problems surrounding human security is an example of the realist metaphysics which pervades Japan's human security texts. The excerpt above suggests that the apparent increasing complexity of human security problems can be explained through recourse to metaphysical realism. By focusing upon the problems and their transformations rather than upon the people who construct them through the production of discourse, the text implicitly supports an ontological status for these problems which is realist, or metaphysical in Rorty's terms, in the sense that problems are deemed to have an identity or nature which is independent of discursive acts of construction.⁹⁵ The complexity of human security comes across as having been *discovered*, rather than *created* or *developed*; thus implying that it would have

94 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

95 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 4.

existed irrespective of its empirical observation by a researcher, scientist, politician, scholar or some other profession ascribed with the power to announce such discoveries. This epistemological position is not, however, unique to Japan; such “cosmological realism” being a characteristic of human security discourse in general.⁹⁶ An alternative account might focus instead upon those very people who construct these problems through the linguistic act of theorising about them; in essence to argue that these problems come to appear more and more complex not when new theoretical connections are *discovered*, but when they are *made or formulated* by theorists of human security; a position reminiscent to that of Rorty's “ironist”.⁹⁷

The representation of those things said to be problems for human security in terms of *complexity* functions to legitimate state policy in two ways. Firstly, there is the sense of necessity, impetus and imminence that is built up through talk of *increasing* complexity. Secondly, the signification of human security issues as *complex* justifies a state role in the process through an appeal to, and support of the idea, that governments are still the only bodies with the necessary or sufficient resources and expertise to deal with various problems, especially in light of the implied limitations of the individual human being in realising its own human security.⁹⁸ However, the juxtaposition of complexity in

96 Kyle Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional Debate.,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2008): 383–401.

97 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 1989, chap. 4.

98 Interestingly, Japan's explicit appeal to states' monopoly on access to resource as a justification for a state-agent dominated discourse on human security can be contrasted with the human security discourses critiqued by Grayson; ones which which cloak or disregard this monopoly through references to a “democratic world” in which human security interests are pursued by numerous actors which include non-state ones. Grayson argues that such discourses omit to include the fact that “among other things, the state has an edge in financial resources, a monopoly over the ‘legitimate’ use of means of violence, a heightened ability to disseminate (dis)information and an advantage in the levels of energy that it can dedicate to perceived vital causes”. The difference between Japan's human security discourse and the one's targeted in Grayson's critique, is that the former proudly touts the superior resources of the state as a reason why the state should be involved in the realisation of human security, whereas the latter seem to obfuscate them in order to present an image in which the state's role is not out of proportion to the roles of non-state actors. As an aside, Grayson's critiques such “democratic world” themes because they take attention away from the potential that “national security paradigms can dominate and co-opt human

self-referential terms with complexity regarding relationships with other objects comes with a number of theoretical problems. The most obvious one is that *despite* the presence of complexity, the texts are silent on the *details* of this complexity, omitting discussion of its nature, meaning or ramifications. As such the discourse contains an unfulfilled potential for the facilitation of policy objectives through opportunities for the application of power that come when new discursive formations are constructed.⁹⁹

Increasing severity of problems

Not only are the issues and problems related to human security constructed in terms of a more and more complex and tangled web, they have also been presented as “increasingly severe”;¹⁰⁰ a characterisation which serves to give impetus to activities taken in the name of human security in tandem with the trope of complexity and *increasing* complexity. Ironically, this way of speaking about human security problems comes with the unacknowledged connotation that human security efforts so far have been relatively ineffectual. Since problems are becoming *increasingly* severe, it must be the case that whatever is being done to address them is lacking in efficacy. Here one can discern a problem of legitimation in the discourse: the promotion of continued and increased human security praxis through an appeal to its own inefficacy. Importantly, this paradox brings to light a consistent omission in Japan's human security texts: the matter of how to prioritise between human security concerns, and the measurement and assessment of efficacy of policy actions.

security ‘vulnerabilities’ to further state interests” See: Kyle Grayson, “Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor,” *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 338.

99 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976).

100 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003.

Context dependence in threat prioritisation

In representing human security in terms of “different concerns [...] depending upon [...] natural environment and other conditions”,¹⁰¹ Japan's human security discourse reveals a sensitivity to the influence of context in determining whether an event or phenomenon comes to be signified as a threat to human security. This postulation of context dependence suggests that, for Japan, human security practices are not conceptualised in terms of a blanket approach which asserts applicability to all places, situations, or people. But, the texts examined did not reveal significant elucidation about just what those *other* conditions might be, what exactly constitutes a *natural* environment, or how either of these sets of factors might impinge upon human security and how its erosion might be measured.

The discourse does thus demonstrate at least a kernel of theoretical sensibility regarding the identification of sources of human insecurity according to particular times, places or locations. It also suggests that prioritisation in establishing a human security agenda might be also possible, through the assertion that “every county (*sic*), every community, every individual will have (*sic*) different sense of (*sic*) most serious fear and insecurity, reflecting the condition and circumstance under which they are placed”.¹⁰² This expression serves to project an image of human security practices as being sensitive to the various concerns of different policy beneficiaries and brings with it the impression that policy is not about realising the parochial interests of a human security agent such as Japan, but rather the interests of all the various subjects which are invoked as beneficiaries; countries, communities, and individuals.

101 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, May 8, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html.

102 Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People,” May 18, 2007.

In promoting the idea that different subjects will have varying ideas about what issues are most significant for their human security, a difficulty for the discourse is the lack of theorisation on how priorities should be determined, and what to do in cases where the priorities of different subjects run counter to each other. If there is no specific delineation about which issues need to be solved first, there is an evident likelihood of conflicts regarding interests arising; either where subjects of human security policy disagree on how resources should be dispersed, or more dangerously in situations where different bodies consider the priorities of the Other to be a threat to their own human security. A consideration of the question of how one might practically go about determining individuals' perception or understanding of threat was conspicuously omitted, despite frequent emphasis¹⁰³ on the individual level throughout the texts examined.

Causality and agency regarding human insecurity

Japan's human security texts contain little detail regarding who or what stands behind problems which cause human insecurity or threats to human security. Instead, phenomena which are ascribed with a negative effect on human security, irrespective of the level of certainty associated with them, often appear as if they simply came about of their own accord, without the actions of any particular body. Indeed as pointed out earlier, they are sometimes ascribed with a certain natural, inevitable character through the metaphorical elucidation of globalisation as having occurred in rapid waves.¹⁰⁴ For instance, one early human security speech by Obuchi contains no references to an acting subject of

103 As was discussed in chapter two, this emphasis is ambiguous; it manifests itself in texts' indeterminacy regarding the question of who is to be the main beneficiary of practices undertaken in the pursuit of human security.

104 Takemi, "Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept," 2002; Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

any sort; neither states, individuals, people, nor non-governmental organisations are ascribed with a causal role vis-a-vis those things which are said to impinge on human security in either potential or concrete terms.¹⁰⁵ Whilst there is talk of *environmental problems* endangering people, *transnational crime* increasing, or in general *problems* crossing national borders or threatening human beings, no actual acting or causative bodies are invoked. Agency, as a consciously or unconsciously motivated activity of social actors working in the interests of someone or something, is rarely invoked in reference to problems for human security or threats to it, in Japan's human security documents. Instead, causes of human insecurity are often attached to non-human, inanimate processes or phenomena such as globalisation, economic crisis, conflict, structural change, or process:

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has experienced rapid globalization accompanied by the economic liberalization and a marked progress of information technology. At the same time, this process has significantly deepened (*sic*) interdependence of the world, having brought substantial benefits to many people on one hand, widening the gap between the rich and the poor both nationally and internationally on the other.

Today, as many as 1.3 billion people are forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day. The massive and rapid movement of people, goods, money and information encouraged (*sic*) transnational problems to spread, including the smuggling of persons, arms and drugs as well as infectious diseases. The economic expansion has worsened global warming and other environmental degradation and energy problems. Furthermore, the collapse of the Cold War order has triggered off numerous civil conflicts, whose root causes lie in religious, racial and ethnic contexts, accompanied by refugee and internally displaced person issues, anti-personnel landmines and small arms.¹⁰⁶

This typical expression of human security threats and problems does not refer directly to a social actor or agent which might be, either intentionally or not,

105 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998.

106 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007, 2.

causing human insecurity. Notably, the passage contains the implication that it is people themselves who are a cause of human insecurity, through talk of them being forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, a sense of an implied, embodied causality also lurks in the invocation of “problems such as the exodus of refugees”,¹⁰⁸ in which the blame for potential negative effects on human security is dispersed across a relatively faceless mass of *people*; though their actions are still nonetheless implied as being not entirely of their own free will, due to their characterisation as refugees.¹⁰⁹

The preceding discussion suggests that Japan's human security texts do not substantially address Bellamy and McDonald's critique of human security in general, whose case against the prioritisation of a state role in the realisation of the idea is in part supported by the argument that insofar as the causes of human security threats are concerned, “states are more often part of the problem than the source of the solution”.¹¹⁰ The only explicit case in which the state is implicated as at least a partial cause of human insecurity, can be found in an early speech by Obuchi in which he asserts that “both the state and the market, unless carefully managed, may well hurt human dignity by shoving

107 If the clause regarding people being forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day is apprehended at face value, one can see that the use of the passive form for the verb *to force*, takes attention away from a consideration of who might be forcing people to be in poverty. The ascription of a causative role to people for human insecurity, can be discerned if one considers the context in which the clause is situated; namely in a paragraph that deals primarily with causes of human insecurity. As such the idea that people are forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day suggests that dire financial circumstances have resulted in people undertaking behaviours which erode human security. Moreover, this unacknowledged ascription of causality suggests a conceptualisation of people as *homo economicus*; a form of behavioural determinism which prioritises economic considerations over the effects of ethics, socialisation, or culture.

108 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

109 In other words, their signification as *refugees* connotes different reasons for moving than would be the case if they were spoken of as *tourists* or *immigrants*.

110 Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, “‘The Utility of Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow,” *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002): 273. For another critique of the prioritisation of the state in the provision of human security, see Heidi Hudson, “Gender as a Tool for the Analysis of the Human Discourse in Africa,” in *Gender Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Studies*, ed. Kari H. Karamé and Torunn L. Tryggstad (Oslo: PRIO, 2000).

suffering on the socially vulnerable”.¹¹¹ The relationship between the market, the state and human security is affirmed by Thomas et al., who argue that economic downturns can represent a “serious challenge” to human security through their mutual relationships with political and social (in)stability.¹¹² However, Obuchi himself neglects to explicate the mechanism through which mismanagement of the state or market might erode human security, how such effects may manifest themselves or how they could be discerned.

Obuchi's assertion is unusual not only because it is one of only a few examples in which causes of human insecurity are ascribed to a particular agent, but also because this agent is said to be the state. However, the implication is subtle and indefinite because it is made through the use of the modal auxiliary verb *may*, which only indicates probability rather than certainty. Incidentally, the use of the verb *to hurt* reveals a characteristic indeterminacy in Japan's human security language, because of the term's subjective nature. This usage is nonetheless consistent with Japan's partial conceptualisation of human security at the level of the individual, since it is the case that an individualist point of view does give credence to the idea that each person could in principle have a different perception regarding the constitution of pain/hurt, as well as what might be a bearable level of it. The representation of insecurity in terms of a causal role for the state functions to present Japan – a state agent of human security – as cognisant of its own potential role in the creation of human insecurity, although the significance of this picture is tempered in the interests of Japan's positive image, by speaking of only a *potential* role for the state or market in causing human insecurity. As a result, actions taken in the name of human security come across as being constructed by a body which is self-aware of its own potential shortcomings and actively working towards countering them. In other words, representation functions to legitimate policy through an

111 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.

112 Nicholas Thomas, Michael Wesley, and Hee-Soo Kim, “Human Security in the Western Pacific: The Asian Economic Crisis and Beyond 1,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 29, no. 1 (2001): 131.

appeal to infallibility, introspection and sincerity; in this case the state as an agent of human security is not presented as all knowing or omnipotent, but rather as wholeheartedly attempting to realise human security in spite of its own shortcomings. Furthermore, rather than hiding them, it is not afraid to acknowledge these inadequacies and speak of them, thus painting itself in terms of, and appealing to, a sense of humility and honesty. As stated above, Obuchi's subtle implication of state agency in the creation of human insecurity is notable, as most texts in the corpus examined did not ascribe a particular agent with causality for human insecurity, speaking instead in terms of natural uncontrollable forces or implying that humans themselves are at blame for human insecurity.

An instance of ascription of agency for human insecurity to a particular body was also found in the invocation of problems associated with the “unprecedented moves of people, goods, money and information”, that are said to have come about in the present period of post Cold War globalisation.¹¹³ For the most part this movement is attributed to inanimate objects, but notably also to the movement of people themselves. As such, the discourse situates people as *both* an object of insecurity, as well as a cause of it. Unlike other passages – discussed above – in which problems were said to be at least partially attributable to mismanagement of the state or market,¹¹⁴ here the ascription of cause or agency is made only in passing and in relation to the human subject itself. This positioning of the human as both victim and perpetrator brings to mind debates regarding the ascription of blame to victims of crime such as rape, although in this text this blame is only subtly implied. Importantly, despite Obuchi's exceptional counter-example regarding the roles of the state and market, one can discern a delicate yet consistently implied representation of the state as being relatively innocent in the creation of human insecurity. As an

113 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

114 For instance see: Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.

aside, this apparently multi faceted, unprecedented movement is said to only “sometime[s]” worsen these problems, thereby once again revealing the contingent and contextual, yet also imprecise nature of Japan's representation of threats to human security. Moreover, not only is Sumi's exposition indeterminate regarding the cause of threat, and the conditions under which it might become manifest, he is inconsistent in characterising the origin of human insecurity. This is because on the one hand dangers are said to be “transnational”, whilst on the other he asserts that “in recent years many dangers have not come from outside boundaries”.¹¹⁵ This intra-text inconsistency regarding the source of human security problems aside, Sumi does not elucidate on the conditions under which problems might be worsened by international movement, other than to say that it is only “sometimes”.¹¹⁶

Human security is often represented in reference to the objective of empowerment of people, both at the level of the individual and the community.¹¹⁷ Targeting people, as opposed to states, is consistent with the notion of human security that Japan is putting forward because the concern is with conflict undertaken by people:

At the same time, in order to prevent people from relapsing into conflict and allow peace to take root, it is necessary to develop institutional framework to ensure rule of law and democracy so that 'human security' is maintained in a sustainable manner.¹¹⁸

As this excerpt above shows, it is not states which need to be prevented from relapsing into conflict, but rather people. From this perspective, the concept of human security comes across not as a concept which deals with the eradication

115 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

116 Ibid.

117 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 3; Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.

