The renaissance of diplomatic theory

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Abstract:
When traditional diplomacy was institutionalised in the seventeenth century diplomatic theory and theorists were invaluable in overcoming a period of confusion as to what diplomacy was or ought to be. Similarly, the modern diplomatic environment with its mixture of state, non-state and rogue diplomatic actors is equally puzzling. Charting the historical and modern relationship between diplomatic theory and diplomatic practice, this article argues that such confusion is a sign of a theoretical and practical renaissance in diplomacy. In order to make sense of and potentialise modern diplomacy (what it is now and what it ought to be) this paper argues that diplomatic studies needs to move beyond its culture of theoretical resistance and embrace both the idea of grand and abstract theorizing and the many benefits that would follow. To that end, three schools of diplomatic thought are evidenced, reified and presented in this article. This proposed taxonomy should prove useful as it offers a neat synopsis of many diverse views on what constitutes modern diplomacy today. Not only does this exercise categorize and allude to the remarkable collection post-Cold War writing and thinking on diplomacy, it demonstrates that the surface of our modern theoretical understanding of the ‘business of peace’ is only just beginning.
Introduction:

It is over two decades since the end of the Cold War and the international relations system remains in turmoil. Complex transnational issues such as climate change, terrorism or pandemic disease endure and seem to go well beyond the traditional methods, frameworks and diplomatic tools used to guarantee state survival in the past. The new international security agenda with its volatile mixture of the old and the new is one of tradition and transformation and continues to test, frustrate and surprise both ‘Cold Warriors’ and the ‘Web 2.0 generation’ alike. Despite a withering, hollowing out and general deliquescence the incumbent state endures as the primary diplomatic actor but increasingly it has to share the international stage with a diverse cast of non-state actors (NSAs), institutions and individuals, some benign but others recalcitrant, aggressive and hell bent on tearing down the rules and norms of the prevailing diplomatic and security architecture. If anything, the international relations system today resembles pre-Westphalian times. Ergo the diplomatic picture is equally confusing. Diplomacy, after all, is a social, human institution and merely reflects the epoch in which it finds itself.

In response the theoretical canon of diplomatic studies is broadening which has proved both boom and bust for diplomatic studies. To answer the simple question ‘what is modern diplomacy?’ is no easy task and continues to provoke debate, intrigue and divergence among diplomatic scholars. Traditionalists such as G. R. Berridge insist that diplomacy ‘is an essentially political activity and, well resourced and skilful, a major ingredient of power. Its chief purpose is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies……it follows that diplomacy consists of communications between officials designed to promote foreign policy.’

For Berridge, to practice diplomacy is to be an officially accredited representative of a sovereign state, and not those who work for a Civil Society Organisation (CSO), Multi National Corporation (MNC) or a global sporting federation.

Conversely, Modelski thinks that diplomacy is dead. To him contemporary diplomacy is ‘technologically redundant, self-centred, inbred and fossilized’ as well as ‘impervious it is to its general environment.’ Post-positivist scholars such as Der Derian (1987) offer a third opinion. They argue that both Berridge and Modelski’s views – the traditional and the unconventional - miss the point. For post-positivists it is important to ‘relax the assumption
that diplomacy is conducted only by states’ and instead view diplomacy as ‘human beings engaged in a particular kind of social practice.’

Regardless of the confusion over the basic meaning, key referent object and application of diplomacy most scholars agree that the ‘business of peace’ however amorphous, transitory and plural has an important role to play in the twenty-first century. For Kerr and Wiseman:

‘Diplomacy is controversial – it has its advocates and critics. That said, the main trends – globalization and interdependence, alongside regionalization, the continuing use of force, and the probable power shift in world politics – make diplomacy an imperative and perhaps the only sustainable option for managing differences between political entities, be they state or non-state actors.’

Hocking et. al. agree. In a 2012 report prepared for the Finish Ministry of Foreign Affairs they describe modern diplomacy as ‘rapidly changing landscape marked by conflicting tensions…crowded agendas and increasingly dense patterns of communication…the world has never required these [diplomatic] assets more than it does now.’

While there is agreement on the importance of practical diplomacy the same cannot be said of diplomatic theory. Diplomats are the chief critics and tend ‘not to like theory,’ particularly ‘explanations of why the world is the way it is and what people ought to do’ as well as theorising, often critically, on ‘how they [the diplomats] relate to one another…and what they do’ in their day to day jobs. In the face of budget pressures or questions over their relevance the practitioners ‘tend to be overwhelmed by the immediate demands of the day and often unaware of the larger picture.’ Most diplomats turn their nose up at ideas of grand theory, abstract thought or of esoteric epistemological inquiry on diplomacy. And besides, diplomats will often insist that to practice diplomacy is to theorise.

Diplomatic scholars were – for the most part – not much better in their attitude toward theory. Unlike the mother discipline of International Relations (IR) the sub field does not have a readily identifiable body of lucid, extractable and plural theory with which to make sense of modern diplomacy. This is nothing new. It is well documented that diplomacy and diplomatic studies has a resistance or inertia to theory (Der Derian 1987; Constantinou 1996; Murray 2008, 2011; Neumann 2003; Sharp 2009). Because of this resistance diplomatic studies in the twenty-first century is much like the practical environment it focusses upon: the field is puzzling, multifaceted and its core subject is contested.
At this baffling juncture this paper argues that while there is ‘imperative’ need for practical diplomacy in a globalizing world there is a greater need for a well thought out, thriving and plural body of diplomatic theory. Theory is useful to fields of study grappling with questions over its subject matter; it is vital to filtering complex and growing bodies of knowledge peppered with contested claims; it offer scholars and practitioners a theoretical identity hitherto lacking; and drives fields of study forward, revealing gaps in the canon.

In the mid-seventeenth century diplomacy was in a similar evolutionary, formative period and theory was fundamental to cementing diplomacy as an important area of study and practice. The pre-Westphalian theoretical renaissance – a rebirth in ways of thinking about diplomacy – must be matched by a post-Cold War renaissance. If both the practitioner and scholar hope to understand and potentialise the ‘business of peace’ in the modern diplomatic environment then building, consolidating and debating distinct Schools of diplomatic theory is fundamentally important.

In this article three different Schools of diplomatic thought, or diplomatic theory, are evidenced, constructed and reified to help clear the confusion over diplomacy: the Traditional school, the Nascent school, and the Innovative school. For outsiders the proposed taxonomy will prove useful as it offers a neat synopsis of many diverse views on what constitutes diplomacy today. For insiders, the three schools will provide sharper lenses which make the modern diplomatic picture clearer.

In this context the article has four aims: first, to confirm that there are many disparate views on what constitutes diplomacy in the modern era and to argue this plurality is both necessary and positive; second, to expose students and practitioners of diplomacy to the remarkable array of diverse work undertaken by scholars of diplomacy since the end of the Cold War – modern diplomacy is certainly more than the ‘dialogue between states’; third, to propose several benefits to the scholar and diplomatic studies field that result from an enhanced attitude to diplomatic theory and theorizing; fourth, to act as a rallying call for students and scholars of theory: considering the culture of inertia that has prevailed for so long, there is much work to be done. As Murray et. al. wrote in a 2011 International Studies Association Forum discussing the theoretical and practical nature of modern diplomacy, ‘there may have been easier times for studying diplomacy, but there never have been better or more interesting ones.’

