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Decker, Jeffrey

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Primacy of the State in Global Integration:
Successful Strategies for Gaining State Support
for Global Maritime Security Integration

by Jeffrey Decker

The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies,
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Bond University, QLD, Australia, 4229

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Primacy of the State in Global Integration:  
Successful Strategies for Gaining State Support for Global Maritime Security Integration*

by Jeffrey Decker

Introduction

Since September 2008, the number of states patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa has increased (“EU Naval Operation”, 2009; Seibert 2009; Willett 2009). While the majority of literature addressing the response to Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali territorial waters has traditionally concentrated on national and multinational naval approaches, the recent focus of academic inquiry has transitioned to the emergence of global maritime security structures (Berube, 2007; Etzioni, 2009). The reason for this shift, according to Chalk (2008: 2) of the Rand Corporation, is that the dangers piracy poses today require the pooling of state naval assets, since these new challenges are qualitatively different from traditional maritime security threats.

Historically models of integration in maritime governance have been the predecessors for integration in other public areas not confined to the control of a single person or state, a situation termed “global commons”1 (Snape and Gunaselara 1997: 3; Triggs 2006). Because of this, the fields of Strategic Studies and Global Governance have been encouraged to explore global governance structures emerging as a result of Somali piracy. Of particular interest is the impending establishment of global maritime security networks to overcome problems currently stymieing national and international piracy suppression efforts in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. Growing state cooperation and coordination in these waters has been accompanied by analyses on theoretical applications of various theories and models of global naval integration to combat contemporary piracy (Berube 2007; Galdorisi 2007;

* The views of Research Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, position or policies of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies. Bearing in mind the controversial debates now occurring in International Relations, Strategic Studies, and East-West Studies, the editors endeavour to publish diverse, critical and dissenting views so long as these meet academic criteria.

1“Global commons are natural assets outside national jurisdiction such as the ocean, outer space and the Antarctic” (Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD, 2001).
Archibugi and Chiarugi 2009; Seibert 2009). Exploring the capacity of joint military task forces and their operational capacities are critical to restoring security and safeguarding the transit of international trade through this important trade route (Middleton 2008; International Maritime Bureau [IMB] 2009a; IMB 2009b). In particular, the coalescence of global enforcement structures has been of specific interest in light of statistical evidence showing the futility of recent national and international military responses (IMB 2008; IMB 2009b; International Maritime Organization [IMO] 2009).

The difficulty in suppressing Somali pirate attacks is exemplified by joint operations between the Combined Task Force 151, NATO, and the European Naval Force. They continue to respond slowly to pirate attacks because of communication failures, while mission successes are thwarted by national legal incongruities impairing the ability of the task forces to prosecute and punish perpetrators when they are detained (Kontorovich 2004; Kraska and Wilson 2008). Thus, at the global level, state cooperation reveals the collective will to contain piracy, but not the capacity in view of an absence of integrated processes. This suggests the problem lies in the interrelationships at the global-state interface.

This paper explores this interface by theorizing the global-state relationship apropos the development of global maritime security networks. It uses two case studies to lay out state-level strategic responses by global networks to integrate state navies in pursuit of global security objectives. As a result, the main findings of this paper indicate that discourse in global security between Rationalist and Internationalist perspectives is dealt with through the global-state nexus, thereby affecting the way global maritime integration is developed. Specifically, this interrelationship empowers the state, since global security integration is contingent on the ability of global networks to appeal to state-centric ambitions.

**Theorizing the Global-State Naval Nexus and the World’s Response to Piracy**

Piracy is considered to be *hostis humani generis*, or an enemy of humankind, which society has been combating since the establishment of sea-based trade (Joyner 2005: 137).

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2 Annually, more than 22,000 commercial vessels transit the Gulf of Aden carrying eight percent of the world’s oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America (Kraska & Wilson, 2008: 41; Middleton 2008: 3; IMO, 2009).
Accordingly, because piracy impinged upon the principle of the right to free seas established in 1609 by Hugo Grotius (Hall, 2006: 7; Triggs, 2006: 8), it has been the impetus for collective efforts since the Hanseatic League of the 13th Century (Menefee 1990: 132). As such, piracy is the original universal crime recognized alongside state sovereignty in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Kontorovich 2004: 190). Correspondingly, piracy, as a unifying evil, has caused the maritime sector to become the natural vanguard in the evolution of trans-societal integration.