118 Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’,” January 26, 2008.

or regulation of state controlled conflict, in which states go to war as part of a rational foreign policy, but as being concerned with making sure that people do not engage in conflict of their own accord, divorced from regulation by the state. Again, as in the cases of people's movement or when under dire economic circumstances, people are implicitly situated as agents of their own insecurity. This form of representation gives the impression that human security policy, or the *human security/human centered perspective*,¹¹⁹ advocates one of two things: either the prevention of war policies by *other* states, through targeting the populations of those states directly in order to create domestic popular resistance to war, or simply the prevention of any domestic conflict which is not regulated or controlled by the state. Here the crux of the point being made is the distinction between state policies of *war*, and unwanted or unregulated instances of *conflict*. Fukuda seems to be painting a picture in which the problem is not state controlled use of military force, but rather popular forms of apparently random, non-rational violence on a mass scale; although the scale of conflict which is to be addressed is not specified.¹²⁰ He speaks of *people*, rather than states, in conflict. In other words, Fukuda's speech implies that policy is concerned with people, rather than states, as a cause of conflict which is said to endanger human security. In this case one can observe another instance of the deflection of responsibility for causing human insecurity away from the state and towards people themselves.

Fukuda's speech contains conceptual opacity regarding the relationship between two elements of human security: the issue of who is to be the primary beneficiary of human security policy and the matter of causes of human insecurity. The ambiguity comes from the invocation of two groups of people:

119 Global Issues Cooperation Division, "The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 'Human-centered' 21st Century," March 2007; Tsuchiya, "Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 'Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community'," February 25, 2003; Sato, "Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network," May 28, 2004.

120 These forms of violence are implied as being random and non-rational through their positioning in opposition to policies of state.

those who are to be empowered and protected as part of the pursuit of their security, and those who are to be prevented from relapsing into conflict. Both groups of people seem to be amidst conflict which causes human insecurity for non-rational reasons. The former group of people “have found themselves there”,¹²¹ suggesting that they did not desire or rationally plan to be there, but rather ended up amongst conflict despite their wishes. Since the latter group has the potential of “relapsing into conflict”,¹²² the connotation is that they are also amongst conflict or involved in it in spite of themselves; as if their participation was at least the partial result of some unconscious drive, desire, or illness. Specifically, ambiguity is a result of the indistinct way which this latter group of people is theorised regarding human insecurity. It is difficult to discern whether they are hypothesised as being causes of insecurity for the former group, whether they are themselves suffering from human insecurity which causes them to participate in conflict, or whether their status vis-a-vis sources of human insecurity entails being both victims *and* causes.

As mentioned earlier, it is rare for Japan's human security discourse to ascribe either threats to human security or the problems that cause them to a specific actor. Rather, these issues are usually portrayed as being unwanted or uncontrollable effects of things such as globalisation or economic crisis. However, Fukuda's speech is notable because it indicates an awareness of a need to face the issue that, according to the logic of human security, some humans' insecurity can result from the activities of other humans. It is because of the potential for such paradoxical situations that Foong Khong charges the concept of human security with “false causal assumptions”, asking rhetorically whether it “would [...] not be foolhardy to put the safety of Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters on par with that of the Bosnian Muslims?”.¹²³ Nonetheless,

121 Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’,” January 26, 2008.

122 Ibid.

123 Foong Khong, “Human Security,” 2001, 234.

the theoretical omission regarding the relationship between causality and the line between victims and perpetrators of human insecurity is not addressed in the corpus of Japanese human security texts.

In conclusion, this chapter has revealed and analysed a number of elements of Japan's human security discourse related to the representation of threats and other phenomena which are positioned as having a corrosive effect on human security. The chapter began with a problematisation of signification and securitisation, where it was found Japan's human security texts demonstrate limited sensitivity to the subtleties of signification and language use. It is the case that the literal interpretation and analysis of texts that has been undertaken in this thesis does not ascribe much importance to figurative, metaphorical, or common sense uses of language in which the gist is more important than precise meaning. However, considering the pervasive nature of human security policy on the everyday minutiae of human life, literal analysis was undertaken by choice. If promoted as linguistic currency through the norm setting actions of the United Nations General Assembly or the linguistic acts of states, Japan's discourse will make up at least the partial conditions and foundations of thought and practice aimed at realising human security, and for this reason the texts were apprehended in a strict and literal manner in which the nuance and meaning of individual words was assumed to be of prime importance. Moreover, this approach was justified because of these texts' role in communicating Japan's human security thought to a wider international audience. Since according to the discourse itself, "it is vital for Japan to express [its] ideas in a clear manner and to undertake the implementation of concrete policies which are founded on the basis of these ideas,"¹²⁴ it was deemed appropriate to examine the discourse in terms of the subtleties of language use and signification. In terms of this apparent intent to communicate, it is clear

124 Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'," June 24, 1999.

from the discussion above that imprecise and inconsistent signification has the opposite effect; that of adding opacity and ambiguity to constructing a shared idea of human security, and not explaining Japan's own ideas clearly. Furthermore, not only is inconsiderate signification a risk to clear communication, it also embodies a danger that texts will be manipulated to legitimate unintended practices taken in the name of human security. In a similar vein, whilst securitisation might be an effective way of affecting policy priorities of the foreign policies of Other states, it has the unwanted side effect of moving many mundane and private matters into the realm of security and legitimising them as points of intervention for the state or other non-human, non-individual body representing itself as working in the name of human security. What is more, Japan's human security discourse also reveals an ambition to hegemony, because it unashamedly advocates the modification of the policy agendas of Other states and international actors.

The discussion then moved on to show how uncertainty signified in terms of threat or danger is situated in a central position in Japan's human security thinking. Whilst texts did also invoke specific problems which were said to affect human security directly rather than being mediated by threat, in general there was a tendency for Japan to focus on things which *might* eventuate, rather than on specific issues which could be shown to have occurred or that might be observable in empirical terms or under specific, known conditions. With this in mind it is not unreasonable to say that Japan's human security discourse implicitly promotes the idea of prevention and pre-emption, rather than working to neutralise or remove problems after their manifestation.

Next, the chapter continued with an examination of the textual representation of causes and sources of threats and problems pertaining to human security. Commonly invoked tropes in this regard were the end of the Cold War and globalisation. Whilst under-theorised in terms of temporality or mechanism of effect, both of these ideas were used to explain apparent rises in human

insecurity even though their presentation was multi-faceted and led to tension and ambiguity in Japan's human security discourse.

Following on from the section on cause and origin, the chapter dealt with how texts have presented threats and problems as diverse, interrelated, transnational, complex or numerous, and how these images both work with each other, whilst also leading to problems and inconsistencies in representation. For the most part it was found that agency or cause for human security issues was not ascribed to any particular body such as the state or international community. It was also implied that humans were themselves at least in part responsible for human insecurity as a result of transnational movement and a lack of economic well-being.

The final analytical chapter which follows is concerned with discursive representations pertaining to human security practices and the relations between different agents of human security.

Chapter V: The realisation of human security

The previous chapter was concerned with Japan's textual representation of threats and problems related to human security. It was found that there is a lack of theoretical elucidation regarding the antagonistic relationship between various phenomena and human insecurity, and that to a significant extent the effects of these phenomena on people's security are mediated by the probabilistic idea of threat. This chapter is primarily concerned with an exposition, analysis, and problematisation of the representation of the relationships between those actors and agents which are postulated as having a role to play in the realisation of Japan's human security objectives.

Chapter four is comprised of two sections: the first introduces the agents of human security which were invoked in the corpus of texts examined, whilst the second undertakes a more detailed examination and discussion of the ways in which these agents are positioned in regard to each other, as well as differences in the way that bodies positioned as having a role to play in the realisation of human security are depicted. The discourse represents the realisation of human security as necessitating the actions of a large palette of both state and non-state actors. However, a significant measure of discrepancy can be observed across texts in regard to how much agency is ascribed to various agents of human security; ranging from the extremes of almost an entirely statist project, to that of a pluralism characterised in terms of equality and partnership between both state and non-state actors.

Agents of Human Security

At one end of the spectrum, Japan has represented the realisation of human security as being based *mainly* on the initiative of states:

Needless to say, appropriate security and economic policies which consist *primarily of responses mounted at the state level* will, as in the past, be essential for the resolution of [human security] problems.¹

Whilst non-state agents are not ruled out in this excerpt, it prioritises the state as the main protagonist in realising human security by signifying responses mounted at the state level as making up the *primary* form of practice. The mode of representation evident in this example is consistent with research which has charged human security with being a statist project that has lost its emancipatory potential precisely because of this kind of emphasis on the state as the main determinant of policy.² It is a mode of representation which leaves a significant space for the continued monopolisation of power by the state in the everyday minutiae of lived human experience. Vesting too much responsibility in the state for the realisation of human security runs counter to the necessity of protecting people from its arbitrary power, since the marginalisation of non-states in the pursuit of human security works to limit their ability to offer a critical perspective in the determination of policy agendas,³ and runs the risk of prioritising state interests in lieu of human ones.⁴ It is thus notable and ironic that whilst Japan represents its human security policy in line with the

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- 1 Keizo Takemi, "Keynote Address 'New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual'" (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html emphasis added.
 - 2 Tan See Seng, *Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation*, Working Paper Series (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), <http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4407>; Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, "'The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002): 373–77; Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, "Japan's Pursuit of Human Security: Humanitarian Agenda or Political Pragmatism," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 199.
 - 3 It should be noted that there are also pessimistic views regarding the extent to which non-governmental organisations can offer critical perspectives. Duffield, for instance, asserts that "NGOS have progressively become adjuncts and implementing partners of policies and interventionary strategies emanating from effective states [and maybe even] uncritical accomplices of Western foreign policy. See: Mark Duffield, "Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror," in *New Interfaces Between Security and Development* (presented at the 11th General Conference of the EADI, Bonn, 2005), 16.
 - 4 Heidi Hudson, "'Doing' Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 165.

Commission on Human Security,⁵ that body has argued that an effective human security policy should not rely exclusively on the state; that “the range of actors [should be] expanded beyond the state alone”.⁶

Whilst the excerpt discussed above prioritises the state in realising human security, in the following example human security policy is alternatively represented as necessitating the full participation of non-state actors:

One important point to be made here is the diversification and stratification of the players in the international community [...] On one hand, it is more and more essential to respect the individuals not merely from the standpoint of a beneficiary but also as a [*sic*] full-fledged players in the game in the so-called era of province⁷ or civil society.⁸

These two excerpts contain an ambiguous if not conflicting image of the importance of state and non-state actors in human security practice. In the first example, it seems unequivocal that states should be the main protagonists in the realisation of human security. However, the second passage destabilises this assertion by invoking non-state actors as *full-fledged* participants in international affairs. In comparing these two images – ostensibly at odds with each other in regard to the division of labour in the realisation of human security – it is important to keep in mind that they actually come from the same speech. To reconcile them it seems necessary to abandon the idea that being a *full-fledged player* is synonymous with having a role equal to that of the state in

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- 5 Shinako Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “ Human Security - Its role in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security” (presented at the The General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, United Nations General Assembly, May 22, 2008), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2008/un0805-6.html>.
- 6 Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 2003, 4.
- 7 Takemi did not indicate what was meant by “the era of province”, nor did the phrase come up again in any of the other texts examined.
- 8 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

determining or realising the aims of policy. Indeed, Wittgenstein's argument regarding the difficulty of identifying a consistent set of commonalities between all those various things which are called *games*, serves as a reminder not to be overly hasty in ascribing a phrase such as *full-fledged player* with egalitarianism or equality.⁹ At the most, it seems that being a full-fledged player within this game metaphor merely establishes one's access to a particular role in the game and that the existence of the role is to be acknowledged by the other players. However, the text under consideration provided no *a priori* justification for assuming that the existing rules of the game could change as a result of incorporating new players or that players' relative positions are to be defined by either equality or fairness; that they have the same rights, obligations, or powers. Indeed, even in a game such as chess, which is sometimes used as a metaphor for international politics, particularly in reference to the Cold War,¹⁰ pieces have different powers, degrees of freedom, strengths and weaknesses which are stipulated by the rules of the game. Moreover, being taken into the game can be a form of co-optation on behalf of the existing players, as incorporation into it can have the effect of legitimising the game, its rules and existing players, but without providing an opportunity for new players to change the conditions of the game. As such, whilst the players are said to have diversified, it is nonetheless not clear as to what their respective roles or authority might be.¹¹ It is clear though – from the text itself – that relations

9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Singapore: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2009).

10 For instance: Daniel Johnson, *White King and Red Queen: How the Cold War Was Fought on the Chessboard* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008); Suzanne Romaine, "War and Peace in the Global Greenhouse: Metaphors We Die By," *Metaphor & Symbolic Activity* 11, no. 3 (September 1996): 175; Francis J. Partel, *The Chess Players, a Novel of the Cold War at Sea* (Navy Log LLC, 2011).

11 Regarding non-governmental organisations based in Japan, their relationship with the Japanese government seems somewhat weak. Whilst there has been an increase in their numbers, their influence in setting agendas is limited by their relative short history of participation in Japanese politics, limitations brought about by tax legislation in Japan, and an unwillingness by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give them a role in policy making. For more detail see Yukie Osa, "The Role of Japanese NGOs in the Pursuit of Human Security: Limits and Possibilities in the Field of Refugees," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 251–265; Kaori Kuroda, "Japan-based Non-governmental Organisations in Pursuit of Human Security," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 227–250; Mieko Fujioka, "Japan's Human Rights Policy at Domestic and International Levels: Disconnecting Human Rights from Human Security," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 287–305.

between the various players are stratified. As an aside, it is notable that the context of human security is presented as being a game; a metaphor which brings to mind the idea of international diplomacy as *the great game* and contains within it a measure of cynicism or at least lack of due concern, considering that what is said to be at stake in the pursuit of human security is the future of humankind and its way of life.¹²

By expressing the involvement of non-state actors in the pursuit of human security in terms of it being “more and more essential to respect the individuals [...] as full-fledged players in the game in the so-called era of province (*sic*) or civil society”,¹³ the impression is that states have had little if practically any choice in allowing new players into the game; a conclusion which follows because the text informs the reader that not only is respect of non-state players *essential*, but also that we are in a new *era*. The representation of non-state actors' participation as being essential and a matter of change of era constructs an image not of states with unlimited choice, but the opposite: one in which choice is limited because of an inevitable and uncontrollable change to an epoch in which non-state players must be acknowledged and included into the formulation of an agenda once dominated by the state.

In a similar manner, regarding the extent to which states have been able to control or limit the activity of non-state actors in international affairs, the following example also connotes a certain air of inevitability and state powerlessness regarding non-governmental organisations' involvement in

12 The term 'the Great Game' became popular in discourse on international relations and diplomacy after its use by Rudyard Kipling in the novel *Kim*, although it had already been in use in the 1830s. If the metaphor was to be taken literally, it would not bode well for the realisation of human security, since it is only “when everyone is dead [that] the Great Game is finished. Not before”. Kipling quoted in Matthew Edwards, “The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder,” *Central Asian Survey* 22, no. 1 (2003): 84.

13 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

human security issues:

Under the existing international order, the state has been the basic constituent component, and within this framework, international peace and stability as well as economic prosperity have been pursued, with the advancement of the national interest as the key motivating factor. However, in coping with these many new problems, it has become apparent that this kind of framework is no longer a panacea. That is to say, non-state players--for example, international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, and so on--are beginning to play a much greater role in every aspect of efforts to solve these problems--from information gathering and the enlightening of public opinion to the mobilization of resources and activities in the field. ¹⁴

Because of the use of the passive voice, in which there is no reference to an agent that may have caused or allowed their participation, the assertion that non-state players are “beginning to play a much greater role” brings with it the impression that this role is becoming manifest in spite of, or independently of, the actions of states. Discussed in chapter three, a similar expression which hints at the inability or powerlessness of states to deal with change, is present in Japan's legitimation of the pursuit of human security in reference to the idea that states have had to respond to human insecurity because of civil society's insistence on accountability and transparency.