The article also has its parameters. It focusses on the modern period in international relations, from Westphalia onwards. In other words, it does not engage with anthropological stabs in the dark over troglodyte diplomacy or the legacy of the Amarna or Greek systems on
diplomacy. The paper begins by charting the history of modern diplomatic theory and practice from the seventeenth century (the initial renaissance) before describing the complex nature of modern diplomacy and the need for esoteric diplomatic theories. It finishes by introducing the three schools of diplomatic thought and proposes a number of benefits to the diplomatic community by developing a theoretical culture not known not for theoretical resistance but renaissance.
Part One – from Westphalia to Euthanasia

The paper begins by tracing the history of diplomacy from Westphalia to the end of the Cold War. It does so to illustrate that the current renaissance of diplomacy has precedent and to prove that early diplomatic theory and theorists were invaluable in alleviating a similar period of confusion over what diplomacy was or ought to have been.

When the modern system of diplomacy emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century the fledgling international relations system was fragmented, violent, divisive and transitional. The narrative should be familiar to most International Relations (IR) students. At the time Europe’s political structure was pluralistic, a mixture of proto-states, diverse religious entities, and mercenary and private armies battling it out for territory, enrichment, souls and political influence, all of which culminated in the brutal politico-religious Thirty Years War. From the ashes of a conflict that ended the domination of the Holy Roman Empire and ushered in the age of state sovereignty, raison d’état, secularism and religious particularism, the 194 belligerents that signed the Treaty of Westphalia ‘established principles that have endured and remained at the heart of contemporary international politics.’

One of those principles was diplomacy which from the outset was Machiavellian, driven by the hunger for power, territory and resources; it was strategic and chess-like, a shrewd, tactful, cunning and at times deceptive game of oractical manoeuvre, of poise, thrust and counter-poise. Concerned from its inception with the haute politique, a nascent industry of diplomacy and international law was embodied by men like Cardinal Richelieu, the world’s first Prime Minister, who unified French foreign policy in the Quai D’Orsay (the world’s first Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and insisted diplomacy must be ‘a continuous activity, not an occasional necessity’ where national interest could be furthered through cooperation and not conflict.

This practical renaissance was matched by a theoretical boom. Keens-Soper informs us that between 1625 and 1700, 153 titles on diplomacy were published in Europe: of these, 114 were new contributions to the literature, the others were translations. Most of these works dealt with the virtues necessary to make a successful ambassador – what Keens-Soper refers to as a literary fascination with a diplomats ‘moral physiognomy.’ The works were written to enhance perceptions of diplomats who did not have particularly good reputations at the time. Holsti accredits this poor image to perceptions of diplomacy heavily associated with ‘spying and with excesses of theatre and show’ (2004: 183). Duplicity and deceit were finally

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abolished as the norm for diplomatic exchange. ‘It is a fundamental error,’ wrote de Callières ‘and one widely held, that a clever negotiator must be a master of deceit. Honesty is here and everywhere the best policy: a lie always leaves behind it a drop of poison, it awakes in the defeated party a sense of irritation and a desire for vengeance.’

While most of the early theoretical works were concerned with the moral physiognomy of the ideal diplomatists a clearer understanding of the nature, role and scope of diplomacy emerged. Engaging with theory helped alleviate the confusion over what seventeenth century diplomacy was or ought to be; it developed a ‘a shared corporate culture,’ with ‘professional language, behavioral codes, entry procedures, socialisation patterns, norms and standards’; and theory helped form identity, meaning and purpose for the profession and established diplomacy as ‘the conduct of relations between sovereign states with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.’ There can be little doubt that diplomatic theory – a set of consensual, interrelated assumptions about diplomacy – was fundamental to diplomacy becoming the ‘master-institution of international society.’

At the time diplomacy also mattered as a subject of study in universities. Diplomacy was synonymous with inter-state affairs and if ‘you understood the rules of diplomacy, both formal and tacit, then you would understand what was important to know to make sense of international relations.’ The precursor to IR, Diplomatic History concerned a fine-toothed examination of official treaties and documents, the study of a ‘sort of official handwriting, the archives,’ which ‘revealed the pattern of secret strategies of monarchs and statesmen’ to wide audiences. For many years Diplomatic History was well established in higher education institutes alongside medicine, law, engineering, economics, philosophy, mathematics and physics.

Since the mid-seventeenth century diplomacy has been the state’s vanguard institution for international affairs. As the state developed, diplomacy evolved mutually and came to monopolise international relations. During this time, state-to-state diplomatic interaction was the only game in town. The players – the diplomats – acted above and beyond the domestic state, physically, culturally and philosophically, like some elitist gatekeepers of a hermetic, old boys club imbued with sacrosanct historical traditions that utterly escaped the man on the street (or so we were told). The diplomats occupied a hidden world, a luxurious, rarefied and aristocratic realm. Although over time, the institution of diplomacy took on unique characteristics – the development of a diplomatic culture and corps, for example - it was
axiomatically linked to its realist state master; and the men – and they were all men – came to see international affairs as a zero-sum game where one state’s gain was another’s loss.

As ever, diplomacy had its critics and the reasons, rhetoric and diatribe aren’t so dissimilar from the criticisms aimed at modern diplomacy. For James Connolly writing in 1915, for example, diplomats were not men of honour. Diplomacy was “hypocrisy incarnate,” full of ‘false prophets’ where:

‘the diplomat holds all acts honourable which bring him success, all things are righteous which serve his ends. If cheating is necessary, he will cheat; if lying is useful, he will lie; if bribery helps, he will bribe; if murder serves, he will order murder; if burglary, seduction, arson or forgery brings success nearer, all and each of these will be done.’

Such ardent views on the inherent duplicity of diplomacy were, as they are today, in the minority. It was generally agreed that a clear theoretical understanding and practical application of diplomacy, however malodorous, was vital to international relations. As Wight and Butterfield remind the doubters:

‘the various activities and institutions of diplomacy, such as the exchange of resident ambassadors, the activity of communication between states, the practice of diplomatic immunity, the holding of congresses and conferences, the negotiation of treaties and agreements of various kinds, are not only distinguishing features of diplomacy but also a foundational element of any society of independent states.’