Piracy’s unifying effect on sovereign states began from the late 18th Century when Thomas Jefferson proposed the creation of a league of maritime states to combat the Barbary Pirates in 1790 (Morris 1979: 69). Although the proposal failed to garner mass support in Europe, which ultimately led to its demise, the subsequent drawn-out conflicts between the United States and the Barbary Pirates (1801-1805 and 1815) indicated that maritime security is best accomplished through multilateral means (Menefee 1990). This unilateral failure represented a transitional period in international relations as the historically state-centric foreign policy perspective gave way to a collective approach to the mutual problem of piracy on the high seas. This shift reflected both the willingness of states to cooperate in achieving shared goals as well as the limited ability of states to suppress piracy unilaterally.

Today, this shift is perpetuated by multinational task forces enhancing integration in naval operations against piracy. This compensates for individual state military obsolescence in dealing with asymmetric threats from non-state actors such as pirates (Mullen 2005; Berube 2007). Consequently, the inability of traditional navies worldwide to adequately address contemporary piracy has nurtured strong perceptions that further integration is needed to enhance the security of the seas through collaborative efforts between states. If this perception is true, then the establishment of a global naval structure, in the Gulf of Aden and the world’s seas, could have implications beyond the maritime security environment. However, Berube (2007: 602) suggests that the loss of state sovereignty and potential multinational failures will inhibit the creation of a global maritime structure since integration is driven by states, and states are traditionally averse to these trends.
Thus, the argument on whether to create a multinational, integrated, global maritime-network or continue to focus on unilateral maritime operations remains controversial. These differing positions exist because of the discourse between Rationalists, a theoretical component of Realism that is synonymous with ‘structural offensive realism’, and Internationalists on whether the nation-state or the world’s people are the primary subject of global security (Pettman 2005: 144-145). According to Mearsheimer (2001), a Rationalist within the Realist tradition and the founder of offensive realism, the focus of global security is the state. Mearsheimer (2004: 63) also emphasizes this point in suggesting:

Great powers do not work together to promote world order for its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own share of world power, which is likely to clash with the goal of creating and sustaining stable international order.

Conversely, Internationalists argue the primacy of human security. Pettman (2005: 145) states:

Securing people . . . necessitates greater interstate cooperation and collaboration as state . . . borders become colanders not canopies and as they find themselves obliged to respond with cooperative regional and global initiatives to deal with [global issues].

Therefore, debate on the intensity of naval integration is a construct that is facilitated by discourses on state and human security. Such discourses try to articulate the future trajectory of naval operations against piracy in a global society. However, the amalgamation of naval power and global governance is a multi-dimensional dynamic process that is more complex than monolithic security paradigms would suggest. Accordingly, Rosenau (1995: 9) states that there

... is no single organizing principle on which global governance rests, no emergent order around which communities and nations are likely to converge. Global governance is the sum of myriad - literally millions of - control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures, and processes.
As such, pinning down specific organizational principles that support the emergence of global governance at large is problematic. However, because the process of global integration refers to an increase in interconnectedness (Weber 2008: 274), and military integration is specifically associated with linking personnel, weapons systems and technology for a concerted approach to warfare, organizational principles of global governance can be discerned in specified issue-areas such as global naval integration.

Accordingly, Pattberg’s (2006: 10) concept of global governance is based on several assumptions. Three of these assumptions relate specifically to the phenomenon of global naval integration:

1) [global governance] ascribes special relevance to non-state actors;
2) is concerned with new modes and mechanisms of producing and maintaining global public goods and;
3) highlights the establishment of new spheres of authority beyond the nation-state and international cooperation.

By applying these assumptions to global naval integration, several organizational principles may be discerned as states converge around the singular goal of piracy suppression. In determining the emergence of a global naval alliance, critical organizational principles indicating global integration are presented by the failures of current multinational structures. The most notable determinants of integration failure are the incongruent national legal norms that inhibit the creation of joint standards, and the inability to communicate, which impairs collective responses to piracy.

Clearly, because of the integral role these organizational principles play in the cohesion of a global network, they are effective indicators of present levels of integration in global maritime security networks. This aspect is evidenced by the unreliability of multinational task force responses to piracy, as well as the tenuous process of prosecuting and punishing pirates upon detainment. However, while these organizational principles are important, the application of the Rationalist and Internationalist paradigms are the best indicators of future levels of integration as they are both the harbinger of multinational failure and presage global integration. The reason for this is that state participation in global security hinges on how
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states perceive global threats to their interests. The following case studies offer a vignette of integration strategies used by two global maritime security networks that have seen their state-focused integration strategies rewarded by state support, compliance and integration at the global level.