However, the following example paints a different image in which non-state actors have seemingly been incorporated into human security policy through states' rational, utilitarian calculations, rather than as a result of inevitability or a lack of choice:

This brings me to the complementary role of non-state actors, that is, members of civil society who are close at hand and familiar with the specific requirements of their fellow citizens. They are better equipped to interact directly with individuals

14 Keizo Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century” (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html.

to address their specific concerns.¹⁵

The implication is that non-state actors are a part of policy for the specific reason that they have a superior understanding of individuals' needs as they relate to human security, in comparison with the state's own knowledge. One is left with the impression that after assessing its capabilities and finding them lacking, the state has chosen to make up for its inadequacy by incorporating other instruments of foreign policy – in the form of non-state agents – into its human security policy. This representation of non-state actors as necessary in realising human security because of their expertise, adds legitimacy to government policy by creating an image of the state as self-aware, gregarious, and willing to share its power with non-state actors, all in the interests of human security.¹⁶ At the same time, the visage is problematic for the state because it can be interpreted as suggesting that government has inadequate familiarity of the requirements of the people, in comparison to non-state actors, thus destabilising its claim to primacy as an agent of human security.

The passages above have identified the postulation of both state and non-state actors as agents of human security in Japan's official texts. Whilst the realisation of human security is at least in part about the satisfaction of individual interests, policy is also sometimes represented as requiring the participation of those same individuals:

The objective of human security is to ensure that individual human beings have the chance to lead healthy lives with dignity and to develop their potential capabilities

15 Yukio Takasu, "Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World" (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.

16 The idea that the Japanese government has been willing to allow non-governmental organisations to have a role in the formulation of human security policy has been disputed by Fujioka, who argues that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has *not* been "enthusiastic about having NGOs involved in the policy making process regarding domestic and international human rights issues". See Fujioka, "Japan's Human Rights Policy at Domestic and International Levels: Disconnecting Human Rights from Human Security," 2003, 290.

to the fullest extent. *It is, therefore, primarily the responsibility of the individual to do his or her best to overcome any impediment and to try to fulfill his or her potential to lead a happy life.* It is the responsibility of the government, however, to provide a foundation or environment that will enable individuals without restrictions to fulfill their own responsibilities.¹⁷

This excerpt presents the realisation of human security policy as not only a matter of state and non-governmental organisations' practices, but also as being dependent upon individuals working towards their own human security by maximising their potential for a happy life. However, the fulfilment of the individual's role is dependent upon a facilitation function by the state; that of the construction of a context in which restrictions to the individual's role are not present.

At the outset, the above expression of human security practice is notable because it is different from earlier representations of policy, as consisting “*primarily* of responses mounted at the state level will [...] from a standpoint that gives full consideration to protecting the interests of individual human beings”.¹⁸ Whilst Takemi's representation of policy as *primarily* a matter of state agency does not exclude other forms of actions undertaken by non-state agents of human security – as there is still scope for *secondary* responses mounted at the non-state level – there is a significant change of emphasis here; from asserting that human security is primarily a matter of *state policy*, to stating that it is primarily *up to individuals* to realise their own human security through their potential to be happy. One of the difficulties in resolving the presence of both these representations comes from the different elements of human security which they implicitly highlight. In Takemi's speech from 1999, state policies are contextualised in reference to a non-specific measure of human security; it is

17 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

18 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

human security *in general* which is said to be primarily a matter of state level policies. On the other hand, Takasu's speech from 2000 brings up a particular element of human security – human potential for happiness – and represents it as being mainly reliant upon individuals' own efforts. In light of the linguistic and theoretical imprecision evident when these texts are placed side by side, it is difficult to come to a conclusion as to whether it is the human or the non-human that is to be primarily responsible for human security, or to determine just which actions are responsibilities of individuals and which should be undertaken by the state or other non-human bodies.

The excerpt above¹⁹ frames the realisation of human security as primarily a matter of individuals' effort to overcome impediments, whilst fulfilling their potential for a happy life. However, these objectives are said to be possible only in an *environment*, or upon a *foundation*, in which there are no restrictions to that fulfilment; and that the realisation of such a permissive environment is a role for government. Notably, this element of the construction of human security practice implicitly invokes a distinction between “impediment” and “restriction”;²⁰ terms which are similar in the sense that they both imply difficulties, originating externally to the acting subject, in the realisation of objectives. However, they also differ regarding the power differentials they connote between the individual and the state. The use of the term *obstruction* suggests a hindrance, albeit one which can be overcome. On the other hand, a *restriction* points to a more severe impediment, and it is here that the assistance of the state is said to be necessary. Whilst humans are ascribed with the power to deal with *impediments* to their human security, they require the state in order to be able to manage with *restrictions* to that security. However, the text lacks detail regarding the difference between these two limiting factors, making it difficult to determine the conditions under which assistance by the state might

19 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

20 Ibid.

be necessary. A consequence for the construction of the condition of human security as a function of state agency in the case of restrictions with which humans are unable to cope on their own, is a continuing demand for the role of the state in the achievement of human security, despite the presence of a concurrent statement positing that this role is mainly one to be undertaken by the human individual.

The excerpt above, from Takasu's speech at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow,²¹ is characteristic in terms of the lack of clarity that pervades Japan's human security discourse; a result of interchanging terminology and an insensitivity to the nuances of signification that were discussed in chapter four. For instance, the second clause in the above passage states that it is “the responsibility of the individual to do his or her best to overcome any impediment and to try to fulfill his or her *potential to lead a happy life*”.²² However, the next clause – which is joined to the preceding one through the use of the conjunctive adverb *however* – asserts that it is the government which should “enable individuals without restrictions to fulfill *their own responsibilities*”.²³ The problem is that the first clause is based around the idea of the fulfilment of potential, whilst the second speaks of fulfilling responsibilities. Despite this imprecise use of language, the impression is that the condition of human security involves an obligation for each individual to lead a happy life; although as discussed in chapter two, the discourse does not elucidate upon the factors which constitute happiness.

In constructing an approach to human security in which “each one of us [...] has the responsibility to lend a hand so that [policy] aims are realized”,²⁴ and where

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid. emphasis added.

23 Ibid. emphasis added.

24 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003.

“one sheep's care is all sheep (*sic*) business”,²⁵ brings to mind the mutual surveillance that Foucault brought to light in reference to the construction and operation of J. Bentham's panopticon,²⁶ or that of the omnopticon notion related to mutual Internet surveillance.²⁷ With this approach to human security in which the interests of the individual are shared by the group, one might imagine that an answer to Juvenal's proverbial question of *who is watching the watcher*, would be that all of the other watchers are watching the watcher, as well as each other. A conceptualisation of human security such as this, where it is in the interests of the individual to be concerned with the security interests of all other individuals, works to destabilise Japan's emphasis on the individual level in policy since an interest shared with all other members of a community is more reminiscent of an analytical perspective at the group level, rather than the individual level. Furthermore, this excerpt seems to envisage a form of human existence in which there is very little scope for privacy, as individuals' livelihoods, dignity, well-being, freedom and other elements of life making up human security, are conceptualised as being within the sphere of interest of not only states and non-governmental organisations, but also other individuals.

Representations of an international community

Aside from participation by the state, the non-governmental organisation, and the individual, the realisation of human security is represented as necessitating “the coordinated action of the international community”;²⁸ this is because many of the problems affecting human security are said to cross borders. Though an

25 Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html.

26 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Allen Lane (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977).

27 Sarah Elwood and Agnieszka Leszczynski, “Privacy, Reconsidered: New Representations, Data Practices, and the Geoweb,” *Geoforum* 42, no. 1 (January 2011): 6–15, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.08.003.

28 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow” (presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>.

international community is invoked often throughout the body of Japan's human security texts, there is little specification as to its nature or constitution. Because of the concurrent invocation of numerous forms of agency that are to be working in the interests of human security, it is difficult to ascertain whether Japan conceptualises the international community as being made up exclusively of states, or whether it also includes non-state bodies such as non-governmental organisations or individuals:

What is required for the 21st century is a clear recognition that the notion that “you are with us or against us” should be supplanted by a transnational esprit de corps among nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Such transnational alliances between government and civil society are surely the most effective method of combating threats to the security of the international community.²⁹

In this case, the objective of human security policy is that of combating threats to the international community, through the combined efforts of a number of different bodies: international organisations, non-governmental organisations, nations, government as well as civil society. However, it is not clear whether bodies such as civil society or non-governmental organisations constitute a part of what is meant by *the international community*, or whether they are just envisaged as working for its benefit. That certain bodies might be tasked with working in the interests of a group to which they do not belong is certainly a plausible, if utilitarian prescription.³⁰ However, the matter of the constitution of the international community is muddled if one considers that the beneficiaries of human security include individual human beings as well; and since human

29 Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in *Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow*, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2002), 44, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf.

30 Indeed, the question of whether civil society is independent or merely serving the interests of states, was posed in the context of human security practices in Southern Africa by Ngoma, through the words of South African President Thabo Mbeki: “(Does the continent) actually have an independent African civil society, because you have civil society organisations funded by the Americans, Swedes and the Danes, and the Japanese and so on, who set agenda(sic)”. Katzenellenbogen cited by Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In Southern Africa,” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 2 (2006): para. 3.

security is said to also be about the realisation of individual interests, the logical conclusion would be that individual human beings are indeed also considered to be part of the international community.

As discussed earlier, human security policy is said to exist in a context where there is a “diversification [...] of the players in the international community”,³¹ and so at least in regard to some texts, it does indeed appear that this international community also includes non-state actors. Furthermore, speaking of human security as “a concern of not only states, but also the international community as a whole”,³² presupposes an international community which includes, but is not limited by the membership of nation-states. However, Takemi adds confusion to the meaning of the term by differentiating the international community from developed countries, arguing that, “if the international community and the developed countries had extended to Somalia economic cooperation based on the idea of human security ten years earlier, [...] conflict could probably have been avoided”.³³ In other words, the invocation of both an international community *and* developed states presupposes a difference between the two groups, even though the significance of making such a demarcation is not explained. Nevertheless, the phraseology works to create an image of two kinds of international membership defined according to a state's characterisation as either developing or developed. On the other hand, a text by Obuchi implies that for the most part the term *international community* refers exclusively to states:

Since many of the problems affecting human security cross national borders, no country can solve such problems alone. The co-ordinated action of the international community is necessary. ³⁴

31 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

32 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

33 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

34 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

In this excerpt, the impression that *international community* refers for the most part to states is connoted by contrasting the idea of individual states being unable to deal with human security problems, with a co-ordinated international community that *will* be able to deal with them. Despite indecisiveness or perhaps just a lack of clear language regarding the constitution of *international community*, it is the case that invoking such a body as working in the name of human security, certainly adds an air of consensus regarding both the meaning of the term and the objectives of policy. This comes about through the framing of the pursuit of human security in reference to a co-ordinated, unified community of states being in agreement about the idea and how to bring it to fruition.

Although non-governmental organisations' participation in human security policy is represented in terms of them being a “credible political and social force and an indispensable partner in decision making”,³⁵ this image is destabilised within the same speech, through a form of representation in which the United Nations General Assembly appears as the place where discussion and definition of the concept of human security is to be undertaken:

In the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005, our political leaders committed themselves "to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly."³⁶

The resultant picture is one in which, whatever non-governmental organisations' decision making role might be, it does not include participation in discussions about, nor definition of, human security at the conceptual level. Moreover, whilst the role of non-state agents in the pursuit of human security is said to be indispensable, it is still contingent upon the power and leadership of the state; since “without the political will and commitment of respective

35 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

36 Ibid.

governments, there is a severe limit as to what non-state actors can do”.³⁷ As such, whilst non-governmental organisations are represented as necessary in the realisation of human security, they are also constructed as being insufficient for the task on their own or without leadership from the state; thus reinforcing the centrality of state actors in human security praxis.

Relative positioning of human security agents

As discussed above, Japan's human security discourse invokes a number of human security agents aside from the state, but it lacks elucidation upon the form that relations between them should take. Nonetheless, texts do represent – either explicitly or implicitly – the relative positioning of state and non-state agents in human security practice. One form of representation in which non-state actors are involved, occurs in reference to a recent “diversification and stratification of the players in the international community”.³⁸ An initial reading of this assertion gives the impression that recently there has been a decrease in the homogeneity within this nebulous and under-theorised community and that there has also been a change in the relations between its constituents; resulting in a decrease in equality. At least two observations can be made in reference to this picture of relations between agents of human security; both dealing with temporality. Firstly, it is implied that changes have come about recently, but there is no reference as to when they are supposed to have happened, or when they became noticeable. This kind of indistinct use of tense appears as a rhetorical device similar to one which was encountered and discussed in chapter three, dealing with the legitimation of human security policy in reference to temporal markers and distinctions between the past and the present. Secondly, one can discern a tension in the juxtapositioning of diversification with

37 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

38 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

stratification; discernible in the logical incompatibility between the terms when they are positioned in relation to the so-called players in the international community. The presence of the idea of a recent diversification of players in the international community works to create the impression that there was limited, if any, distinction between international agents in the past. However, one would assume that there must have been at least a modicum of plurality in the past, for stratification to be possible now; since to speak of stratification – a process – implies a change in *existing* relations. Furthermore, the characterisation of relations between agents of human security in terms of stratification is in tension with other representations throughout the texts where harmony, partnership and equality are foregrounded; and notably there is no specification regarding the context of stratification. In other words, whilst speaking of stratification brings to mind a vertical ordering of human security agents, one is not told what that ordering refers to; whether it is an ordering of agents' importance, significance, power, or influence in setting the human security policy agenda or some other element of foreign or human security policy.

As mentioned, other Japanese representations of the relationship between various agents of human security paint a picture of them working in a manner which is energetic and heart-felt and in a spirit of togetherness and agreement. For instance, interaction between representatives from developing countries, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, officials in charge of economic cooperation policies from donor nations, as well as “other people involved with these matters”, at the "Health Initiative in Asian Economic Crisis: A Human-centred Approach" symposium, was characterised as being a matter of “vigorous discussion”, whilst the outcome of these discussions was said to be “broad consensus”.³⁹ Yet, even though under some circumstances signification of events as *vigorous discussion* might imply disagreement or contest regarding the positions taken by participants in the symposium, that the outcome was said

39 Ibid.

to have been a *consensus*, works towards an image in which the participants' hard work, passion or effort is highlighted, whilst potential dilution or compromise of human security objectives that may have occurred for the sake of that very consensus, is de-emphasised.