The section illustrated that the seventeenth century renaissance in practical diplomacy was matched by a similar boom in diplomatic theory. Such symbiosis helped alleviate much of the confusion over this transition period for diplomacy which in turn gave both the profession and its study a clear identity, one of the reasons why traditional diplomacy operated at the forefront of the affairs between states until the early 20th century.
How then did diplomacy get so confusing? The mad twentieth century

The halcyon days for the theory and practice of diplomacy came to a shuddering halt in the twentieth century. Diplomacy was blamed by many for its inability to prevent the First World War. Its impotence was further highlighted when several sovereign nations poured scorn on bold new diplomatic initiatives such as the multilateral diplomacy of the League of Nations. Speaking in 1939 and citing the ‘spectacular failure’ of the League to settle the ‘disputes about Manchuria in 1931, about the Chaco territory in South America in 1933, about Ethiopia in 1935, and about Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia during the last two years’ (and it would be remiss to ignore the rise and rise of the Nazi party in the 1930s), Dr Max Habicht\(^{23}\) prophetically argued that the ‘present machinery of the League has not been able in the past and will never be able in the future to bring about a peaceful solution’ to the diametrically opposed interests of sovereign states.\(^{24}\)

During the Second World War and Cold War diplomacy and diplomatic theory was shunted further from the political foreground. As Sharp reminds us, a ‘host of ideological arguments of political, economic and legal provenance’ held that ‘international relations and the challenge of avoiding another war could not, and should not be left to diplomacy and diplomats.’\(^{25}\) The sword became mightier than the pen and soon the military took over foreign policy. Inter-state exchange became dominated by, for instance, hard power capabilities, strategic arms races, the specter of nuclear annihilation through Mutually Assured Destruction and proxy wars. Diplomacy – the business of peace and the minimization of friction in international relations - was pushed to the theoretical and practical margins; it became an anachronistic backwater populated by theorists and practitioners stuck in the past and obsessed with the glory days when diplomacy did matter. In universities the world over those that occupied the growing discipline of IR thought of world affairs ‘in terms that excluded diplomacy, or took for granted what it continued to accomplish, while highlighting its shortcomings.’\(^{26}\)

Similarly the post-Cold War environment, with its volatile mix of new transnational security threats and old attitudes to countering those threats, has not been kind for states and their diplomatic institutions, partly because of their inability to cope with a host of Gordian issues set free after 1989: a plethora of failed and failing states starved of financial support from their Cold War masters, various financial crisis and rise of fundamentalist Islam, for example.
Questions that were asked of the relevance of the state were suddenly asked of diplomacy: were diplomats still necessary? or ‘is diplomacy dead?’

Like the state, traditional diplomacy was accused of being obsolete, irrelevant and archaic, withering away and doing little more than providing ‘dubious solutions to long-forgotten or out-dated problems.’

The diplomats also came under attack (again). They were stereotypically labelled as blue-blooded public schoolboys doing nothing much other than following the canapé trail and the pink champagne, ineffectively operating somewhere between the tropical and the alcohol and having a jolly good time abroad living as princes in lavish, ornate residencies all at the expense of the taxpayer. In the 1990’s where ‘every man’ became a diplomat, ‘painful though it may be for professional diplomats to acknowledge,’ diplomacy appeared to suffer some sort of ‘existential crisis.’

Amidst this so-called crisis (which was often trumpeted but rarely substantiated) non-traditional diplomatic actors began to emerge and proliferate, filling the vacuum of responsibility left by growing numbers of inept failed and failing states. The appearance of ‘new’ diplomatic actors – civil society organisations (CSOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs), Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and even influential celebrities such as Bono, Bob Geldof and Bill Gates – led to the introduction of terms like plural, ‘polylateral’ or ‘multi-stakeholder’ to describe the vertical and horizontal networks that came to characterise modern diplomacy. While these non-state actors range from the messianic to the mad, it is indisputable that they have affected change to the international relations system, thus bringing into renewed and further question the relevance and effectiveness of the state and its diplomacy to solve the growing pains of globalization. In this rapidly changing environment diplomacy came to be interpreted in binary terms: it either was or was not relevant, dead or alive; either it was in a state of decline or it showed evidence of reform and change. The rise of CSOs, for example, was pitched as some sort of contest over diplomatic legitimacy where the state and non-state, the old and new, the traditional and non-traditional, were apparently fighting over the title of top diplomatic dog.

A more accurate picture of modern diplomacy emerges if one steps back from such needless drama. State and their diplomats still endure in the twenty-first century. Practically the state is the most dominant political actor while its diplomatic institution (centrally orchestrated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) remains the most visible, relevant and networked diplomatic actor. In the physical sense, traditional diplomacy has ‘become a growth sector’ and remains the ‘engine room of international relations.’ Currently there are 193 states operating in the modern diplomatic environment compared to 47 in 1950 and 26 in 1950 and 26 in
1926: all of these states interact diplomatically, all need to represent themselves, and all need continuously to negotiate advantageous foreign policy ends in an increasingly competitive and hostile environment. With over three hundred years of ‘the conduct of relations on a state-to-state basis, via formally accredited resident missions forms the bulk of international exchange.’ In other words, claims of the irrelevance and obsolescence of diplomacy, or any talk of the death of diplomacy are melodramatic, ill-founded and far-fetched; old wine in new bottles. In the global century more, not less, diplomacy and diplomats are required.

Moreover, the traditional diplomatic institutions is reforming and adapting to its dynamic environment. In light of public and private calls for reform and changes in society such as the ICT revolution diplomacy is reinventing itself whether it id diplomats changing their role from that of specialists to generalists, from ‘gatekeepers’ to ‘boundary spanners,’ or experimenting with E-diplomacy, Virtual Embassies, or social media. Whether it is employing sports-people or sporting mega events to enhance a state’s diplomatic message or the mass stampede toward Public Diplomacy, it is difficult to prove diplomacy as an area of theory and practice is in recession.

Theoretically speaking diplomatic studies is also booming, so much so a second renaissance can be evidenced. While the end of the Cold War was tumultuous it ushered in a process of introspection for diplomats and diplomatic studies which, in turn, ‘began a process of change in terms of reinstating diplomacy and raising the level of academic interest in it.’ Overcoming the backwater status and the marginalization of diplomacy drove a generation of ‘epistemic torchbearers’ to push diplomatic studies closer to the centre of IR, where it rightly belongs. Since the early 1990’s scholars such as Sharp, Melissen, Cooper, Riordan, Hocking, Wiseman and Kerr have consistently produced innovative, heuristic work on Public, NGO, citizen-to-citizen, and even celebrity diplomacy and in doing so have revealed a far broader, virginal, and fecund landscape of inquiry than traditional, state-centric theories of diplomacy were ever able to conceive of.

Evidence of this theoretical renaissance can be further substantiated by a cursory glance at some of the recent publications in diplomatic studies, the volume of which would easily bypass the 170 of the Westphalian diplomatic renaissance. Today the student of diplomacy can peruse topics as diverse as Guerrilla Diplomacy (Copeland, 2009) to A Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Sharp, 2009) to bizarrely titled memoirs of diplomats such as H.E. Craig Murray’s Dirty Diplomacy: The Rough-and-Tumble Adventures of a Scotch-Drinking, Skirt-Chasing, Dictator-Busting and Thoroughly Unrepentant Ambassador Stuck on the Frontline of the War Against Terror (2007). More soberly, the
work of Pigman (2005, 2006, 2008), Lee and Hudson (2004), Hocking (2002, 2004) and Potter (2002, 2003), and many others has introduced debates about the reform of traditional diplomacy or the role of business and civil society groups in diplomacy. Other dynamic scholars focus on integrative-diplomacy (Hocking, Et. al. 2012), city-diplomacy (Acuto, 2010), sports-diplomacy (Murray 2012) or sustainable-diplomacy which focuses on ‘how people should live if they are to remain in harmony with their natural environment.’ And some thinkers have even gone as far as to entirely disaggregate the state and its diplomats in their novel theories (Der Derian 1987; Hoffman 2003).