Case Studies: The Global Maritime Network and Proliferation Security Initiative

Maritime partnerships have employed a range of integration strategies on the seas for many years. Beginning in 2001 with the proposal of the 17 member Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the approach to maritime security has focused on intergovernmental cooperation at the regional level (ReCAAP 2010). Recently, however, regional security structures have given way to global security structures which often extend partnership to intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and corporations, as well as states.

The Global Maritime Partnership and the Proliferation Security Initiative are two examples of emerging global maritime security networks. The Global Maritime Partnership focuses on variations in global integration levels and the primacy of the state to attract broad support for their anti-piracy network. The Proliferation Security Initiative, although not an anti-piracy partnership, is also integral in facilitating global integration by bypassing traditional state partnership mechanisms. Both of these structures concentrate on variations of cooperative techniques that extend beyond states.

Global Maritime Partnership

The Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) is an amalgamation of state and non-state actors. National navies and law enforcement agencies, as well as shipping companies, tackle issues such as sea-based terrorism and piracy by improving maritime domain awareness and enhanced maritime enforcement capacities, facilitating information flows and intelligence in a global partnership (Berube 2007: 601; Chalk 2008: 40). The aim is to create a more integrated network through partnership building, particularly between shipping, regional, and

[^3]: See Appendix A.
major port states. The GMP’s success in the maritime security environment, while other task forces fail, can be credited to its informal structure that promotes global maritime security without the use of treaties, alliances, formal support structures or binding agreements (Woodson 2007). Further, the Partnership has no independent state leadership or formal membership requirements (Woodson 2007). Accordingly, GMP goals are to secure international waters, while allowing national navies to pursue their individual state security objectives (Berube 2007: 601). Its success in integrating maritime actors against maritime threats is derived from a policy of enhancing globalized integration between states while respecting state sovereignty issues and emphasizing the growth in security as a result of strengthened partnerships. In this case,

...dominance is not just about combat power: it is also about our ability to work with other nations to provide global maritime security and prevent conflict. (Admiral Gary Roughhead, Chief of US Naval Operations, in Kraska, & Wilson 2008: 45)

When national navies talk of success in increasing maritime security, they speak the language of suppressing the dangers at sea through a collective response because of its deleterious effects to state and international commercial interests. US naval officers tasked with developing this network have predicated its foundation on the assumption that everyone has an interest in the safety and security of the world’s oceans as piracy threatens sea lanes, commerce, and navigation, while undermining regional stability (Kraska, & Wilson 2008: 43; Rahman 2009: 47). As such, the Global Maritime Partnership leverages the economic benefits of working together to secure state dependent international trade on the high seas (Woodson 2007). In this way, integrating maritime security to obtain economic objectives strengthens state sovereignty as free seas facilitate the trade of goods. This strategy of reinforcing aspects in which states can gain from enhanced global integration places the GMP as a non-sovereignty threatening network to Rationalist minded state leaders that want to limit integration.

Responding to the increase in piracy off the Horn of Africa, the GMP has established partnerships with non-state actors as well. Increasing the number of partnerships, both governmental and non-governmental, enhances the breadth for consultation on development
and implementation (Woodson 2007). For this reason, the GMP has made integral use of international organizations, specifically the International Maritime Organization, the International Labor Organization and the World Customs Organization ‘to foster the creation of maritime norms or globalize preexisting regional norms’ (Woodson 2007). This logic has also been applied to the commercial sector as the GMP envisions extending partnership to some 46,000 commercial vessels (Galdorisi 2007: 69). As a result, by recognizing and encouraging the primacy of existing systems and regional coalitions, the GMP has created a forum where ‘best practices’ in the commercial industry and state security can be shared to enhance the overall safety of the seas. This provides members with ‘the framework to think globally, while acting regionally’ (Woodson, 2007).

Proliferation Security Initiative⁴

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) addresses Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation. Although it does not deal with piracy per se, research into its globalized structure and organizational techniques is useful when discerning integration procedures that can benefit the development of a globalized anti-piracy network. The PSI was established on 31 May 2003 with eleven member states as a response to a security gap in the international system (Etzioni 2009: 7). Currently, it has more than 90 members including the whole of the European Union and the G-8 (Squassoni 2006: 1, 4; Etzioni 2009: 8).