The representation of relations between agents of human security in the establishment of an approach to human security in terms of *consensus*, works to promote policy through an image of harmony, like-mindedness, agreement and determination regarding the best way to proceed with human security praxis. It is also interesting that consensus was said to have *emerged*, like a natural process that came about despite any particularities of the actions of participants; as if the result was somehow different to a negotiated settlement in which parties compete to set agendas, bargain with each other, prioritise their objectives and sacrifice smaller gains for larger ones, use coercion or pressure each other to realise parochial interests. Consensus is a notion which allows for the dispersal of responsibility, since in its presence it is difficult to determine the locus of particular decisions or initiatives, or to ascribe responsibility for a decision to a body in particular. Furthermore, it contains a strong legitimation potential which can be used to reject charges of parochialism through the connotation that action is based on and promotes a dispersed, diverse and generalised set of interests that are not exclusive to any one actor. However, the invocation of consensus in the so called international community is problematic, even in regard to apparently formal expressions of it such as the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, of which Japan spoke at the 2008 United Nations General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security. By framing the General Assembly debate as a matter of “*our* commitment”, and speaking of “*availing ourselves* of an important opportunity to initiate [...] discussion”,⁴⁰ Japan appears to be expressing the views of all of the members of the General Assembly, through the use of the inclusive plural pronoun *our*. In a

40 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

similar manner, by asserting that “the notion of human security had been discussed at the United Nations [and that] the Member States agreed upon a common understanding on human security by this resolution”,⁴¹ an image of a international community in general agreement on the meaning of human security, as well as its agenda and legitimacy is formed. This is despite the fact that a closer examination of United Nations General Assembly statements reveals significant differences in opinion about both the definition and aptness of the human security concept and its pursuit. For instance:

The representative of Syria said that [...] the human security of individuals could not replace the security of the State and society, or “govern above it”.

The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation was not convinced about the very concept of human security or about the “value added” that it could have for the work of the United Nations.

The representative of Venezuela said he had joined consensus, but while progress had been made towards a common understanding of human security, work must continue to define the concept, its scope and implementation within the United Nations system.

The representative of the United States [said that] human security was a sensitive issue, on which there was a wide array of views on what it was and what it was not and, thus, a shared definition remained elusive.⁴²

The aforementioned representations of policy in regard to consensus and rational discussion were constructed in reference to the formulation of a conceptual approach to human security. Similar themes can be discerned in the context of assertions made in reference to actions that are to be undertaken, or are being undertaken in the pursuit of human security. For example, the Trust

41 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly ‘Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome’,” November 9, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/9/0911_01.html.

42 “United Nations General Assembly GA/11274,” October 9, 2012, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11274.doc.htm>.

Fund for Human Security is said to have been established in order to allow “governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organisations [to] work *together* to strengthen their responses to problems threatening human security”.⁴³ In a similar vein, a “human-centered approach”⁴⁴ was invoked in contrast to the so called “theory of state security”,⁴⁵ in which competition is eschewed for togetherness expressed in terms of an *esprit de corps* and *transnational alliances*:

What is required for the 21st century is a clear recognition that the notion that “you are with us or against us” should be supplanted by a transnational *esprit de corps* among nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Such transnational alliances between government and civil society are surely the most effective method of combating threats to the security of the international community.⁴⁶

The above expressions of solidarity and togetherness between agents working in the pursuit of human security, function to dissipate the impression that human security policy is exclusively a state project or that it represents solely Japanese foreign policy interests. Other variations on such themes can be discerned in Sato's statement to the Human Security Network:

For each of these policy conclusions, joint efforts and actions are necessary - a network of public, private and civil society actors who can help in the clarification and development of norms, embark on integrated activities and monitor progress and performance. Such efforts and actions could create a horizontal, cross-border source of legitimacy that complements traditional vertical structures. This array of alliances could begin to give voice to a nascent international public opinion. Human security could thus serve as a catalytic concept that links many existing initiatives.⁴⁷

43 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.

44 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998; Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

45 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.

46 Ibid.

47 Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network” (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004),

In this case, human security practices are expressed as *joint efforts and actions* as well as *alliances*. Whilst there is an exposition of the actions which are to be undertaken, the excerpt does not indicate whether all agents of human security are to do these things, or whether the roles are to be specifically prescribed. At the same time, the relationship between these agents is expressed as a *network*. This is notable because of the different implications of conceptualising relations as networks, rather than as a *partnership*, which is discussed below. The latter term works to form an image of close relations and joint decision making, whilst idea of a network connotes a looser or more informal form of relations.

Japan has also represented the relationship between states and non-governmental organisations in the pursuit of human security in terms of *complementarity*; an expression implying harmony, consensus, and a necessary pairing that makes up the implied lack which would be present if either party were absent.⁴⁸ This kind of relationship comes across as justified because of the apparent fact that non-governmental organisations are “members of civil society who are close at hand and familiar with the specific requirements of their fellow citizens [and] better equipped to interact directly with individuals to address their specific concerns”.⁴⁹ As such, the impression is that neither state nor non-state actors can possibly fulfil their human security mandates without each other's presence; an equality defined in terms of essential participation or presence. However, as with the game metaphor discussed earlier, a relationship of *complementarity* does not necessarily imply equality in terms of the roles, responsibilities or powers ascribed to either party, because the context in which the term is used by Japan does not indicate the characteristics or obligations of the respective, and apparently complementary, roles. Rather, complementarity only stipulates that both parties are required in order to realise the objectives of

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html.

48 Specifically, Takasu spoke of “the complementary role of non-state actors” in dealing with problems related to human insecurity. Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

49 Ibid.

policy. Interestingly, the idea that the complementarity of non-governmental organisations contains within it an “indispensable [...] decision-making”⁵⁰ function is brought up in a way which presents Japan as an erudite, rational and open-minded actor, due its ability to take into consideration the functioning of non-governmental organisations in political processes outside its own local context; namely, in Korea.⁵¹ Paradoxically however, the invocation of a decision making role for non-governmental organisations in the specific and historically bounded context of the “evolution of civil society in Korea after the economic crisis of 1997-1998”,⁵² can also function to provide an argument for the suppression of such a role for non-governmental organisations in a non-historical, present tense or future context. Such a rhetorical turn could be undertaken by arguing that a decision making role for non-governmental organisations was only justified under specific, historical conditions in Korea, but that in current or non-Korean conditions such a role would be unnecessary or unwarranted.

Whilst ostensibly consistent with the visions of togetherness and unity in the relationship between states and non-governmental organisations discussed above, and despite assertions such as “it is important for governments and international organizations to strengthen the linkages and *cooperation* with citizen's activities to cope with [human security] problems”,⁵³ certain variations on the themes of joint action are problematic in regard to the implications of power inequality between states and non-states. For instance, action represented as having contributed to the realisation of human security – Japan's signing of the Ottawa Convention against anti-personnel land mines – was said to have been the result of “collaboration” between Japan and “NGO

50 Ibid.

51 Did not explicitly indicate which Korean state he had in mind.

52 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

53 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.

groups”.⁵⁴ Consistently with the tropes of working together and eschewing competition, the form of relationship between Japan and non-state groups is characterised as *collaboration*; thus implying that the impetus for action was the free will of all parties involved, rather than for instance, coercion or political pressure. Also of significance to the construction of power relations, is the facile claim that this collaboration was undertaken by Japan as the *sole* state, together with *a plurality* of non-governmental organisations. Whilst the text does not make anything of this characterisation, to speak of non-governmental organisations in the plural form paints a picture that has implications which are very much in line with the assertion that human security praxis “does not in the least diminish the significance of the state as the basic component of the international society”.⁵⁵ However, this visage of imbalance based on the idea of the gravity of a single state necessitating non-state protagonists to work as a group, causes problems for the unproblematic manner in which state/non-state relations are frequently characterised in ways which emphasise equality whilst backgrounding their huge power differentials.

Presuppositions regarding the centrality of the state in the realisation of human security can be discerned in representations which seem to do the opposite; i.e. to emphasise equality. For example, the Japanese state – represented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency – is presented as having *recognised* non-state actors as *partners*, and as having entered into a particular relationship with them in which the state *entrusts* implementation of projects to them.⁵⁶ Whilst this kind of assertion can work to raise the profile of non-state actors from a peripheral position, it is also notable that characterisation of the relationship in terms of *entrusting* connotes the transference of a mandate and responsibility from one body to another, thus presupposing that one of the parties has the power to do so whilst the other initially does not. For this

54 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

performative utterance to be valid, the state must be ascribed with an authority that will indeed bring non-state actors into the fold of human security practice.⁵⁷ It is as if the state was bestowing upon non-state actors the right to participate and take action in the name of human security. To speak in this way gives the impression of a state-based agenda to which non-states are given access, rather than an image of partnership based on an agenda for action determined by both states and non-states together. In other words, whilst speaking of partnership works to paint a picture in which power and agency imbalances between state and non-state actors are concealed, to speak of entrusting non-governmental organisations with a role to play in the implementation of human security policy counters the image of partnership because it implicitly reinforces power imbalance and presupposes the power of one side to determine the conditions under which the other side might be allowed to take part in the realisation of human security. In a similar manner, Japan's presumption that it has the performative authority to assert that in regard to the health aspects of human security policy, "civil society should be included in a process of formulating health policies", it is implied that the relationship between the state and civil society is not equal, because only one party – the state – is able to determine the conditions under which the other party is to be included in policy practices.⁵⁸ In other words, the statement presupposes that it is the state which is in the privileged position of deciding who should be allowed to have a role in the practices of human security.

Japanese human security texts commonly represent the relationship between the state and non-governmental organisations in terms of *partnership*. For example, in a speech subtitled "Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World", non-governmental

57 For more on the presuppositions of various kinds of statements, see Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, vol. 10, Theory and History of Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 9–11.

58 Sumi, "Human Security and Health," 2006.

organisations were said to be indispensable *partner[s]* in decision making”.⁵⁹ Other examples in which *partnership* signifies relations between state and non-state agents include:

The UNTFHS⁶⁰ finances projects carried out by organizations in the UN system, and when appropriate, in *partnership* with non-UN entities, to advance the operational impact of the human security concept. ⁶¹

[UNTFHS] Operational projects shall be selected along the following parameters [...] Promoting *partnerships* with civil society groups, NGOs, and other local entities and encouraging implementation by these entities. ⁶²

Partnership, protection and empowerment are key words for human security and Japan hopes that this new security concept will be widely accepted to meet new challenges. ⁶³

Partnership is presented in a number of forms including “cross-sectorial partnership”, as well as in an intra-sectorial fashion which can apparently “take many forms at the local, district, national as well as at the regional and international levels”,⁶⁴ although details of these differences and their ramifications for human security practice were not found in the body of texts examined. It was also presented in relation to “factors that determine the success or failure of a cross-sectorial partnership”,⁶⁵ revealing a construction of partnership in relation to knowledgeable practice; that there are both correct and incorrect ways to undertake partnership around which a body of knowledge exists, although details of those factors were not presented other than the invocation of a number of so called “core principles [...] such as better

59 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000 emphasis added.

60 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.

61 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 2008), 1 emphasis added.

62 Ibid., 2 emphasis added.

63 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.

64 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

65 Ibid.

governance, community participation, the empowerment of individuals, new partnerships for development and greater public awareness ”.⁶⁶

Partnership relations are also presented as a fundamental form of relationship between all agents purporting to work in the interests of human security:

Any government must inevitably extend its hand of partnership to non-state actors including intellectuals, academics, think tanks, community leaders, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, and members of the business community.⁶⁷

The presence of the idea of *partnership* brings connotations of equality and egalitarianism; that associated bodies acting in the name of human security have a relatively equal role to play and an equal voice in determining agendas and forms of activity; although as discussed above it is the case that various types of relationships can be encapsulated by this term, and thus one should not presume *a priori* that an *equal* partnership is being implied. Framing policy in terms of *partnership* serves to take away focus from any parochial or self-centred interests Japan might be pursuing through its human security policy, since being in a partnership is at least in part defined by the common interests of all the partners. Another problem with Japan's assertion that human security policy depends on “an equal partnership among recipient countries, donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs which address the so-called gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance and so on”,⁶⁸ is that such themes of togetherness and equality are present side by side with expressions in which the position of the state is prioritised. For instance, Takasu implied that the setting of the human security agenda and the meaning of the concept are responsibilities of the state, through his announcement that “in the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005, our political leaders committed themselves to discussing and defining the

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

notion of human security in the General Assembly”.⁶⁹ Similarly, in affirming that it is “primarily the responsibility of the individual to do his or her best to overcome any impediment and to try to fulfill his or her potential to lead a happy life [but that] it is the responsibility of the government [...] to provide a foundation or environment that will enable individuals without restrictions to fulfill their own responsibilities”,⁷⁰ the human individual is implicitly positioned in a subordinate relationship to the state in regard to the realisation of human security, as was discussed earlier. This hierarchical relationship, which is somewhat at odds with representation in terms of equality or partnership, works to make the individual dependent on the state because even though people's actions are said to be necessary for realisation of the state of human security, they are not sufficient on their own. It is only when the state *provides* the appropriate base that people are *able* to satisfy the conditions of their human security.

Japan's human security practice is also depicted as involving “support [for] the initiatives of people”.⁷¹ Here the implied relationship between the state on the one hand, and people as agents of human security on the other, is characterised as being a matter of aid or assistance.⁷² As such, the impression is that the human security agenda and its pursuit have, at least in part, sprung primarily from the actions of the people rather than from the state. This image is

69 For example Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.

70 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

71 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

72 Interestingly, through the use of the signifier *assistance*, the majority of human security projects which Japan has funded through the Trust Fund for Human Security have also been presented in a way which implies a supporting rather than leading role for Japan. See “Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance.html; “Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security Archives,” accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/archive.html; “Other Assistances for Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance-2.html.

bolstered by the characterisation of people's actions in terms of *initiative*; a form of signification which works to paint people as working for human security of their own will and enterprise, rather than being encouraged or led by the state to do so. Notably, here the representation of relations between people and the state is different from the form it took in the above mentioned example where people are implied as being dependent upon the agency of the state for their security. In this case, the act of representation is different because the image highlights the role of the state in assisting the human, which does not connote as strongly the idea that people are not able to realise their security without the intervention of the state.

In a similar vein, to speak of a “foreign policy that moves hand-in-hand with the people”,⁷³ is to imply that human security policy is something which is desired by the imprecise notion of *the people*, rather than being an initiative of government or state. Consider the following example:

In accordance with this way of thinking, Prime Minister Obuchi, ever since he was Japan's Foreign Minister, has been *encouraging the initiatives of citizens* for the creation of a new international order for the 21st century.⁷⁴

In this excerpt, Takasu speaks of human security policy as if it was designed to help actions undertaken spontaneously by citizens; giving the impression that the government's role is that of facilitating a movement – the pursuit of human security – which came from its people.⁷⁵ This visage presupposes a clean separation between people on the one hand, and the state on the other. In reality such a distinction is difficult to maintain since – for instance – government officials are also citizens of the state and as such also constitute the people. The representation present here appeals to a common sense imagery in which the state/government is a body separate from that of the

73 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

74 Ibid. emphasis added.

75 Note that it was said that it was people's *initatives* which are encouraged; thus suggesting that those initiatives had already been undertaken prior to the involvement of the state.

people/population, allowing justification and legitimation of government regulations through – *inter alia* – popular elections or the idea that the government is working for the people and in its interests.