Alongside the Palgrave-Macmillan book series on diplomacy, the Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy makes it debut in 2013 and The Hague Journal of Diplomacy now enters its seventh year and continues to provide an outstanding resource for theorists and practitioners and acquaint a growing readership with the best work being undertaken in diplomacy. Epistemic nodes for study diplomacy such as Clingendael’s Diplomatic Studies Programme, the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (ANU), and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (Georgetown) are also multiplying and further confirm the renaissance; and the first textbook of diplomacy – Diplomacy in a Globalizing World by Pauline Kerr and Geoff Wiseman – finally offers the growing number of university courses on diplomacy a sound resource.

This section illustrated that the theory and practice of diplomacy is not in a state of decline, irrelevance or general deliquescence but in renaissance. Recently, Hillary Rodham Clinton accurately conveyed the attitude of many diplomatic actors when she said:

‘To meet these 21st century challenges, we need to use the tools, the new 21st century statecraft: complementing traditional foreign policy tools with newly innovated and adapted instruments of statecraft that fully leverage the networks, technologies, and demographics of our interconnected world...we find ourselves living at a moment in human history when we have the potential to engage in these new and innovative forms of diplomacy and to also use them to help individuals be empowered for their own development.’

Such rhetoric however only captures part of the modern diplomatic renaissance: the statist view from the embassy window. It only reveals part of the milieu of the diverse cast of diplomatic actors: large firms such as Google, powerful individuals like Yao Ming, or even ‘Terrorist’ organisations of Hamas and Hezbollah that can be said to practice their own unique forms of representation, communication and negotiation. This plurality alludes early on to the difficulty in answering the simple question: ‘what is modern diplomacy?’ At least
the theorists and practitioners are for once in agreement: in the twenty-first century diplomacy matters once more. But why does the confusion over its essence, meaning and practice persist? And why, more importantly, is it important to alleviate that confusion?
Part two – The importance of theory to complex subjects

While the diplomatic renaissance in diplomacy is promising in that it alludes to a more general preference for the business of peace over the industry of war, for example, diplomacy has never been more confusing. Scholars – still - are preoccupied by the essence, shape and nature of diplomacy. Kerr and Wiseman, for example, feel that ‘complex and intellectual developments in world politics’ generate lively ‘debate about the nature of contemporary diplomacy’ and charge those with an interest in diplomacy to address ‘how is diplomacy changing, why, and with what implications for future theories and practices?’ For Sharp the confusion over modern diplomacy also raises questions ‘about who or what are important in international relations, what may be properly regarded as diplomacy, and, thus, who can properly be regarded as diplomats.’ And in a 2012 report commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several leading diplomatic scholars wrote of modern diplomacy as ‘a complex picture marked by a balance between change and continuity…expectations as to what constitutes diplomacy as an activity, how and where it can be practiced, by whom and according to what rules are all contentious issues.’ For most defining modern diplomacy is an ‘often-clouded’ puzzle.

This puzzle becomes evident when trying something as simple as defining diplomacy. In Satow’s ubiquitous definition diplomacy is ‘the application of intelligence or tact to the conduct of relations between the governments of independent states; or more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means’. Under this view diplomats do not exist outside the halls of the embassy. Traditionalists like Satow ‘reject the broader conception of diplomacy’ implied by the diplomatic renaissance ‘because in their view diplomats must be accredited representatives of states’ because they ‘enjoy more legitimacy and are better at conducting international relations than are other people.’ Hoffman, on the other hand, would argue that such parochial rhetoric is nonsense. To him the ‘state is incoherent, and that this incoherence necessarily extends itself to statist diplomacy…traditional or conventional notions of diplomacy’ must be avoided if we are to understand the nature of modern diplomacy. These days trying to distil the essence of diplomacy seems nigh on impossible.

For others, the stretching of the supplication and scope of diplomacy – sometimes referred to as the New Diplomatic Studies Paradigm – is a source of the modern confusion over diplomacy. Today, Sharp writes, ‘people struggle to make sense of an expanding range of hyphenated diplomacies, for example public-diplomacy, private-diplomacy, military-
diplomacy, field-diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy. The danger with hyphenation is that the hybrid often amounts to something lesser that its individual elements. Moreover, this trend of over-hyphenation further dilutes and obfuscates the form and shape of modern diplomacy in a time when it can ill afford an identity crisis.

This paper argues, however, that the confusion over diplomacy stems not from over-hyphenation, definitional or semantic quarrels but from the culture of theoretical inertia that despite recent impressive gains in diplomatic studies lingers. Partly this theoretical reluctance is due to the assumption that for legitimacy diplomatic studies must pander to the profession of diplomacy and the diplomats themselves, to appease the empirical hand that supposedly feeds the field. If the diplomats are ambivalent to diplomatic theory, to ‘the theorist’s conceit that the unexamined life is not worth living,’ then why should diplomatic studies bother with the sort of epistemological enquiry that the mother discipline of IR engages with?

Not many diplomatic scholars would agree that diplomatic studies needs to think more deeply of the meaning, uses and application of theory (highlighting the recent boom in diplomatic scholarship as counter-evidence). In fact, when theoretical inertia, reluctance, or resistance is mentioned scholars seem to take either offense or cover: ‘we have a lively theoretical debate…moreover, it has been going on for centuries’ is a familiar retort. But why then do only a handful of explicit—not cross-fertilizations with social theory or practice-based manuals for novices entering the profession - theoretical works exist (Der Derian 1987; Constantinou 1996)? Or why is it that only in 2009 did Sharp’s *A Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, the first exclusive book on diplomatic theory, appear? It would be foolish to argue that in the past two decades the scholarship on diplomacy has not been innovative and pushed the boundaries of the field but diplomatic studies’ conceptual framework continues to lag, and the subfield—still—does not seem to get the bigger theoretical picture.

Most students, scholars and graduates don’t appear to think too deeply about how fields of study actually come to bodies of diverse theory. Often they are just ‘there’ in the textbooks or embedded as part of the academic lexicon. But if theory is thought about more broadly - where it has performed a fundamental role in the philosophy of knowledge since the days of Aristotle for instance - the theoretical reluctance or inertia that blights diplomatic studies could perhaps be countered.

Generally, in a social science field such as IR a theory can be defined as a ‘set of interrelated concepts, assumptions, and generalizations that systematically describes and explains regularities in [the] behaviour’ of a subject under examination.
invaluable to complex bodies of knowledge because they describe, explain and predict regularities and continuities of the subject under investigation. At their most basic theories are consensually organised assumptions about how the world works or about how it ought to work; they ‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, puzzling world around us intelligible.’ Theories are also heuristic, that is, they stimulate, generate and direct the further development of knowledge by highlighting ‘gaps’ in existing bodies of knowledge. As Sir Karl Popper (1966) noted of theorising, ‘the more we learn about the world, and the deeper our learning, the more conscious, specific and articulate will be our knowledge of what we do not know, our knowledge of our ignorance.’ In this respect theories develop novel facts about the subject under theorisation. More importantly – especially for a confusing field such as diplomatic studies – theories can be employed for filtering and processing large and expanding bodies of literature, for ‘processing the raw material of knowledge – selecting, categorizing, ordering, simplifying and integrating.’