The PSI has altered the structure of older international systems whose bureaucracies impede the flexibility, speed and breadth needed to address cross-border problems (Etzioni 2009: 7). As a result, the PSI is successful at facilitating concerted ship-boarding, ‘shutting down facilities, seizing materials, and freezing assets’ because it ‘strengthen[s] political commitment of likeminded states to follow through’ to counter weapons proliferation on a global scale (Bush 2004). It functions continuously as a rudimentary police force at sea and has been successfully employed over a dozen times (Etzioni 2009: 9).

Four key factors contribute to the success of the PSI’s international operations—flexibility, integration/coordination, international legitimacy, and state sensitivity (Squassoni 2006;

⁴ See Appendix B.
Etzioni 2009). First, the PSI is extremely flexible as it does not have an ‘international secretariat, offices in federal agencies established to support it’, nor ‘reports of successes or failures and no established funding’ (Squassoni 2006: 4). Because of its lack of structure, the Bush Administration referred to it as ‘an activity not an organization’ that has participants and not members, which emphasizes the responsive characteristics of this non-restrictive structure (Etzioni 2009: 8).

Second, integration and coordination between states have facilitated operational successes as reaction time has decreased by bypassing the past multinational task force reliance on intergovernmental bureaucracies, like the UN, which shroud operations with red tape (Squassoni 2006: 5). Streamlining occurs at the state-level during frequent joint training operations rehearsing communication and operational exigencies to increase coordination (Etzioni 2009: 8). These measures enhance the PSI’s success because, in theory, each PSI state acts unilaterally in sharing intelligence and coordination activities thereby requiring a high level of support, transparency and interdependence which are fostered during these exercises.

Third, international legitimacy contributes to the success of the PSI by drawing support from state participants, which is crucial because it relies on state resources. Legitimacy was gained by the Initiative through UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673, which indirectly endorse the PSI by criminalizing WMD proliferation. The PSI has also been legitimized through bilateral agreements that legalize ship-boarding between states under international law (Squassoni 2006: 5).

Fourth, and most importantly, the PSI prioritizes the centrality of states in its operational principles. The PSI’s structure now permits further integration to create a web of partnerships that inhibit the ability of proliferators to trade WMDs and materials (Squassoni 2006: 4). This does not impinge upon state sovereignty in the process because it is a non-binding cooperative endeavor. This strategic refocusing was prompted after India held that rigid PSI objectives were discriminatory in 2005 (Squassoni 2006: 2). As a result, PSI objectives are ‘encouraged’ and not mandated, giving states leeway in choosing which policies to follow and which to ignore. Further, because the ‘hard power’ of the global network emanates from
states, sensitivity to individual states is mandatory. As such, the PSI empowers states by relying on their strength and ingenuity to operationalize the overall objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The success of the PSI has called for an expansion of its operational mandates beyond the sea and into space (Etzioni 2009: 10). The PSI’s strategies embrace two guiding operational principles - enhance integration through flexible objective goals, and defer to the strength of national navies to reinforce sovereignty. As a result, PSI has successfully created a loosely tailored global initiative that enhances state integration and strengthens its individual role in global maritime security issues.

**Significance for Global Integration Strategies**

State naval integration policies link directly to their conception of attaining higher levels of security in response to global security threats. On the state level, this strategy is designed to maintain autonomy by facilitating national naval capabilities and deferring public danger problems to a collective naval body. This limits the need for states to further acquiesce sovereignty in integrating naval operational structures. However, it is also clear that states cannot ignore the benefits global integration have had on collective naval operations. As a result, although global integration is met with criticism by state governments, the role global naval networks can play in combating non-state actors in the ‘global commons’ should not be understated (see Berube 2007; Galdorisi 2007; Archibugi and Chiarugi 2009; Rahman 2009).

What is interesting is how global networks attempt to reconcile the conflict between Rationalists (protection of sovereign power and the centrality of state in security matters) and Internationalists (production of public goods and the centrality of people in security matters) based on the integration of organizational principles. In other words, these global maritime structures have managed to establish a loose set of global parameters that guide the integration process beyond states to include non-state actors. The success of both organizations in fostering integration is based on their ability to mitigate the polarization of monolithic security paradigms. This supports an effective global integration strategy that facilitates the achievement of global security goals without entering into a binding partnership where impingements on sovereignty may occur.
As Berube (2007) suggests, global integration in anti-piracy operations means that the costs associated with unilateral power are averted in collective security structures. Clearly, few states advance a wholly Internationalist perspective toward global security and no state champions a withering of national power. Yet, the Global Maritime Partnership’s strategy of aligning its goals with state-centered notions of security has proven to be successful. The Partnership has done so by linking into a key national interest, that of economic security. GMP successes relate directly to its ability to pair state security goals with global security ambitions. This success was achieved through the use of existing regional anti-piracy mechanisms and linking them to create a global partnership through a series of regional partnerships. Mechanisms like these emphasize the regional practice of using non-state actors by focusing on international trade and the threat piracy poses to it, thereby distancing states from the one-dimensional security perspective that is evinced by either zero-sum or relative gain logic.