The following excerpt is similar to the preceding one, but it also contains an implied meaning which actually runs counter to the image of policy as a response to the initiative of the people:

In the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005, our political leaders *committed themselves* "to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly."⁷⁶

On the one hand, the framing of the derivation of a definition of human security as a matter of political leaders' commitment, invokes an imagery of a public to which this commitment was presumably made. As a consequence, the representation of policy – in this case the discussion and definition of human security – as a result of a commitment to an imagined public, also works to give an impression that it is the public which has called for human security, rather than it being a design of government. However, this form of representation is problematic because declarations about the necessity of discussing and defining the notion of human security at the United Nations General Assembly presuppose that it is still an undefined or incomplete notion. As such, it seems inconsistent to argue that initiative for human security has come from the people, when the concept itself is apparently yet to be formulated and elucidated upon in full. A correspondingly inconsistent strategy – which was discussed in chapter three – can be found in Japan's justification of its moves to take on a greater role in international affairs. Within one and the same text, it argues both that its human security practices are part of an overall policy aimed at securing the confidence of other states, and also that its pursuit of human security is a response to the international community's calls for a greater Japanese presence

76 Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security," May 22, 2008 emphasis added.

in international affairs.⁷⁷

Of note is the implication regarding relations between intellectuals on the one hand, and policy-makers on the other, present in the ascription of a role for the former which involves the “review and [analysis of] major global trends from a broad historical perspective [...] to present directions which policy makers should follow in formulating policy measures”.⁷⁸ Ostensibly, the relationship comes across as prioritising so-called intellectuals, since they are represented as being a guide for, and source of, human security policy at the conceptual level. However, it is also the case that the work with which intellectuals are tasked is presupposed as being rooted in a particular methodological framework consisting of historical analysis, the postulation of international trends, and the prediction of the future. In other words, whilst on the one hand the work of intellectuals is said to serve as a basis for the development of a human security policy and agenda, it is also the case that the way in which they are to work and the methods that they are to employ are at least in part exogenous to them, seemingly having been predetermined by the state at the outset. From this epistemological point of view, the impression is that it is indeed the state, rather than the intellectual, which is the locus of human security policy at the conceptual level; due to its role in choosing the theoretical and methodological tools which are to be used by intellectuals working on the idea.

As far as the representation of relations between intellectuals are concerned, their practices have been signified in terms of *discussion*; painting a picture of a calm, rational and emotionally detached group of people gathering pragmatically in the the interests of human security:

77 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.

78 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.

The "First Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow" was held in Tokyo last December, with the concept of "human security" as its main theme. Many intellectual leaders from Asia participated in the conference and, recognizing the realities of Asia in which diverse cultures coexist, discussed their visions and strategies for new development in Asia, taking "human security" fully into account.⁷⁹

Indeed, this detachment is implied in regard to intellectuals' national identity, since it has been said that:

In order to build such future, that is to say such a "tomorrow," the most important thing is for the intellectuals to gather by *crossing national borders* and sharing their confidence in the future based on common aspirations emerging from their intellectual dialogue.⁸⁰

In other words, the determination of a human security policy agenda necessitates the partial abolishment of national sentiment or the pursuit of the national interest in exclusive terms; an image which is consistent with other tropes in the discourse which assert that human security policy is *not* a project for the realisation of parochial Japanese interests as much as it is about the good of an imagined international community. However, this emphasis on trans-national sentiment in the formulation of a concept of human security works to destabilise Japan's support for the utility of national markers and boundaries, implicit in claims that human security is "promoted in full respect of national sovereignty",⁸¹ or that Japan does not "associate [itself] with the sweeping argument that human security concerns transcend national sovereignty".⁸²

79 Takemi, "Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century," September 1, 1999.

80 Obuchi, "Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," 1998 emphasis added.

81 Takasu, "Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security," May 22, 2008.

82 Takasu, "Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World," June 19, 2000.

The discourse also contains an unacknowledged position in regard to the relationship between the state and the human conceptualised in terms of a particular demographic group. By speaking of youth as a “resource”⁸³ in the pursuit of human security, the impression is of a relationship in which, from the perspective of the state, young people are objects to be used in the realisation of foreign policy objectives determined exogenously to them. At the same time as the youth of Japan are positioned as policy instruments, it is also asserted that “the commitment of the young of Japan is something that we must continue to nurture”,⁸⁴ thereby constructing the commitment of youth as being inspired, maintained and promoted through the efforts of the state, rather than as a result of their own, self directed actions. This image of the state steering the activities of young people towards the pursuit of state objectives, reveals not only an instrumental and utilitarian attitude towards governance in the name of human security, it also presents a problem for representations of human security policy in which the state's role was said to be merely the support of people's initiatives, rather than that of leading or formulating them. It is worth noting that to speak of people as resources whose commitment is to be nurtured, is not the same as talking about support and assistance for people's initiatives. The difference is that in the latter case, the impression is that the role of the state is only that of assisting or helping people achieve objectives which they determined or mounted for themselves. Conversely, in the former expression the connotation is of the state deciding the agenda and objectives of human security policy and working in such a way as to encourage people to promote that policy and take part in its realisation. Clearly then, there is a discrepancy in Japan's representation of the relationship between the state and youth in terms of impetus or motivation for the pursuit and realisation of human security.

As far as relations between non-human agents of human security are concerned, themes of togetherness and congruity are likewise present in Japan's

83 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 50.

84 Ibid.

presentation of a vision for the relations between two diplomatic forums said to be dedicated to human security; the Human Security Network⁸⁵ and the Friends of Human Security.⁸⁶ In distinction to Acharya's characterisation of human security as “*not essentially a multilateral notion*”,⁸⁷ Japan characterises the relationship between these forums in terms of *working together*, carrying out *joint activities, complementing and supporting* each other. Significantly, their relationship is also expressed in opposition to *competition*:

First, the FHS is an open-ended, informal forum of representatives who are supporters of human security and willing to work together to make its approach better reflected in UN activities and to carry out joint activities. The Friends is not to compete with the Network. Rather, the two groups will play complementary and supporting role by sharing information and good practices. For instance, the initiative by the Network to promote better protection of children in the UN FORA will receive favorable support from many Friends countries.⁸⁸

The expression of relations between these two bodies as *not* being about competition is noteworthy because it brings with it the risk that the objectives of human security, measured in relation to human beneficiaries, can come to be marginalised in favour of the interests of these two state forums. On the other hand, if competition was embraced like it is in certain variants of free market capitalism on the basis that it fosters benefits to the consumer rather than to the members of the market as a group, one might imagine that the consumer – in this case those bodies said to be beneficiaries of human security policy – might receive a better outcome in regard to their human security, as agents such as the Friends of Human Security or Human Security Network competed with each

85 The Human Security Network is an initiative between Norway and Canada which was initiated in 1998 under the name of the Lysøen Cooperation. See: “Human Security Network,” *The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa*, accessed March 19, 2012, <http://www.emb-norway.ca/Embassy-and-Consulates/norwaycanada/Initiatives1/humansecurity/>.

86 The Friends of Human Security is an grouping primarily initiated by Japan.

87 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” *International Journal* 56 (2001): 456.

88 Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html.

other to provide humans with the best service. Such a competitive situation – reminiscent of Waltz's notion of relative gains⁸⁹ – is feasible, but even if providers of human security such as the Human Security Network or the Friends of Human Security were to eschew monopolisation and compete against each other, Japan's human security texts do not ascribe people with the power to choose the nature of the human security policy they will receive or from whom they will receive it, unlike consumers in a free market. Without such an ascription, neither competition nor collusion between agents of human security can guarantee that the interests of individual humans will be prioritised in practice.

Whilst Japan's human discourse commonly invokes a plurality of agents in the realisation of policy objectives, little attention is paid to the details and technicalities of how various agents are to act in relation to each other. One of the fundamental tropes that surfaced throughout the body of texts examined was that of the international and interrelated nature of the threats and problems faced by the condition of human security. This idea is used as a warrant to make the case for an agent to act to strengthen and coordinate agents working for human security:

Given the various interrelated problems that now transcend national borders, there has never been a greater need than today to strengthen and coordinate the roles of donor nations, developing countries, and international organizations, in addition to individuals acting as players in their own right.⁹⁰

Notably, whilst human security policy extends to include a coordinator role, the wording of the passage suggests that coordination is primarily supposed to be undertaken in regard to non-human agents of human security, but not towards individuals. Directly influencing the activities of private citizens in Other states would be problematic in light of prevailing international norms of national

89 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

90 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.

sovereignty, despite Japan's ambiguity on this point in its human security texts. Nonetheless, if private individuals are indeed to have a role in the realisation of human security policy objectives, as Japan's texts have suggested, some consideration to how these private individuals' actions affect the initiatives of donor nations, developing countries, or international organisations seems warranted.

It is the United Nations – albeit without specification as to which organ – which is presented as being most appropriate for taking on the role of coordinator:

Someone must assume the role of setting an agenda for the international community as a whole and coordinating its activities. In my view, no institution is better qualified to accept this challenge than the United Nations, given the universality of its 185 members and its wide-ranging authority over not only political security issues but also issues related to development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, the environment, and social development in general.⁹¹

Placement of the United Nations in this role is justified according to an apparent universality based on its constitution by nation-states, although this universality only extends to membership but not function within the organisation, as debates about the reform of the United Nations Security Council in terms of the fairness of its representation suggest. Moreover, Japan's invocation of a universality based on United Nations membership clearly prioritises states in regard to human security policy, since it is only states that are represented at the General Assembly or Security Council. Nonetheless, the relationship between all agents of human security under the coordinating and agenda setting leadership of the United Nations is represented as being that of an equal partnership; without acknowledging the possibility that state interests will receive more attention than human ones, when an organisation made up exclusively of states is positioned as the coordinator of international human security policy:

91 Ibid.

In responding to these problems it is absolutely essential to provide assistance by means of a comprehensive approach within a framework of an equal partnership among recipient countries, donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs which address the so-called gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance and so on.⁹²

In conclusion, this fourth and final analytical chapter has focused primarily upon the textual representation of bodies tasked with realising human security and the relationships between them. A number of points serving as a summary can be made in this regard. Firstly, as far as agents of human security are concerned the discourse is for the most part silent about the distribution of roles in the pursuit of human security. That is to say, there is very little elucidation regarding distribution of responsibilities and delineation of roles in practices aimed at realising human security. Such a stance makes it possible to construct contextually sensitive responses to human insecurity as the participants in human security practices and their roles can be established on a case by case basis. On the other hand, it does not contribute to the transparency of such practices because there are limited grounds according to which policies can be assessed in terms of efficacy; a problem which is compounded by the lack of a concrete definition for human security. As such, human security practices are open to interpretation not only in terms of aims and objectives, but also in regard to who is to take part and what their roles might be. The end result of such a situation is the potential pursuit of numerous contradictory interests – undertaken merely in the name of human security – by actors who are for the most part required to work, in the first instance, in the pursuit of their own national interests.

However, it was found that one exception to this general trend, of not specifying who is responsible for what in human security practices, was

92 Ibid.

suggested by the prescription that the concept of human security and an agenda for its realisation is essentially a matter for states, implying that the role of non-states is peripheral thus limited to an instrumental role of implementation. This prioritisation of the state is troubling because it does not acknowledge the idea that the state is at times a culprit in the emergence of human insecurity and that non-state actors should be more than just instruments for state-derived policies and agendas, if they are to offer a critical perspective and contextually sensitive approach to human security practice.

Secondly, whilst texts made it relatively clear that non-state agents should have a part in the realisation of the human security agenda, they were ambiguous in regard to why this should be the case. The inclusion of non-state agents was attributed not only to a choice made by states on the grounds of rational calculation, but to an inevitable result of circumstances beyond the power of states. Non-state actors should indeed have a role in human security practice; including the determination of the meaning of human security and how it should be achieved. Moreover, there are numerous reasons for why their participation is important. These include the potential to offer alternative points of view which are not tied to the national interest or success in political campaigns, as well as a finer affinity with and understanding of particular groups and their specific needs or the forms of insecurity with which they are faced. However, that Japan's discourse rarely invokes these reasons indicates that there is limited understanding of the significance of non-state actors in policy amongst political elites in Japan and that their incorporation in policy rests on shallow foundations which reflect Japan's concern with being seen as a progressive and modern state rather than being a state which has an original or novel contribution to make in regard to the theory and praxis of human security.

Thirdly, whilst the notion of an international community working towards the objectives of human security was prominent throughout the entire body of texts examined, there was significant ambiguity in regarding the membership of such

a grouping. Whilst some texts gave the impression that it consists only of states, others implied that non-state actors are also part of this community, or even that individual human beings are in it. As far as the relative positioning of human security agents is concerned, the representation of their relations vacillated between explicit images of equality, harmony, and partnership on the one hand, and implications of difference and stratification on the other. This representational tension is particularly discernible in texts which prioritise the role of the state in determining the meaning of human security and an agenda for its realisation, as well as in expressions which ascribed the reason for the participation of non-states in the practice of human security to a rational choice by states, rather than non-states. The prevalence of the state in the realisation of human security could also be seen through the way in which the state positioned intellectuals as having an important role in the conceptual elements of human security policy, but at the same time dictating the mode of research that these intellectuals should use in their work.

The next and final chapter constitutes a conclusion of the four analytical foci undertaken throughout the body of this thesis.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

The research reported in this thesis has revealed, analysed and problematised a neglected aspect of human security: political discourse on the topic of human security as constructed, propagated and main-streamed by Japan. Instead of attempting to deduce or infer reasons or causes for why Japan has undertaken human security practices, the thesis focused on Japan's world view, as reflected in official discourse, with an emphasis on a particular element of social and political reality as inscribed by language: human security. Moreover, analysis did not proceed with the intent of ultimately making generalisations about findings; this approach was eschewed because it was deemed to come with the risk of taking away from the rich detail, nuance and particularities of the data at hand. One of the objectives of the form of analysis undertaken in this thesis was to uncover the details about Japan's world views – in the sphere of human security – and this included an interest in the points of textual consistency as well as inconsistency, difference and contradiction. As such, to attempt to make generalisations about the findings would only efface and trivialise difference and nuance; the only advantage of writing about generalisations would be to make neat and easily comprehensible statements about Japan's human security discourse, but at the expense of a more detailed understanding of the topic.

The modest contributions of this thesis to the body of knowledge regarding human security can be encapsulated in four points. Firstly, a form of conceptualisation and analysis which had not been applied to the field of Japanese human security policy was utilised. This involved establishing – as the object of inquiry – a body of texts published by Japan, purporting to be on the topic of its human security policy. These texts were conceptualised as political artefacts containing linguistic representation of a number of elements of reality which are associated with the term *human security*. In order to uncover these elements, analysis was organised around four general questions which served as points of departure for delving into the world depicted by the texts and for

discerning its details.

These questions – which promote an emphasis on the role of texts and language in constructing social reality – and the answers to them, make up the second element of contribution to human security knowledge offered by this thesis. Addressed in chapters two to five, they represent an opportunity to look at the act of writing as the researcher's interrogation of Japan's human security texts and a problematisation of what they profess to know about human security. The first analytical chapter (chapter two) inquired about Japan's conceptualisation of the notion of human security. This involved examining the bodies and objects which Japan posited as benefiting from its human security practices, the parameters making up the conditions of human security, as well as the nature and status of human security as a body of knowledge. The next chapter was interested in determining why Japan, or indeed anyone, should be interested in pursuing and realising human security around the world. The third analytical focus involved looking at the way in which Japan's texts represented and constructed the phenomena, events or occurrences which have a negative effect on human security. Finally, the fourth analytical chapter (chapter five) inquired about the bodies and agents which Japan has invoked for the task of undertaking human security practices and the relations between them.