Thinking about theory in these terms would be useful for diplomatic studies; if anything, it could allow scholars to move past the ‘what is diplomacy?’ type of questions. Diplomatic theories as is true of all theories merely ‘describes a range of possibilities.’ In the oft-times bizarre world of theory the question actually has no answer, and besides, the question is always more important than the answer.

So what might a diplomatic theory or body of theories look like?
Part three – The three diplomatic schools of thought

Based on the principles of theory outlined above and drawing from the modern diplomatic studies canon the article now introduces three schools of diplomatic thought: the Traditional, Nascent and Innovative Schools. Classifying and ordering the many disparate views on diplomacy in this manner consolidates the recent gains made in diplomatic scholarship and helps build a strong, novel and productive research agenda for the early twenty-first century. For insiders, the following taxonomy permits an epistemological assessment of where the field lies on the diplomatic continuum: what we know or think we know in relation to diplomacy. For outsiders, the three schools (and remember Popper’s words: there may, should be more schools – this triumvirate is not exclusive) will allude to the scope and potential of modern diplomacy as well as provide a synopsis of the diverse views on what diplomacy is or ought to be in the plural, dynamic and volatile twenty-first century international relations system.

*The Traditional school of diplomatic thought*

The Traditional School is the most familiar way of theorising diplomacy. For centuries, traditional works dominated the canon of diplomacy and in time came to constitute a distinct way of thinking and writing on diplomacy. Certain common characteristics, assumptions and generalisations are shared by Traditionalists which allows the introduction of a unique school of diplomatic thought.

The traditional approach to writing on diplomacy has several synonyms: ‘statist’, ‘state-centric’ or ‘rationalist’ being common. This article prefers the label Traditionalism. The tradition in this case is to continue to emphasize the centrality of the state to diplomacy. Continuity allows each generation of Traditionalists to build on the foundations laid by their theoretical forefathers. Each of the Traditionalists relies on, develops and expresses an admiration for the work of their predecessors. Satow, for example, writing two centuries later considered the work of De Callieres as a ‘mine of political wisdom.’ In *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method* (1957) Nicolson too expresses admiration for the work of his traditional forefathers regarding de Callieres’ work as ‘the best manual on diplomatic method ever written.’ And the title of G. R. Berridge’s *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (2001) indicates an admiration for the earlier scholars writing on diplomacy.
Traditionalists share five common assumptions that allude to a distinct school. First, they describe diplomacy as an almost exclusive state function. They infer ‘that diplomacy is the privileged domain of professional diplomats, conducted almost exclusively by Foreign Service personnel and officials from Foreign Ministries.’ In the modern era, traditional diplomacy is an activity where professional, officially accredited state representatives are portrayed as the monopolistic gatekeepers of a sacrosanct historical tradition. Diplomacy is ‘the formal body of conventions and understandings that regulate the conduct and specific the rights and duties of professional diplomats as set out in the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.’ End of story.

Second, Traditionalists interpret diplomacy as the study of the international realm of sovereign states, with the central purpose of diplomacy being to overcome the anarchical nature of that system and to facilitate peaceful relationships amongst sovereign states through familiar, historical channels of diplomacy. In this light, Traditionalism:

‘establishes the idea that diplomacy is constituted by, and also constitutes, state sovereignty. State sovereignty, in turn, constitutes the anarchic systemic structures characterised by a separation of the domestic from the international, the economic from the political, and the private from the public.’

This neat separation allows Traditionalists, third, to concentrate on diplomacy’s role in relation to a classic political-military agenda which can be described as a:

‘conception of international relations, where states are motivated by considerations of measurable power. Thus, foreign affairs among states is fundamentally concerned with war and peace, and the employment of state power vis-à-vis other states. These traditional political-military concerns, which include issues such as force balances, demarcation of territories, arms control negotiations and alliance cohesion, have not been replaced.’

Traditionalists therefore focus largely, but not exclusively, on diplomacy’s role in relation to the high political agenda. Low political issues – socio-economics or humanitarian aid, for example – are considered ‘peripheral, rather than central to diplomatic practice’ and, consequently, to Traditional understandings of diplomacy.

Fourth, Traditionalists consider diplomatic and political history as central to their school of thought. The study of diplomacy, they argue, demands an embracing of the distant as well as the recent past. This ‘propensity to treat the future as an extension of the past’ is a central characteristic of the Traditional School and could suggest that the Traditionalist’s
attitude towards diplomatic history is ‘psychologically more comforting than living with an uncertain future.’ 69

Fifth, Traditionalists write prescriptive guides to diplomacy where they theorise on the practice of diplomacy. Satow’s Guide to Diplomacy (2009), Berridge’s Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (2010) and Rana’s The 21st Century Ambassador (2011) can be classified as such. These books are ‘manuals of diplomatic procedure, in the tradition of the guides that made their appearance early in the European system, and continue to dominate the field.’ 70 They convey a view of diplomacy as a specialised skill, the vocation of the select few and are beneficial for the novice entering the profession. Such ‘conventional accounts’ usually include:

‘a narration of the progressive story of diplomatic history; the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the formulation of foreign policy; the functions of the embassy; the qualities of the diplomat; and different accounts dealing with issues ranging from negotiation to immunities, and from international trade or law to etiquette and protocol.’ 71

From the five, common assumptions introduced a definition of traditional diplomacy can be cemented. In the classical vein, Nicolson packages diplomacy simply and in statist terms. He writes that ‘diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist.’ 72 Each Traditional definitions of diplomacy distinguishes itself by subtle nuances however each impresses upon the reader a fundamental message: that the state and its diplomats are the only actors that practice actual diplomacy.

The Traditional school remains essential to understanding modern diplomacy. It describes the inner workings and realms of professional diplomacy and conveys the myriad intricacies of the diplomatic ‘game’ in a rigorous, historical and pedantic manner. In terms of explaining the rules, procedures and processes of traditional diplomacy to outsiders their contribution is invaluable. However it would be foolish to believe that the Traditional School accounts for ALL diplomacy at work in the modern diplomatic environment. Thinking again of the heuristic nature of theory, the state parochialism inherent to the Traditional school encourages the search for falsifying instances which challenge this particular school’s way of writing and thinking on diplomacy. In the modern diplomatic environment it is difficult to uphold that the state is the ‘only diplomatic actor of significance.’ 73 Debunking such myth and adding new layers to the understanding of diplomacy is a task wholeheartedly embraced by the second school of diplomatic thought.
The Nascent school of diplomatic thought

The second school, the Nascent school is almost polemically opposed to Traditionalism and most certainly emerged to challenge the dominant Traditionalist school. The statist parochialism inherent to Traditionalism means that ‘such a perspective plays into the hands of those forces which view [traditional] diplomacy as increasingly removed from the real problems – and solutions – facing the world in the post-Cold War years.’ Those ‘forces’ are what this paper refers to as the Nascent School. Nascent scholars view traditional diplomacy as increasingly distanced from the real world problems of the twenty-first century.