Understanding the absorption of states in their own security matters, in relation to integration, and exploiting this constraint is critical for developing global security networks. In this way, the Global Maritime Partnership and Proliferation Security Initiative operate on the same levels of association in constructing global partnerships to enhance global security. Because these structures embody the Internationalist perspective while understanding the state Rationalist perspective, they can enable global partnerships by appealing to specific state-level security issues rather than broad global security issues.

The appeal to global issues is done in different ways by the GMP and the PSI. For example, the PSI appeals to state security by bolstering the national desire for a strong navy, while granting states the flexibility to pursue this goal by adhering to the PSI as much or as little as they wish. This encourages and emphasizes a strong state naval force to enable the PSI to achieve its objective. Paradoxically, this global strategy, while strengthening global security, relies exclusively on individual state motivations to deter and reduce global threats. By establishing a joint goal that intersects Rationalists and Internationalists principles, the PSI produces a broad foundation, with more than 90 members, in support of PSI goals. This strategy, when coupled with integration and cooperation through collective efforts towards a
single goal, projects an image of the PSI as directly serving the interests of the state as well as indirectly achieving Initiative-based goals. Once Rationalists’ and Internationalists’ sensitivities are addressed other organizational principles, such as legal and communication standardization and establishing international legitimacy, can occur.

The GMPs strategy appears to follow that of the PSI with an emphasis on state sovereignty and state security. However, while the PSI concentrates state ambitions on the amount of power to be gained in joining the Initiative, the GMP depicts the economic losses states are likely to incur if action is not taken under the Partnership. The success of the GMP’s integration strategy relates to its ability to maximize the benefits of integration by avoiding catastrophic events, thereby asserting state influence on the global threats. Through this strategy, the GMP is reducing costs to commercial vessel owners, safeguarding maritime cargoes and crew, and facilitating state profits through international trade by concentrating state policy on tangible economic problems that directly affect the health of a national economy. It appeals to Rationalists who are concerned with securing the economic prosperity of the state, while also appealing to Internationalists who are concerned about the threat piracy poses to government, commercial, and private seafarers. By spotlighting and linking the state’s discursively-constructed economic security value system and marshalling the resources needed for it to achieve the Partnership’s goals, the GMP demonstrates a desire to work with states and advance global security.

**Conclusion**

Given the interplay between the subject of global security, Rationalist concentration on state security and Internationalist concentration on human security, the construction of how security affects the state becomes an important challenge to the establishment of global networks at the state level. As such, this relationship is an influential component of collective anti-piracy operations in the waters off the Horn of Africa and helps to explain varying levels of integration in global maritime networks and the reluctance of states to remedy challenges to existing collective operations.
Clearly, the relationships established between states and the integration desired by global partnerships are based on the primacy of state security over global security. At a superficial level, the strategy is merely a realistic way for states to protect their national sovereignty and boost their power by participating in a globally-integrated remedy for global security problems. Yet, the reinforcement of state-centered security has wider implications on different aspects of maritime security threats. By supporting a value system that defers to the state to bolster global integration, global maritime security networks exacerbate the dichotomy between state security and global security. Attempts to reconcile global security issues with state security ideals limit the overall influence of global security issues at the state level. Thus, as global security networks are created and/or strengthened through state cooperation and global integration, state-centric ambition is empowered at the global level. As states enhance integration around the discursive constructions of global security, state-centric Rationalist security concepts become more powerful.

Given Mearsheimer’s (2004) Rationalist analysis and Berube’s (2007) maritime specific analysis, the capacity to establish global maritime security networks hinges on the ability of the global networks to appeal to state-centric ambitions. This having been said, although piracy is a universal crime that affects global intercourse between states, the threats piracy pose need to be subject to a state, and therefore global, response. The ideological impact of this state-centric default is that a situation is created whereby sovereign states more readily (and possibly more stringently) appraise the value of adopting global policies in relation to the benefits that can be achieved through state action. The case studies validate that the discourse between state/global, Rationalist/Internationalists and autonomy/integration operate concurrently and influence one another. This is so because, despite increasing trends of complex interdependence and globalization, the formation of global networks relies on state power to drive global integration. The discourse of global security empowers state-centered security as threats and dangers have consequences for the state, thus fostering the Rationalist concept in global security. Within this structure of perceptions and interactions, state-level decision makers, determining whether or not integration benefits the state, hold the power to decide the future of global maritime security networks. As a result, a strengthened adherence to the Rationalist paradigm on global issues in the maritime domain, a historically tenable field of multilateral integration, indicates that integration in non-maritime domains could face
even greater problems bridging the global-state divide. However, current anti-piracy networks spearhead integration structures in the ‘global commons’.