The third point of significance regarding the research contained in this thesis, is the form of critique and problematisation which was applied to the four analytical pillars identified above. Although the style and form of each chapter differed somewhat because of shifts in analytical perspective, each chapter interrogated the political imagery which was found in Japan's human security texts in terms of the structure and validity of its logical conclusions and outcomes, differences and inconsistencies between representations of the same or related discursive objects, ambiguity or tension in representation, ineffective representation which led to discursive formations appearing as rhetorical figures, omissions in representation, recurring themes and tropes applied to

different aspects of human security reality, the ramifications of representation on human freedom and security and the image of the state.

Finally, the work undertaken in this thesis has attempted to add theoretical rigour, consistency and precisions to Japan's construction of the idea of human security and to bring attention to the significance that discursive practices such as signification and representation have on reality, the state, policy practices and human activity. The remainder of this chapter concludes the thesis by offering a final overview of the complexity, ambiguity, tension and selectivity characteristic of Japan's human security discourse, presenting a number of general observations and drawing implications for future research.

Chapter two – the first analytical chapter of the thesis – began with an examination of Japan's discursive representation of the objects of its human security practices. Numerous bodies were found to have been postulated as beneficiaries of these practices, including humans, at both individual and group levels, as well as the non-human bodies of the state, the region and the international community. In this regard, Japan's human security discourse is unique because it does not focus as strongly on the human individual as the beneficiary of security practices, as do other human security discourses. Human security practices were represented as being in the interests of all of these different beneficiaries. In principle, there is no theoretical impediment to postulating such a wide range of objects for human security practice, but two problems were encountered in regard to this issue. Firstly, there was significant ambiguity in certain texts as to the actual object of concern at any particular time because of an unreflective linguistic tendency to interchange human and non-human bodies as recipients of aid and assistance. Secondly, the discourse did not indicate a way by which to resolve the conflicts of interests which are implicit in concurrently situating the security interests of individual humans, groups of humans, and non-human entities as the objective of policy practices. Whilst lacking theoretical precision and elucidation, the positioning of all of

these bodies as objects of security practice functioned to legitimate policy taken in the name of human security over an exceedingly wide range of objects.

The primary focus of the second chapter was Japan's representation of the constituent parts and parameters of the condition of human security. An extensive range of over thirty five elements, covering social, psychological, spiritual, biological and economic fields, was found to have been brought up throughout the discourse to give the concept meaning. However, most of these constituent parts were invoked only in individual cases and without definition or theoretical elucidation. The state of human security was not represented merely in terms of the maintenance of biological life or the prevention of injury, but also encompassed the way in which people's life should proceed or be led. The postulation of a wide palette of human security variables was found to work towards the legitimation of a broad range of interventions – by legitimate agents of human security – in the everyday lived experience of all of those bodies that fall within the category of the human.

The three most invoked and elucidated upon elements of the condition of human security were found to be survival, dignity and livelihood. However, the meaning attributed to these three concepts was unstable both across and within particular texts. Textual representation of dignity was found to have been imprecise, under-theorised and ambiguous. The most cohesive expressions of human individuals' dignity were constructed in terms of the life experiences and conditions of others and individuals' economic well-being. However, texts did not indicate the mechanism through which the dignity of the Self could be either enhanced or eroded by the experiences of the Other. One of the consequences of this oversight, was difficulty in ascertaining whether all people could achieve an acceptable level of dignity at the same time, or whether its acquisition by one person could only be at the expense of another's. Furthermore, a specification of acceptable levels of dignity was not encountered in any of the texts examined. The relationship between individuals' levels of dignity was constructed only in

the potential form, with texts failing to indicate the conditions under which the Other's life conditions would affect the dignity of the Self. This dynamic and relative concept of dignity was posited as being realisable in the future – as a result of human security practices – but due to a lack of theoretical precision regarding the temporal delineations between the present and the future, it functioned merely to legitimate perpetual human security practices, rather than to offer criteria for measuring absolute or relative changes in people's dignity. The association of dignity with economic well-being was under-theorised because no grounds were offered for accepting the notion that an increase in one's affluence would cause a corresponding improvement in dignity. The construction of dignity also lacked a specification as to whether it should be conceptualised in subjective or objective terms, and means by which one might measure dignity in either relative or absolute terms were not present in the texts examined. Consequently, it was not possible to conceive of the situations under which an intervention in the interests of human dignity might be justified. The notion of dignity's proximity to the idea of value was problematic because it ascribed human security practice with an instrumental character in which individuals' dignity was a function of their value to the state. In light of the centrality of the notion of dignity in Japan's human security discourse, an interesting avenue for future research might be that of considering the extent to which dignity pervades or is present in Japan's general political discourse. Its cursory and inconsistent treatment in the texts making up the body of Japan's human security discourse – specifically in regard to questions about the point of view from which it should be conceptualised, how it should be measured or even discerned or how individuals might be guided to treat each other in more dignified ways – might indicate that dignity is not a particularly salient element of Japanese domestic political discourse. Rather, on the face of it, it seems that its presence in Japan's human security discourse is merely the continuation of an ongoing international trend of invoking the concept without elucidation, rather than an attempt to develop it or incorporate a sophisticated, pre-existing Japanese version of it within the concept of human security.

In comparison to dignity, the construction of life was more complex. One mode of its representation invoked the activities people pursued on a daily basis, but without specifying what those activities actually were or if individual differences in daily behaviour were to be taken into account. A similar form of construction encountered was one in which life was conceived of as a set of recurring patterns of daily activity which should not be hurt or disrupted. In this case too, there was no indication as to what made up these patterns of activity, how they could be discerned or measured, or what constituted either hurt or disruption to them. As in the case of dignity, temporal delineations were vague, such that it was not possible to determine how quickly changes would need to occur in order for them to be signified as sudden. Life under a human security regime was also posited in temporal terms; both in the sense that human security was represented as having a positive correlation with one's life expectancy, and that it was not only the human security of living people which should be of interest, but that as yet unborn, future generations should be taken into account when assessing threats to human security.

Another aspect of life under the conditions of human security was that of creativity. Although the form that creativity should take was not stipulated, it was found to have been delineated according to the prescription that it must be concurrent to individuals being happy; albeit without indication of how happiness itself should be understood or assessed. Human security was also constructed in terms of people having the freedom to live their lives in a way whereby they could take responsibility for themselves and make their own choices. However, texts did not acknowledge or deal with the potential for situations arising in which people chose not to take responsibility for themselves, decided that the realisation of human security is their own responsibility rather than the state's or rejected the terms of state human security policies or definitions. The inclusion of these forms of freedom as part of the condition of human security was justified according to their apparent utility in generating a sort of wisdom which has apparently allowed the human species to overcome numerous and various – albeit unspecified – difficulties.

However, texts did not explain the ways in which it might be possible for individual choices to contribute to a form of wisdom which is applicable to all members of the species. The freedom to participate in family life also constituted Japan's representation of human security. Nonetheless, the definition of relations making up the idea of a legitimate family life was not catalogued despite the fact that some forms – such as nepotism – are generally decried in democratic societies. Expressions of life as a matter of the freedom to make choices and be responsible for one's self were found to be dependent upon the existence of a body which would provide such freedom, thus functioning to promote the continued role of the state in facilitating individuals' human security, even in cases where people did in fact choose to take responsibility for their own human security. What is more, postulation of human security as dependent upon a form of freedom which necessitates the presence of the state leads to an unstable version of human security, because it cannot be maintained in cases where the state might suspend that freedom or change its definition.

Life was also found to have been positioned in relation to the idea of a vital core; an opaque concept which appeared variously as a non-definitive point of departure for the definition of human security, as a part of the concept of human security, or as something which could – in unspecified ways – function to promote collaboration between states in the pursuit of human security. Texts' assertions that the vital core should be protected in ways which enhance human freedom and fulfilment led to the logical implication that this core could conceivably also be protected in ways which do *not* lead to either freedom or fulfilment and this was problematic in the discourse because, in light of an absence of further theorisation, the relationship between the vital core and human security could not be clearly pinpointed. The ambiguity, under-theorisation and incomprehensibility of the idea of the vital core led to the impression that its invocation functioned only to represent human security practices as a beneficial and effective way to affect some deeply hidden yet fundamental element of the experience of human life.

Despite being a part of the most commonly evoked elements of human security, livelihood was defined only in terms of an opposition to poverty, with no consideration of alternative or holistic definitions of the concept. No specification was provided as to whether understandings of livelihood should be determined objectively or subjectively, although the lack of reference to humans' own thoughts, beliefs or priorities regarding the meaning of livelihood suggested an objective conceptualisation determined endogenously to the human object of human security practice.

Chapter two concluded with an examination of Japan's human security discourse from an epistemological point of view. Japan implicitly represented itself as a source of wide ranging knowledge about human security in terms of history, explanatory, normative and predictive theory, ethics and quantitative social science. However, non-traditional forms of knowledge or personal experience did not figure as components of its understanding of human security. It was also found that texts catered to a particular audience which was characterised by a knowledge of English and the resources which would allow access to these texts through the Internet, participation in human security themed symposia or conferences organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, or its status as a member of the United Nations or other state-based organisation. As such, the human security knowledge which Japan offered through its official documents and speeches was unlikely to be accessed by those people whose human security was often said to be at stake; the people of poorer, developing nations where English is not the native language.

An element of scientificity was prevalent through Japan's representation of the concept of human security; based on the invocation of factors, probability, potential, prediction, statistical data and quantification in talk about the concept. This element functioned to legitimate and justify human security policy through the idea that a scientific approach can offer truth, certainty and a

panacea to disorder. However, the close relationship between probabilistic thought and uncertainty – most conspicuous in reference to the idea of threat – remained unacknowledged throughout the body of texts under examination.

Economic measurements of human security were made in both absolute as well as relative terms. The most salient examples of this were assertions about people having to live for less than the arbitrary sum of one dollar per day, and ones which emphasised the apparently increasing gap between the rich and poor. Relative comparisons were undertaken at both the domestic and international level, but without thought about how it might be possible to meaningfully compare relative income across political or economic systems on an international level. Postulation of absolute measures did not address the issue of just why one dollar should serve as a baseline for acceptable limits, and the ramification that such a measure is at odds with the idea that if human security is to be measured at an individual level with people indicating what insecurity means to them subjectively, other economic baselines need also to be taken seriously if they represent a source of insecurity for particular individuals.

The presence of the concept of human security was represented as the result of an evolution; giving the impression that human security thought has been the outcome of a natural, inevitable process based on consensus and harmony, rather than as a result of political contest and schism. Moreover, human security was depicted as an extension of the notion of state security, which worked towards ascribing human security practices with the same kind of traditional normalcy associated with the practices of state security. At the same time, the concept of human security was commonly represented in terms of newness, but a lack of precision or consistency was evident in regard to the use of this signifier; it having been attached not only to human security as a concept, but also as a phrase and as a set of practices. Moreover, texts did not explicate the nature of that newness. Indeed, ascriptions of newness to human security were problematic because the concept, as represented by Japan, shared certain

characteristics with older forms of knowledge such as political (neo)realism, Critical Theory and feminist theories of international relations. Furthermore, Japan destabilised its construction of human security policy as new by indicating that it was a traditional element of statecraft. Characterisation of human security in terms of newness was accompanied by statements which asserted that human security practices are necessary in the present, working to create a sense of urgency that legitimated the application of these apparently new security practices.

Finally in chapter two, Japan's human security texts were found to have represented the origin of ideas about human security in a complex way in which the United Nations Development Programme took on a seminal role in regard to a number of different facets of human security. Together with assertions that Japan's human security thought is closely related to that of the United Nations Development Programme, an image was formed in which Japan's practices appeared as being in the interests of all states rather than just particular Japanese ones. However, some representational instability was also discerned in regard to the question of the source of human security, due to the presence of a text which strongly implied that human security was a Japanese concept.

The focus of chapter three was the justification, legitimation, and reasoning which Japan has presented for the pursuit of human security. It was found that over twenty distinct discursive strategies functioned to cast human security practice as legitimate, natural, and warranted. These could be categorised according to whether the beneficiary was presented as human, whether reason or non-reason was used to frame policy, and according to whether the condition of human security was a means to an end or an end in itself. There was some tendency for legitimation made in reference to the human subject to be characterised by non-rational appeals, whilst that made in regard to the non-human subject was more often found to be spurred on by rational considerations. Non-rational arguments were couched in language that evoked

beliefs or convictions that the condition of human security is an apt pursuit, whereas rational arguments brought to mind calculations about the tangible, reasonable benefits of policy practices.

A characteristic tension in Japan's human security discourse was discernible if one compared two kinds of framing that were found to be present in its texts on the subject. On the one hand, there were those formations which asserted that human security should be pursued because it can facilitate the realisation of objectives conceptualised with a non-human beneficiary – such as the state – in mind. On the other hand, other excerpts promoted the pursuit of human security as an end in itself, measured in terms of the interests of the human, either at the individual or group level. A potential conflict of interest was inherent – unannounced and unresolved in Japan's human security documents – between these two kinds of beneficiaries. Its manifestation was likely to occur in the case of a simultaneous pursuit of human security on its own terms, with its pursuit as an end in itself.

As far as the relatively sparse non-rational justifications for the pursuit of human security are concerned, it was found that speeches invoked needs, beliefs, convictions, or a heavenly mandate, as well as normative imperatives expressed through the auxiliary verbs *must* or *should*. However, in these contexts there was little explanation for why the security of humans should actually be pursued on its own terms, other than to assert implicitly or explicitly that it was apt to do so. Moreover, to speak in non-rational and normative terms about the human security imperative had the effect of taking away a critical attitude from policy, insofar as such terms represent unquestionable, matter-of-fact and seemingly obvious points of view. Such a non-reflexive attitude was most discernible in expressions which suggested that the pursuit of human security was the will of God.

As a way of legitimating policy, the concept of need was found to have functioned in reference to more than one beneficiary. Whilst some speeches spoke of the needs of the people, others invoked the needs of the international community or states, whilst a third category framed policy in regard to need but without specifying exactly who it was that apparently needed human security practices. Moreover, such expressions of legitimation in reference to the human beneficiary were aimed at both the entirety of humankind, as well as at a subset defined in terms of the severity of their life conditions. However, the discourse remained silent on both the potential conflicts of interests that might arise between these two groups, as well as on a benchmark by which to judge whether a person's conditions qualified as severe.

For the most part, need was invoked without elucidation on its basis or nature; texts did not indicate whether it was based on, for instance, physiological, psychological or social factors and thus it was not possible to determine the consequences of not pursuing human security. A notable exception could be seen in an excerpt which conceptualised needs in reference to state political legitimacy; explaining the imperative to undertake human security practices as a way by which to maintain the state's right of being. However, this argument was found to be circular because it was based upon the presupposition that the realisation of human security is a responsibility of the state.