Scholars from this group focus on emerging forms of alternate diplomacy: hence the label Nascent. This type of diplomacy has several synonyms: new, unofficial, unconventional or track two diplomacy, for example. In the modern diplomatic environment ‘the challenge [for diplomacy studies] now is to develop a way of conceptualising and analysing diplomacy that can identify, explain and understand these sorts of changes to diplomatic practice.’ One change driving the Nascent School is the emergence of CSOs practising faster, less expensive and more effective unofficial diplomacy. The premise that the ‘the diplomatic expertise for dealing successfully with conflict and peacemaking does not reside solely within government personnel or procedures’ is central to this school.

Nascent scholars, like Traditionalists, share common assumptions and generalisations, allowing us to speak of a distinct School. There are four in total. First, Nascent theorists challenge the notion that diplomacy be interpreted in a rigid, precise or authoritative fashion, concentrating on the role of the state. For Nascent scholars, lessening state focus requires a fundamental reconceptualisation of diplomacy. Diamond and MacDonald typify this characteristic when they write that ‘the whole worldview of the last several centuries, which saw the nation-state as the unit of power and the balance of power as the principle of order, is no longer satisfactory to explain all the new conditions and forces at work in the world community.’ In the modern diplomatic environment the state and its diplomats ‘are cast into a limbo of growing irrelevance…[one] only of decreasing relevance.’ This alternate approach (to Traditionalism) suggests that by exploring non-state diplomacy rewarding insight and discovery of ‘new’ diplomacies awaits.

These scholars, second, view the state and its diplomacy as blocking change to a more pacific international relations system. They can be described as ‘those who regard the state as an obstacle to world order’; to them, ‘the development of an alternative diplomacy,
embracing NGOs and transnational movements, offers the prospect of an international order transcending the state system.\textsuperscript{80} Thus the traditional institution of diplomacy is viewed in an unsavoury light by Nascent scholars. Nascent diplomatic writing has ‘a transformational aspect, advocating a change in understanding of a modern diplomatic environment dominated by states’ and the Traditional School that interprets the environment as such.\textsuperscript{81}

Third, Nascent scholars argue that the traditional diplomatic institution is in a period of crisis and obsolescence. Der Derian, for example, writes of the ‘crisis in which diplomacy finds itself’\textsuperscript{82} and Riordan of the continuing ‘fragmentation of traditional diplomacy’ where ‘no country, however powerful, will be immune.’\textsuperscript{83} Similarly, Modelski complains that:

‘Contemporary diplomacy provides neither adequate communication nor faithful or reliable representation; it is (1) technologically redundant; (2) uneconomical and (3) politically harmful to world society….what is special about international diplomacy is….how inbred and self-centred this system has become, and how impervious it is to the general environment.’\textsuperscript{84}

Nascent authors believe that traditional diplomacy is ill-suited to twenty-first century problems, and that this type of diplomacy both as a vocation and an area of theoretical focus is defunct.

The crisis of the traditional diplomatic institution leads Nascent theorists to suggest that perhaps it is obsolete and irrelevant. A portrayal of the traditional diplomatic institution as unresponsive to change, archaic and capable only of providing out-dated solutions to out-dated problems is not difficult to find in Nascent literature. Eayrs, for example, describes traditional diplomacy’s ‘deliquescence’ or ‘melting away into nothingness.’\textsuperscript{85} Similarly Ross, a former British diplomat, writes in a chapter entitled The End of Diplomacy, that there is ‘nothing special about diplomacy’ save its ‘snobbery and elitism.’\textsuperscript{86} For Ross, diplomacy is afflicted by ‘a lack of accountability and responsiveness’ conducive to a ‘crisis of diplomatic legitimacy’ shrouded behind a self-perpetuating ‘veil of privilege and secrecy.’\textsuperscript{87} Realising the true potential of modern diplomacy may require going as far as ‘abolishing the idea of diplomacy itself.’\textsuperscript{88} Such criticism is quite common from the Nascent School. Nascent approaches therefore ‘tend to ignore professional diplomacy or to question its significance’ in relation to understanding modern diplomacy.\textsuperscript{89}

The same criticism is levelled at the state-centric diplomatic writing. Nascent scholars argue that this parochial opinion fails to account for the plural nature of modern diplomacy. If an effective understanding of modern diplomacy is to be forthcoming, the plural environment needs plural theories. State-centric/Traditional writing on diplomacy is thus rejected for ‘not
being sufficiently inclusive, the need is for a more diffuse, multiperspectival approach’ to writing and thinking about modern diplomacy.90

The obsolescence accredited to the traditional way of writing and thinking on diplomacy has led Nascent scholars, fourth, to focus theoretical efforts on alternate diplomatic actors. The twenty-first century has provided the opportunity for these non-state actors to practice diplomacy through the many avenues, pathways and partnerships that now exists beyond the image of a traditional diplomatic ‘gatekeeper.’ Today there are many gates to international relations. The good work been done by the International Committee to Ban Landmines, the Kimberley Process and the recent furore over Blood Ivory are sound examples of new diplomatic networks. To understand modern diplomacy, claim Nascent scholars, means first to acknowledge the multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment and, secondly, to theorise on the diplomacy that unconventional actors practise within that environment.

From these four common assumptions a definition of Nascent diplomacy can be introduced.91 Nascent diplomacy can be framed as a reaction to states’ tardiness in embracing an unconventional or lower agenda that has grown in importance since the end of the Cold War. Nascent diplomacy is characterised by the fostering of equitable, networked and stable relationships amongst non-state actors. These actors share interdependent, low political goals and diplomatically exchange resources, expertise and knowledge (information) in pursuit of unconventional goals such as human rights or aid development issues. Nascent or non-state diplomatic actors have capitalised on state deficiencies to promote their agenda, their position in the international relations hierarchy and their alternate but effective techniques at tackling global problems, which states have been sluggish in addressing.

This School, like Traditionalism, in not without its faults. Perhaps the most obvious falsifying instance concerns its dismissive attitude toward the incumbent state and its traditional diplomatic institution; simply, if these entities are obsolete, in crisis or irrelevant then why do they continue to exist? To deny Traditionalism or state-centrism is to deny a harsh reality of the modern diplomatic environment: the omnipotence of traditional diplomacy.

This School, however, is central to developing a deeper understanding of modern diplomacy in that it encourages students, scholars and practitioners to think outside the traditional square, to develop further questions, hypotheses, which, in turn, lead to novel facts concerning modern diplomacy. As but one example, the Nascent School encourages the further substantiation of alternate forms of diplomacy. Three inexhaustible questions could be
‘do non-state actors have readily definable diplomatic practices and procedures for realisation of policy goals? If so, why are they effective and how do they differ from traditional means and methods of state-qua-state diplomacy?’ By default, the Nascent School directs the field towards ‘new’ areas of research and endorses the notion that the surface of diplomacy has only just been scratched. The Nascent school validates the prospect that unexplored areas of research on diplomacy abound.

*The Innovative school of diplomatic thought*

The third school, the Innovative school, emerged (largely) as a result of the two different schools previously described. As demonstrated, various scholars interpret modern diplomacy differently, in particular the questionable relationship between the incumbent state and emerging non-state actors.