Appendix A
The Global Maritime Partnership in Practice
The momentum for worldwide maritime partnerships like the Global Maritime Partnership is growing worldwide as many states and navies seek collective action against maritime threats (Galdorisi 2008). The biggest challenge to this trend is interoperability between states with common strategic objectives. Accordingly, the largest effect the GMP has on combating maritime piracy is by mitigating the C4ISR (command control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) disparity between states and by facilitating coordination, de-confliction, and intelligence/information sharing between member states (Galdorisi 2008; Chambers 2009).

Mitigating the disparity in C4ISR capabilities hinges on a co-evolvement of technological developments (Galdorisi 2008). Accordingly, the GMP has fostered The Technical Cooperative Program (TTCP) which serves as a collaborative forum on defense science and technological developments. Work done in TTCP laboratories has translated into advancements in maritime networking so member nations are able to maintain communications at sea while continually upgrading their C4ISR capabilities (Galdorisi 2008).

Since the creation of the concept for the GMP by United States Admiral Michael Mullen, and its subsequent implementation, it has also facilitated coordination, de-confliction, and intelligence/information sharing between its 44-state network. This has been done by streamlined organizational structures. Specifically, the GMP utilizes the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) and the United States Maritime Liaison Office
(MARLO) to serve as communication hubs to link navies and task forces to the maritime industry (Chambers, 2009). As such, the UKMTO and MARLO are at the center of the GMP maritime network joining independent navies (Russia, China, Malaysia, India, and Japan), the merchant/civilian shipping industry, the 27 member European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), and the 23 nation Combined Maritime Forces, which includes the counter piracy operation Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) (Chambers 2009: 21).

Restructured operational designs has fostered operational cohesion between member states, heightened the presence of naval vessels in high risk areas like the Gulf of Aden, and has led to the issuance of best practices to the shipping industry (Chambers 2009). While multinational task forces like EUNAVFOR, CTF 151, and NATO continue to face significant operational challenges in networking and communication, increases in the levels of interoperability between and amongst these forces are alleviating these problems, leading to a more efficient collective maritime security presence in the Gulf of Aden. Evidence for this is suggested in International Maritime Bureau reports stating that although instances of pirate attacks increased in 2009, the rate at which hijackings were thwarted by multinational task forces also increased (IMB 2009c).

Appendix B
The Proliferation Security Initiative in Practice
Although the Proliferation Security Initiative does not deal with piracy, modeling global anti-piracy network after its integration procedures and organizational techniques is useful. Specifically, the PSI is successful at bypassing international law under Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by members conferring power to the Initiative’s treaty (Global 2004). Through the PSI treaty, members are able to inhibit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by sharing intelligence, coordinating interdiction operations, and limiting the number of channels operations must be cleared through (Etzioni 2009).

Robert Joseph, a former United States undersecretary of state for arms control, reported that ‘dozens of interdictions have taken place slowing nuclear and missile programs in Asia and
the Middle East’ (Joseph 2008). While members of the PSI have been reticent to discuss the Initiative’s operations publicly, because of fears that intelligence sources and operational methods could be compromised (Boese 2008), it has been successfully employed at least a dozen times (Etzioni 2009).

The most famous PSI success story occurred in October 2003 when US intelligence suspected a German-flagged ship bound for Libya from Dubai was carrying equipment for enriching uranium (Etzioni 2009). Suspicions led the owner of the ship to port in Italy where the Italian authorities seized components of a gas centrifuge, thereby exposing Libya’s clandestine nuclear program (Etzioni 2009). Other successes have also come from intelligence sharing and multinational coordination through the PSI. In February 2005, the European Union refused an export license on a transfer bound for Iran by citing a non-European national law that contravened that export control (Boese 2008). In June 2007, after the United States expressed suspicions of ballistic missile transfers on a Syrian plane bound for a round trip to North Korea, an ‘unidentified’ country denied the plane overflight rights, ultimately canceling, the aircraft’s passage (Boese 2008).

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