Development figured as a common trope of policy legitimation in the texts examined, having been applied to a number of distinct discursive objects of human security practice. Regional, economic, and human development were all brought up as either the final objective of human security measures, or as processes through which human security could be accomplished. However, a difficulty regarding the positioning of development as a reason for undertaking human security practices, was the textual ambiguity about whether development practices were conceptualised as a way by which to realise human security aims, or whether the condition of human security facilitated

development objectives conceptualised at the level of the state and endogenously to the interests of individual human beings. In relation to themes regarding development, the idea that the condition of human security was a goal in itself was destabilised through the implicit construction of human beings as resources which could be utilised in the realisation of state based objectives or as having value, albeit without specification as to the designs in which people figured as resources nor elucidation on the nature of the value with which they were ascribed.

The promise of a better future figured prominently as a device for the promotion of human security practice. One of the ways it functioned was through the creation of an image of foresight, planning and certainty around policy practices, as well as by highlighting shared interests between states while de-emphasising the idea that policy was concerned with realising only parochial Japanese foreign policy aims. However, such formations were found to have concealed a significant measure of variance amongst states in regard to the utility of human security practice or the validity of the concept in regard to norms of state sovereignty. Policy was also promoted through the idea that human security practices are necessary to create better future conditions in the interests of both those yet unborn, as well as those already living, revealing a conservative vision of human nature and society. Another use of temporality based on the idea of the future, was legitimation based on the notion that policy should address issues in such a way that current conditions do not turn into future insecurity. Temporal invocations of the future were problematic not least because of a lack of clarity regarding the way in which one might be able to objectively and accurately distinguish the present from the future or the past. Moreover, expressions utilising the idea of temporality did not include a discussion of, or solution to, conflicts of interests that are inherent in the postulation of a better future for a number of distinct beneficiaries which included the individual, society, future generations, or the international community. The use of the idea of a better future as a way to spur on human security policy was also problematic because this image was sometimes

constructed in terms of hierarchical relations between agents of human security, whilst at other times it was represented in terms of an absence of stratification between them.

The rationalisation of policy in reference to an idealised future was discussed in relation to a number of other tropes that functioned to provide reasonable grounding for the pursuit of human security. One of these was the promise of a new international order or system. This trope was problematic because it was not accompanied by a specific consideration of the perspective from which order was being conceptualised, what its component parts were to be, nor whose interests it served. It was also the case that some expressions of policy in terms of the realisation of a new order were buttressed through reference to the needs of an opaque, homogeneous and under-theorised notion of the people. Invocations of order functioned to add legitimacy to human security practice through the guarantee of certainty and a rejection of chaos and disorder. Textual treatments of international order were contradictory in regard to the direction of causality because they tended to vacillate between a conceptualisation of human security as a result of international order and one in which human security was itself the condition of this order.

Expressions regarding the future benefits of pursuing human security in the present were also constructed in terms of its apparent utility in generating a form of wisdom which has historically allowed all of humanity to overcome various problems, albeit without specification as to how this wisdom could be shared or what those various problems have been. In this case, human security was also partially defined in terms of people's freedom to take responsibility for themselves and to live creative and meaningful lives. However, such prescriptions were problematic because they did not indicate how the potential for living life in a particular way might become manifest if people chose not to take advantage of their freedom or potential. Legitimation tropes utilising the ideas of freedom, wisdom, and potential relied on the invocation of the idea of

human history, but just as notions regarding the future were imprecise in reference to temporality, the discourse did not indicate which particular periods of history were being conceptualised, nor whose history was of interest. As such, they came across as rhetorical devices which worked to create an image of human insecurity as being a universal problem, rather than as theoretical clarifications about the meaning of human security or its normative underpinnings. Fulfilment was also found to be amongst the constructs used in the context of a better future, but without specification as to its precise meaning or ways in which to differentiate so-called *long term* fulfilment from short or medium term fulfilment.

A commonly encountered implicit argument for the pursuit of human security was discernible in frequent connotations of international and domestic norms, as well as consensus within an imagined international community. It was found that despite invoking human security activities of non-state actors in order to support the argument that human security praxis is *already* a legitimate international norm, their role was often constructed in terms of the implementation and realisation of state derived human security aims, rather than as a non-instrumental one that might include a part to play in defining the concept or setting policy agendas. Moreover, particularly in reference to utterances by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, texts created the impression that not only was policy a norm of international behaviour, but also a responsibility or calling; that its pursuit is a matter more of necessity than of choice. However, whilst reasoning couched in international norms and consensus necessitated the invocation of an international community, as with the case of the representation of practice in terms of shared interests, such utterances were very rarely accompanied by acknowledgement of a lack of agreement amongst states regarding the meaning of human security, or whether it should even be a part of states' foreign policies.

The construction of human security praxis in terms of an apparent orthodoxy

within the international community was reinforced in a facile manner by an idea which is prevalent not only in Japan's human security texts, but in many discourses on the topic: that the post-Cold War period has seen an increase in intra-state conflict, as compared to inter-state conflict. Irrespective of the verisimilitude of this claim in quantitative terms, its invocation was problematic because it did not logically support Japan's implicit position that human security measures should be undertaken by states beyond their sovereign borders. This argument was found to have been supported by an assumption of trust and goodwill between states, as well as international relations defined by states' willingness to have other states fulfil their responsibilities to human security when unable to do so on their own.

It was found that the positioning of human security as an international norm in order to argue for its pursuit was undermined by representations of Japan as being a leader in the field and as being particularly committed to it, since such representations also connoted the idea human security is *not* yet an established norm of international conduct. Other forms of human security legitimation found in the discourse – also constructed in terms of international norms – were that Japan pursues human security in part because of similar assistance it had itself received in the past, and that human security policy is a responsibility and obligation of all states. Japan was found to be ascribed with a particular obligation in this regard. However, texts did not indicate the genealogy of this sense of responsibility, nor why it should be more pronounced in Japan's case. Rationalisation of human security practice in reference to international norms demonstrated a strong tendency to promote the idea that policy was primarily about objectives conceptualised in the interests of the non-human international community, posing problems for alternative formations which prioritised human security as an end in itself.

Egalitarianism and fairness both figured as prominent themes which functioned to justify human security praxis. Egalitarianism was most prominent in

invocations of the effects of globalisation, where it was argued that human security practice was warranted because it could counteract some of the negative effects of globalisation in the economic sphere. Globalisation was generally framed in positive terms throughout the discourse, although some ambiguity regarding its status could be discerned in fragments which implicitly ascribed it with a causal role in the genesis of human insecurity. Textual treatment of the effects of globalisation was problematic from a linguistic point of view, with a measure of incoherence regarding the constitution of the so-called global village; a construct which served as the beneficiary of human security practices said to be undertaken in the name of egalitarianism. Similarly to the case of egalitarianism as a justificatory device, humanitarianism was also invoked with a discernible lack of clarity because it functioned to both legitimate *and* de-legitimise human security policy. The problem was that despite claiming that humanitarian intervention was an unjustified practice, it was also partially defined in ways which resembled certain elements of human security praxis.

Finally, the prevention of conflict was brought up as a device in the legitimation of actions taken in the name of human security. Typically of Japan's human security discourse, it was unclear whether human security conditions were conceptualised as a means by which to prevent conflict, or whether conflict is to be prevented in the interests of human security. The relationship between the prevention of conflict and the conditions of human security reflected a generalised tendency throughout the texts to focus on prediction and control via reference to the notions of probability or potential. It was found that some texts connoted the idea of prevention rather than cure regarding not only conflict, but international problems in general.

Chapter four was primarily concerned with Japan's textual representation of issues, events or phenomena which were positioned as being in an antagonistic relationship with the conditions of human security. However, a large proportion of these discursive objects were not posited as being in a direct relationship with

human security; being instead mediated through the probabilistic and uncertain notions of threat and danger. As such, because the manifestation of threats and dangers is not definite, they had only a potentially corrosive effect on human security, although this potential state was not acknowledged in the discourse and threats were often spoken of as occurrences whose effects on human security were known and certain. However, not all phenomena were signified as threats; certain ones were implied as having a definite and verifiable effect on human security through their signification as problems or impingements. From a theoretical point of view, the texts under consideration were found to have been impoverished in regard to the mechanisms by which various phenomena were supposed to affect human security, the conditions under which threats would manifest themselves into empirically observable effects on human security, the way by which to quantify such negative effects and compare them, whether various issues affect all or just some of the components making up the conditions of human security, the extent to which the parameters of human security should be affected in order to warrant a response, and whether not only destruction but merely damage to aspects of human security would be enough to warrant human security practices. Furthermore, whilst the discourse seemed to support the notion that the categorisation of an event or phenomenon as a threat to human security was dependent upon the context at hand, it was unclear if such a decision was to be undertaken by the objects of human security practice – that is, by human beings at the individual or group level – or if it was the state or other agent of human security which should have determined the constitution of threat.

The texts examined were not sensitive to the significance of acts of signification on the construction of social reality, nor their ramifications on thought and policy responses. The most obvious sign of this lack of textual reflectivity was inconsistency in the use of terminology and frequent use of synonyms without a consideration of their consequences on meaning or action. Consistently with existing critiques of human security discourses in general, it was found that Japan's securitising treatment was under-theorised in reference to the

apparently interconnected nature of the vast array of things classed as threats to human security, omitting to point out the nature of the connections and relationships between them, aside from hypothesising that they all have a potentially negative effect on human security. The declaration of an interconnectedness between problems related to human security was found to have a minimal explanatory role, offering little towards their prediction or control, functioning instead to open up and legitimate a wide palette of phenomena to regulation and control by agents purporting to be working in the pursuit of human security.

Aside from threats, discursive objects defined by certainty and identifiable effects rather than only potential ones were also situated as having a corrosive effect on human security. Such objects included conflict, lack of health care and a series of unnamed problems which were invoked only through characteristics such as their ability to cross borders and impair various aspects of human security. A distinction was drawn between problems which affected human security directly, and those which had an indirect effect, although there was no discussion as to the nature of this difference or of why direct threats should be more corrosive to human security than indirect ones.

Throughout Japan's textual treatment of threats to human security, it was found that the commonly invoked notion of dignity was conceptualised in a way which promoted the state's agency in protecting it, thus downplaying the potential for people to enhance their own dignity by overcoming diversity and suffering on their own. Whilst a relationship between suffering – albeit in an unspecified form – and dignity was constructed, there was no elucidation upon the mechanism by which suffering might have a negative bearing upon dignity, the conditions under which this might occur, or how much suffering an individual would need to experience before an intervention for the sake of their dignity would be justified. The lack of detail in Japan's representation of the effects of numerous phenomena on the parameters of human security had the result of

leaving open the possibility that empty signifiers such as suffering or dignity would be appropriated or redefined to complement foreign policy interests conceptualised with the state – rather than the individual – as the beneficiary.

Both the end of the Cold War and the Cold War itself figured as prominent themes in Japan's discussion of things which had a real or potential adverse effect on human security. The end of the Cold War was presented as a singular point in time that marked the rise of problems associated with human security; particularly conflict. Without specifying the kind of conflict which was being envisaged – other than its general negative effect on human security – it was represented as being the result of apparent root causes located in religious, ethnic and racial issues which were dormant until the catalytic effects of collapse of the Cold War structure. Despite the significance of the Cold War trope in Japan's human security narratives, its representation was problematic because texts conflated the end of the Cold War into one unproblematic point in time, not taking into consideration continuing international antagonism based on ideological differences, and connoting that the end of the Cold War was perceived and understood universally in the same way. The invocation of an end to structure served to open up a discursive space for the pursuit of human security through the promise of a new structure that would bring back order and stability. The irony that the apparently stable and more secure state of the Cold War was a result of the conditions of war and perpetual stalemate, remained unacknowledged throughout the texts examined. The trope of the end of the Cold War functioned to add impetus to the pursuit of human security through the delineation of the past from the present, with the alarmist connotation that it is *now* that such policy is particularly necessary. In regard to presence of the Cold War's end, it was found that the discourse entailed a form of structural reductionism which explained phenomena such as conflict not through the *presence* of dualistic notions about conflict between East and West, but rather in terms of their *absence*.

Similarly to the notion of globalisation, economic development was found to be both a positive and negative force in Japan's human security narratives, in regard to its effects on the conditions of human security. On the one hand, together with economic crisis, it was implicated in the rise of human insecurity by having worsened social strain, although on the other hand it was also represented as a process which promised a reduction in human insecurity. A form of development which gave due consideration to human security was promoted, albeit without delineation as to what this meant or how it should be practised, thus failing to resolve potential conflicts of interests between human security and development objectives. Social strain also remained an undefined and under theorised category, thus taking away any analytical, predictive or heuristic value it might otherwise have.

The presence of globalisation in Japan's human security narratives was characterised by tension because, whilst generally ascribed with having a positive role in the accumulation of knowledge pertaining to human (in)security, there was also an implication that it has had an erosive effect on human security. Globalisation was characterised as an overwhelming, natural and disembodied process which has had radical effects on the norms of international relations and conduct, and has progressed in spite of any actions that states may have been undertaking in regard to it. Thus, the texts' construction of globalisation functioned to take away emphasis from states' responsibilities for any ill effects it may have had, whilst creating an impression that human security practices would be beneficial not only in regard to human security, but that they could also empower states and thus help them to cope with the changes brought about by globalisation. Representations of the source of threats to human security also pointed not only to a place within the sovereign borders of states, but also outside of them. Threats were ascribed with the ability to move across borders; for the most part this was said to be a matter of the movement of inanimate objects, although an implication that people's own movement was the cause of their insecurity could also be discerned. The postulation of threats as coming from both within and outside of borders

logically justified the implementation of policy practices both within the borders of any state as well as within the borders of other states.

Poverty was found to have been situated as an important consideration in the genesis of human security. However, the representation of the relationship between poverty and human insecurity was characterised by a lack of clarity that resulted from situating the latter in relation to the former in three distinct ways. The first way presented poverty as a *problem* which affected human security directly. The second form also established a direct link between the two, but threat played a mediating role. In the third instance, poverty was itself a cause of only the problems which threatened human security, rather than having a direct relationship with human security. The texts examined did not elucidate upon these differences by indicating, for instance, the conditions under which poverty's relationship to human insecurity might change, or how responses to these three conceptualisations of the relationship between poverty and human security might differ. It was also found that Japan's characterisation of people as wanting to obtain medical services, functioned to create an image of human security health policy as being a necessary response to people's needs, rather than as an imposition of particular health policies aimed at furthering Japan's foreign policy interests.

A number of ascriptions regarding human security threats and problems were found to be commonly invoked throughout the body of texts examined. For one, threats were said to be of various kinds, thus connoting a wide range of legitimate interventions which could be undertaken in the name of human security, as well as creating a sense of urgency through the construction of a delineation between the past and the present. They were also characterised as being trans-generational, thus revealing a conservative facet to the discourse through the connotation that neither future generations nor future threats would differ significantly from those of the present. However, this conservatism was found to be selective and applied pragmatically, because a difference

between threats was postulated in terms of a delineation between the past and the present; with threats to human security being constructed as particular to present conditions, and different from the threats of the past. Although the representation of threats to human security as new was destabilised by assertions that human security is a traditional and established part of statecraft, it functioned to add a sense of urgency and impetus to policy practices. At the same time, the implicit erasure of differences in threat perception between the present and the future had the political effect of legitimating the continuation and perpetuation of human security praxis beyond now and into the future.