For this third School, diplomatic studies and theory reflects a so-called state/non-state division. The exclusive focus of the Traditional (state) and Nascent schools (non-state) suggests that scholars belonging to either school occupy opposite poles. Where Traditionalists and Nascent scholars are concerned, such approaches still ‘yield cantilevered bridges since their builders do not significantly relax the fundamental assumptions that distinguish the contending research traditions.’92 The result is that the student of diplomacy is presented with two different interpretations of modern diplomacy: a Traditional and a Nascent. Therefore, a middle ground, one that privileges both the state and the non-state, is conspicuous by its absence. The third school emerged to occupy the middle ground.

Scholars from this group share five common assumptions or generalisations, which once grouped confirm the existence of the Innovative school of diplomatic thought.93 The first assumption common to the Innovators is their criticism of the divisionary relationship between the Traditional and Nascent schools. For the Innovators, the need to defend parochial opinion on the nature of diplomacy results in conflicting views, which ultimately produces a confused picture of modern diplomacy. Within diplomacy studies state and non-state actors are often portrayed as:

‘inhabiting different environments, working to different rulebooks and occupying very different positions on the scale of importance in world politics. They exist, therefore, in two solitudes with little or no interaction between their worlds.’94
This exclusivity is regressive and damaging because it encourages competition of opinion at the expense of accuracy. Traditionalist and Nascent scholars alike become consumed with defending their theories and thus stand accused of ‘embellishing notions of diplomacy ‘which do not exist’ or of ‘perfecting and embellishing familiar bricks in a long-established wall whose foundations may be crumbling.’ Such competition, according to the Innovators, means that an impartial body of diplomatic theory truly reflective of the modern diplomatic environment is only now emerging.

For the Innovators, second, polarisation of diplomatic thought forces the observer of modern diplomacy into making a binary either/or choice (diplomacy is either relevant or obsolete, dead or alive, state or non-state, and so on). For Sharp and others polarizing of thought on diplomacy is both frustrating and redundant; it is wrong to assume that either we accept a realist, statist view of diplomacy or that we assume the state was a significant actor in the past but is now irrelevant. Hocking also warns that the study and theory of diplomacy ‘has become an icon for the advocates of two competing perspectives on international politics, the state-centric and world society views.’ This ‘confused and unfocussed’ dialogue can result in ‘two lines of divergent argument’ which bogs the diplomatic studies field in ‘sterile and unproductive debate.’ One gets the impression that the Innovators think the time of Traditional and Nascent diplomatic scholars could be better spent.

Banishing or dismissing such either/or, new/old or state versus non-state rhetoric is a third commonality of the Innovators. They do so through a continuous and objective (re)appraisal of the state/non-state relationship. The Innovator’s propensity to moderate and incorporate balance into their way of thinking and writing about diplomacy is related to the positive networks and plural relationships they believe exist between diplomatic actors of all creeds. They argue that modern state/non-state diplomatic relationships are distinctly non-adversarial, symbiotic and complementary. Non-state diplomatic actors are as much a part of modern diplomacy as state actors are and must be accepted as such by all theorists and practitioners of all types of diplomacy. Lee and Hudson offer a relevant warning for diplomacy studies if non-state actors remain on the margins of the field, arguing that:

‘most diplomatic theorists would have us believe that diplomacy is the stuff of high politics, yet we know this position obscures the practice of a diplomacy that is far more complex and multifaceted. Not only do we know this intuitively, diplomats and official government records tell us that this is so. This blindness produces nothing more than a partial disclosure of what constitutes diplomatic practice.’
For the Innovators, such myopia can be avoided if the focus of diplomatic scholars is reoriented to examine the forces driving change in the modern diplomatic environment. Of the Innovators Melissen notes that they ‘try to provide insights into a transforming diplomatic landscape and the changing modalities and forms of diplomacy within.’102 The work they have done on public, integrative or sports diplomacy has been quite remarkable. By analysing diplomatic advances and change, the Innovators do not make any rash judgments on the fate of the traditional diplomatic institution (as certain Nascent scholars do). At the same time they aim to incorporate observations on non-state diplomatic actors into their way of writing and thinking about diplomacy. Within the Innovative school both the state and the non-state are given equal weighting. This practical balance is a fourth common assumption shared by the Innovators.

Similarly, both Traditional and Nascent works are given impartial consideration by the Innovators. They believe that the modern diplomatic environment is best understood not in either/or terms but from an approach that values opinions from both the Traditional and Nascent Schools. This form of theoretical eclecticism is yet another distinguishing hallmark. Innovators appear to indiscriminately perform an arbitrary or mediating role within diplomatic studies. They feed off the other schools of thought and knowledge clusters, extracting the merits, dispelling parochial limitations and sidestepping adversarial debates (between state and non-state legitimacy, for example) altogether. The end result is an impartial school of thought which stresses the mutually beneficial nature of state and non-state diplomatic relationships.

In this context, there does not appear to be anything particularly ‘innovative’ to the Innovative school of diplomatic thought. After all, knowledge on the diplomacy of state and non-state actors is readily available in the canon. However, it is not the knowledge that is innovative. Rather an approach that privileges both the state and the non-state is novel in diplomatic studies. This orientation suggests a ‘strong demonstration of renewed theoretical innovation in the field, innovation that avoids old patterns and old labels.’103

An Innovative definition of diplomacy confirms this desire to avoid familiar theoretical terrain and to think differently on modern diplomacy. Innovators argue that the term diplomacy is applicable to groups, not only states but also nascent actors such as CSOs or MNCs who play a significant role in modern international relations. For the Innovators, traditional diplomacy must be considered in relation to ‘the transformed environment of actors, issues, and modes of communication within which diplomats function; and yet, demonstrate the continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to most of what happens in
contemporary diplomacy."\textsuperscript{104} In this context diplomacy is ‘the way in which relations between groups that regard themselves as separate ought to be conducted if the principle of living in groups is to be retained as good, and if unnecessary and unwanted conflict is to have a chance of being avoided.’\textsuperscript{105} This expansive approach to writing on diplomacy stresses the ongoing importance of the role of traditional diplomacy but in \textit{relation} to emerging forms of non-traditional diplomacy.
Part Four - The benefits of the proposed taxonomy to diplomatic studies

There are several benefits to the taxonomy proposed above. First, recognising and categorising different views on diplomacy would introduce (more) order, clarity and purpose to the diplomatic studies field. In other words, the confusion would be somewhat alleviated. Essentially, classifying diplomacy in such a simple fashion (establishing what it is, what types exist and what research gaps need attention?) as this article attempts, constitutes a stock take of the diplomacy studies field; an appraisal of what we know or think we know in relation to modern diplomacy.

This appraisal of diplomatic studies is long overdue when compared to other fields. For example, IR scholars ‘have often shown an interest in evaluating the state of their discipline; its practitioners have produced a steady stream of research appraisals.’ 106 Since the end of the Cold War and the close of the millennium, this exercise has been apparent in the broader IR domain but has only recently been conducted with diplomatic studies in mind.107 For the growing diplomatic studies field, this matter of academic housekeeping should be a central and ongoing endeavour.