The presentation of human security threats as being of various kinds, existing now and likely to be present in the future, worked to create the impression of a human security policy which is important and necessary for the protection and promotion of the interests of a vulnerable and dependent human being, who is accosted by danger from all sides. However, this visage of complexity and danger was accompanied by the assurance that there is an extant body of knowledge about human (in)security, which has been evolving and is in continuous development, working to make human security practice appear as realisable and unproblematic. The presentation of policy objectives as being for *all* people worked to buttress the idea that there are various kinds of threats to human security, thus functioning to legitimate an extremely wide range of policy interventions.

Impetus was found to have been added to long term human security practices through the signification of threats as critical and pervasive, despite a lack of elucidation as to what was meant by either of these terms in relation to their effects. However this discursive strategy was seen to be problematic due to lack of acknowledgement that, being only potential events which may *not* materialise, the categorisation of threats as critical, pervasive or otherwise could only be undertaken in a hypothetical manner. The representation of threats as critical and pervasive also pointed to a conservative trend in Japan's human

security discourse, insofar as a rejection of the presence of critical and pervasive phenomena or their effects, indicated a resistance to potential change of the experience of human existence and life.

Other common characterisations of threat which were found in Japan's human security texts were those which spoke of them as interrelated, transnational, and existing in the present. These discursive formations reinforced expressions of policy which emphasised newness, and worked to support late-Westphalian – rather than traditional – notions of sovereignty which prioritise moral principles at the expense of strict adherence to national boundaries. Complexity of human security problems and threats was also a common trope which legitimated long term and detailed engagement in the pursuit of human security by states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations, as well as suggesting the necessity of a coordinating body for these different agents of human security. However, this complexity remained under-worked in theoretical terms, aside from its expression in a dynamic form which emphasised *increasing* complexity and *interlinkage*. Ambiguity also arose because the discourse was indistinct as to whether it was the relations between problems which were complex or whether the problems themselves were complex. The framing of complexity was found to support a realist metaphysics which privileged the idea that phenomena related to human security exist irrespective of the discursive reality in which they are constructed. Ideas about the increasing severity and complexity of human security issues were invoked to legitimate and justify continued engagement in the realisation of human security. However, ironically the idea that human security problems are becoming more severe also worked to destabilise the legitimacy of human security practices, because the notion of *increasing* severity could, in principle, be a result of ineffective human security techniques.

The discourse demonstrated a sensitivity to context in the determination of the events or phenomena which constitute human security threats, by representing

human security threat perception as a function of natural environment, the particularities of the object of human security practice, and other unnamed conditions. However, because texts did not demonstrate significant theorisation or conceptualisation of the relationship between context and how it might affect human security practices or the prioritisation of threats and problems, invocation of the significance of context came across primarily as a rhetorical attempt at creating the impression that Japan's human security practices are not about realising its own parochial interests, but that they are concerned with the security interests of all humans.

Finally, texts were characterised by a tendency to represent threats or problems without specifying who or what was responsible for causing them. Rather, phenomena said to be in an antagonistic relationship with human security were presented as disembodied processes that occurred without the agency of any particular state or non-state body. It was also found that at times the human was itself represented as a cause of human insecurity, as well as a victim of it. Aside from one text in which the state and market were said to have the potential to erode human security if not carefully managed, discussion of the idea that states might cause human insecurity was consistently left out.

The fifth chapter – the final analytical one – had as its focus textual representation of bodies positioned as agents of human security and the relations between them. At the outset, it was found that Japan's human security texts invoked a broad range of agents – including states, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, and private individuals – as necessary for the realisation of human security. However, discrepancies were encountered across texts in regard to the degree of agency ascribed to these different bodies. At times the impression was one in which human security policy was almost exclusively a state determined and implemented project. This mode of representation was found to be problematic because it implied a monopolisation of political power by the state and thus limited the possibility

for critical perspectives on human security, through the marginalisation of non-state actors' voices in policy determination and practice. Assertions which prioritised the role of the state also worked to destabilise discursive formations which invoked the Commission on Human Security – a body which has advocated the participation of non-governmental organisations in human security practice – to legitimate Japan's human security practices.

Other instances in the discourse appeared to advocate more than just an instrumental role for non-state organisations in human security praxis. However, it was difficult to come to a definite conclusion as to the way in which the role of non-state actors was being envisaged, because of the presence of seemingly contradictory assertions in this matter. For instance, the signification of non-state actors as full-fledged players was accompanied by claims – even within the same text – that human security depended mainly on state level responses. It was noted that whilst the use of a game metaphor to describe the position of non-state actors might have, at first glance, implied equality between them and the state, there were also games in which the roles and responsibilities of participants were organised in a hierarchical manner. Furthermore, the representation of relations between state and non-state actors in terms of equality was found to be destabilised by the representation of the United Nations General Assembly as the place for discussing and defining the concept of human security. As such, despite the use of particular terms or phrases which implied the opposite, it was not possible to conclude that Japan's human security texts advocated equality between state and non-state actors in regard to their positions and functions in the practice of human security.

The reason for the presence of non-state actors in the practice and politics of human security was also represented inconsistently. Reminiscent of similarly opaque pictures of the nature of globalisation, their participation was sometimes said to be inevitable and beyond the control of states; a form of depiction which also contributed to the legitimation of human security praxis,

through the construction of a context in which it came to appear as necessary and unavoidable. At other times, it was suggested that non-governmental organisations' inclusion in human security practice was the result of a rational choice by state agents who had realised that these non-state agents had a superior knowledge of people's needs; a mode of representation which contributed to the overall promotion of human security through the promise of efficacy and an image of the state as self-aware and concerned with the security interests of humans, to the extent that it would admit its own infallibility. However, both of these images also worked to destabilise the central position of the state in human security policy, since in the first instance it comes across as powerless in the face of change, whilst in the second instance it appeared as less than omnipotent and lacking adequate knowledge of people's needs.

Other passages in the discourse indicated not that the realisation of human security was to be undertaken primarily by either the state or non-governmental organisations, but that it was mainly a responsibility for each human individual. However, expressions of individual responsibility explicitly presupposed a requisite facilitation role by the state, defined in terms of establishing the indispensable foundations which would allow such a responsibility to be undertaken and realised by individuals. As such this discursive formation revealed a tension insofar as, on the one hand, the role of the state was presented as vital, whilst on the other hand, its responsibility for human security was minimised; a position which served to destabilise assertions which rationalised the pursuit of human security in terms of *state* norms and responsibilities. It was difficult to ascertain the balance of responsibilities for human security between the individual and the state, not only because of a shifting emphasis between *and* across texts, but also because of imprecision in language use; particularly in regard to the question of what the exact object of responsibility was. It was also found that formulations of policy implied an extension of a panopticon model of state-society relations into an omniopticon model in which the sphere of personal privacy was severely minimised because individuals were to be concerned not only with their own human security, but

also with that of others.

A body commonly invoked in Japan's human security texts was that of the international community. Whilst it was used to formulate arguments which legitimated the pursuit of human security in reference to international norms and consensus, as well as being presented as a legitimate agent of human security, texts contained little detail about its composition. Some ambiguity was also discerned regarding whether this imagined body was made up exclusively of states, or whether non-states were also included in it. For the most part it was presented as an integrated body, with little mention of differences between its members regarding the validity of human security as a notion, or the delegation of responsibilities in its pursuit. Its primary discursive function was that of supporting an image of unity and consensus underlying the pursuit of human security. However, such a visage of a homogeneous international community – at least in regard to its members' stances on human security – was unstable because it appeared alongside complex textual formulations that shifted between emphasising equality and stratification in the relations between agents of human security,

Texts contextualised the preponderance of different kinds of human security agents in reference to an apparent diversification and stratification of players in the international community, though without elucidation upon when this diversification was supposed to have begun, nor with meaningful detail regarding the relations between these different agents, specifically in reference to human security practice. There was unacknowledged and unresolved tension between the characterisation of the international community both in terms of stratification and diversification; the two terms implying contrasting levels of plurality that had apparently existed amongst international actors before these two processes began. The characterisation of relations within the international community as being stratified was not accompanied by clarification as to the nature of that stratification, and it was problematic in light of the existence of

alternate images which highlighted equality, consensus, togetherness and agreement.

Reminiscent of the way in which the concept of human security was represented as having evolved rather than being the product of political contest, the consensus said to have been characteristic of relations between agents of human security was framed as having emerged; implying a natural and uncontested process. The representation of relations between agents of human security in terms of consensus functioned to legitimate policy through an appeal to shared interests and therefore connoted a rejection of the idea that human security practices might be used for the pursuit of parochial state foreign policy interests. However, textual representations of consensus or mutual understanding between states on the topic of human security did not elucidate upon differences of opinion between them regarding the meaning of the concept nor the lack of a common position on whether human security contains any added value for the United Nations as a whole.

Relations between agents of human security were most commonly represented in terms of complementarity, consensus, alliance, togetherness, *esprit de corps*, and agreement regarding the formulation of an approach to human security, as well as in regard to actions that have been taken or are to be taken in its pursuit. Whilst some detail was presented regarding the actions that various human security agents are to undertake together, it was not clear whether in practice all agents should be involved, or whether the roles were to be specifically delineated. A measure of ambiguity regarding the nature of relations between different agents of human security was also found through signification of them as a network on the one hand, and partnership on the other. Whilst featuring prominently in the texts examined, the signification of relations between agents of human security in terms of partnership was problematic because there was no elaboration on the meaning of the term and because other passages which prioritised the agency of the state – by emphasising its role in defining human

security or setting the conditions under which individuals could realise their own human security – undermined the egalitarian underpinnings of the idea of partnership. It was also found that expressions about the relations between state and non-state agents of human security in terms of complementarity worked at a rhetorical level to connote equality, but that at the same time this mode of representation guaranteed only the inclusion of both kinds of agents in the realisation of human security, without clarification as to the assignment of responsibilities.

Invocations of plurality of agents working in the name of human security were problematic from a technical point of view because little specification was found as to how these agents should act in relation to each other, aside from the postulation of the United Nations in the role of coordinator. Whilst apparent universality in the United Nations was provided as the primary warrant for suggesting this leadership role, there was no discussion as to potential conflicts of interest in the organisation based on power inequalities. Moreover, to base human security legitimacy on the apparent universality of the United Nations also worked to prioritise state interests, thus undermining expressions of policy in which state and non-state agents were said to be in an equal partnership.

Some texts were found to construct the state as significantly more influential and powerful than non-state agents in regard to human security practices. The representation of Japan's signing of the Ottawa convention as a result of its collaboration with non-governmental organisations connoted cooperative relations between states and non-states in the pursuit of human security, but also implied an imbalance of power by highlighting the fact that a plurality of non-governmental organisations was required to affect state policy. Similarly, to speak of states as *recognising* the importance of non-state actors connoted a power differential which favours states, by positioning them as having the performative authority to incorporate non-state actors in policy design or implementation.

Japan's human security activity was found to be commonly expressed as *assistance, aid or support*; both in relation to state beneficiaries as well as human ones. Rather than constructing an image in which policy was designed and initiated by Japan in its own interests, this mode of representation functioned to make policy appear like something which was initiated either by the people or other states which had requested Japan's assistance because of an inability to guarantee the human security of their citizens. In a related vein, it was found that some texts invoked the notion of a public body that desired an enhancement of human security, and to which the state has a responsibility or obligation. However, this visage of the public wanting the state to undertake human security in its interests was undermined by representations of human security which suggested or implied that the concept was yet underdeveloped or not fully defined. Expressions of human security practice as a response to people's needs were also disturbed by a passage which connoted the initiative of the state rather than the people, through the idea that individuals are resources for the policy designs of state. In a similar manner, the monopoly of the state in determining the agenda of human security policy was found to underwrite an assertion which, on the face of it, suggested that the derivation of the concept of human security is a task of intellectuals who should advise the state on the way to undertake human security practices. However, a close reading revealed a tension in this form of representing the relationship between the state and intellectuals, because it appeared that the research methods which should be used by intellectuals were dictated by the state.

As the findings outlined above indicate, Japan's human security discourse is characterised by omissions, silences, ambiguities, contradictions and variations in representation. One of the implications of this characterisation is the continued marginalisation of the human security discourse by scholars in the field of security studies. Simply stated, the concept of human security – as articulated by Japan – does not come across as theoretically cohesive or

sufficiently critical in reference to its own precepts and thus is still unlikely to be “taken seriously”¹ by either political or security studies. What is more, the presence of unacknowledged and unexplored conceptual lacunas means that the concept is vulnerable to appropriation by various and potentially contradictory political projects which can fill the theoretical vacuums as they see fit, thereby capitulating on the normative attractiveness² of the concept whilst further diluting it and, in sum, adding to its incoherence. As far as the conditions of human security are concerned, the fact that Japan has left so many questions unanswered can only add to the practical, technical and logistical difficulties of realising the security interests of human beings at the individual level. Irrespectively of whether one agrees with the ethics of pursuing human security – essentially a biopolitical project of intervention – the fact remains that whilst the discourse constructs numerous points at which power can be applied, ostensibly in the name of human security, it also contributes to the construction of the human individual as a vulnerable and readily manipulated being. What is more, the interests of Japan's human security project are compromised because the very points at which power might be applied are not of sufficient specificity to prevent various interventions from cancelling each other out and resulting in either unchanged or even diminished aggregate levels of human security.

Few themes were found to be particularly original, although – taking variation in to consideration – it appears that Japan's human security vision focuses less on the security interests of the human individual than do other versions. Moreover, even though Japan's human security discourse shares with other elucidations of the concept a tendency to minimise the role of the state in causing human insecurity, it is unique in attributing partial blame for human insecurity to humans themselves.

1 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 01 (2010): 77.

2 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 358–359.

Future avenues of inquiry implied by the research reported in this thesis include a closer examination of the ramifications of interplay between the numerous elements invoked in Japan's human security discourse, in order to give more cohesion to the potential of Japan's human security for problem solving and realising human security. As far as explanatory theory is concerned, it would be of interest to consider whether there are chronological patterns underlying the different forms of representation present in the discourse. An analysis such as this might examine the extent to which changes in the representation of discursive objects over time has followed a linear progression, or whether objects' forms fluctuated between earlier and later versions. Another promising avenue of research would involve inquiring into the extent to which representation of elements of human security changed according to the context – including the audience, venue, time, place – in which speeches were delivered. In terms of furthering analysis of the politics of representation, an promising research programme, and one with significant ramifications on the stability of Japan's self-representation and its ability to pursue foreign policy objectives effectively, would involve comparing the invocation and representation of elements of international relations ontology between the field of Japan's human security foreign policy and other sites of representation such as national security.

The present work, through its critique of texts on human security published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, has endeavoured to open up this hitherto neglected area of critical inquiry. By employing critical and problematising strategies, which had not yet been applied to Japan's human security discourse, this thesis has found that Japan's official discourse, covering the decade of 1998-2008, situated the human individual as just one of a number of beneficiaries of security practice, conceptualised human security as an extension of state security and, moreover, was explicitly committed to the use of

securitisation as a way to influence policy agendas. These and other findings of this research suggest that the human security concept has yet to distinguish itself sufficiently from conventional notions of state security to warrant its elevated status as a pillar of Japan's foreign policy, let alone the hallmark of a new international era.

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