Understanding individual orientation is also useful for diplomatic scholars in terms of clarity of focus. As other social science fields have realised there are a number of benefits to placing diplomatic scholars into ‘rigid disciplinary pigeon holes’.108 Of diplomatic theorists, ‘anyone of us who has attempted to give an honest answer to the question, ‘so what exactly is it that you do?’’ is unable to give a concise answer.109 Engaging with different diplomatic theories develops a better understanding of the respective produce of diplomatic scholars. Moreover, recognising distinct groups of thinkers and thought urges both scholars and students to contemplate why they think the way they do about the shape, essence and constitution of modern diplomacy.

Once respective diplomatic works and scholars are classified, the strengths and merits of each school can be critiqued. Thus, debate as to the most effective form of modern diplomacy or the most relevant way of thinking or writing on modern diplomacy, for example, can begin in earnest. Such debate can only strengthen each school as well as add theoretical rigour and legitimacy to a field still largely governed by practical, descriptive and prescriptive materials. Moreover, classification of different theories on diplomacy highlights weaknesses in the field as well as novel research opportunities.

One promising research agenda could be to conceptualise if diplomacy is ready to be theorised more? To date, diplomacy and theory have shared a strange, almost taboo
relationship within diplomatic studies. Many scholars are aware of but find unattractive the idea of esoteric epistemological theorising on diplomacy that this article has attempted. There is much implicit theorising already occurring within the diplomatic studies field, but this too is in need of order, revival and direction. An interesting research agenda could seek to explore why this apathy towards theorising on diplomacy prevails and what can be done to redress it once and for all?

The taxonomy suggested in this article is but one tentative step in enhancing knowledge of modern diplomacy. Having three schools of diplomatic thought (see figure 1.1) instead of one dominant type of Traditionalism with limited application improves understanding of the modern diplomatic environment. Similar to the way an optometrist uses a phoropter to incrementally overlay lenses of different strengths to produce a clearer image, by recognising the three diplomatic schools our image of the modern diplomatic environment becomes sharper.

Figure 1.1 – The three diplomatic schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary actor(s)</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Nascent</th>
<th>Innovative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State and Traditional Diplomatic Institution</td>
<td>Non-state: CSOs, IGOs, MNCs (for example)</td>
<td>State &amp; non-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Theory/Philosophy</td>
<td>Realism, neo-realism, Machiavellian</td>
<td>Idealism, Liberalism, Interdependence, Kantian, Moralistic, Ethical</td>
<td>Constructivism, Interdependence, neither optimistic nor pessimistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Bi-Lateral, anarchical, international, balance of power, non-interventionist</td>
<td>Multi-lateral, domestic, international, transparent/open, interventionist</td>
<td>Polylateral, Internationalised and asymmetric networks of state and non-state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins/Emergence</td>
<td>Post 1648</td>
<td>Post 1989</td>
<td>Post 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda</td>
<td>High – military, individual security, defence, trade and national interest</td>
<td>Low – humanitarian, aid, environment, collective security</td>
<td>High and Low; and to clarify the limitations of rival theoretical interpretations on diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This article has demonstrated that the Westphalian theoretical renaissance helped alleviate confusion over what seventeenth century diplomacy was or ought to be. The similarities between then and now suggest the diplomatic studies field is in the midst of a similar period of rebirth but it is operating – largely - in a rudderless fashion in terms of its wholesale attitude toward theory and theorising.

By demonstrating that three diplomatic schools of thought can be evidenced and built this paper has hopefully laid to rest the tiresome claims that diplomacy has nothing interesting to say about international relations or that because traditional diplomacy is a visible profession diplomacy it has an engrained recalcitrance, inertia or resistance to innovative thinking and writing. As an tried and tested alternative to conflict diplomacy is far too important to modern international relations not to be subjected to greater theoretical scrutiny, endeavour and industry.
This article is not an attempt at providing a terminable body of schools of diplomatic thought. To do so would be to deny a common and central epistemological endeavour: to stimulate further enquiry by highlighting strengths as well as weaknesses of certain approaches to our respective subjects (this article included). At its heart, the motivation behind this article is to raise awareness that diplomacy is a far more complex and intriguing area of study than its traditional, dour stereotypic image often suggests. In doing so, it is hoped that the future strength and diversity of the diplomatic studies field will be secured.

The remarkable work done by the epistemic torchbearers, to use Wiseman’s term, since the end of the Cold War has been marvellous; the first component in building a rigorous diplomatic studies research programme well into the future. Conceptualising diplomatic theories and building a well thought out and debated framework for theorising is a second essential component. All the ingredients for a vibrant theoretical debate are present, and the subject of diplomacy – operating at the forefront of any international event of significance – should encourage more theoretical debate. As Paul Sharp one of the leading Innovators accurately states:

‘there has never been a better time for studying diplomacy. The United States is rediscovering it. The European Union is reinventing it. The Chinese are inscribing it with their own characteristics.’

Wise words in a century where diplomacy not war matters.


7 Ibid.


9 Diplomatic missions and the concept of the Ambassador were, of course, familiar long before the formal institutionalisation of diplomacy. But the crucial difference in this era is that diplomats became permanent, or resident, whereas formerly they did not occupy their posts for specific purposes of negotiation or ceremony for any prolonged period.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


22 Wight and Butterfield, *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 22.

23 At the time Habicht was a Member of Secretariat of the League of Nations; Counsel for European Legal and Financial Matters; Lecturer and Writer on International Relations, Duxbury, Massachusetts.


28 See, for example, John Hoffman, ‘Reconstructing Diplomacy,’ *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 5, no. 4 (2003), 525-542. For example, Hoffman claims that ‘the state is incoherent, and that this incoherence necessarily extends itself to statist diplomacy…traditional or conventional notions of diplomacy’ must be avoided if we are to utilize the plural nature of modern diplomacy.’ (526).


30 Ramsay, *Diplomacy Dead?*, 273.

31 Hocking et. al., *Futures*, 9


35. For similar usage of the term ‘institution,’ and the reasons behind the employment of this term in place of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (London: Palgrave MacMillan 2005).
40. Sharp, Perspectives, 66.
41. Murray et al., Present and Future, 711.
44. Kerr and Wiseman, Diplomacy, 2.
45. Sharp, Perspectives, 61
46. Hocking et al., Futures, 12.
47. Hocking et al., Futures, 12.
48. Hocking et al., Futures, 9.
50. Sharp, Perspectives, 61.
52. Sharp, Perspectives, 60.
53. Sharp, Perspectives, 54.
56. Hoy and Miskel, Educational, 367.
58. Hall and Jonsson, Essence, 4.
59. Hoy and Miskel, Educational, 367.

65 Sharp, *Perspectives*, 63.
66 Lee and Hudson, *old and new*, 354.
68 Lee and Hudson, *old and new*, 347.
76 Hocking, 2004: 345.
81 Diamond and MacDonald, 1996: 37.
82 Der Derian 1987: 1.
83 Riordan 2003: 10.
84 Modelski 187-190.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
90 Cooper and Hocking, *Governments*, 362.
91 This definition was developed, in part, from Brian Hocking’s 2004 article ‘Privatizing Diplomacy’, *International Studies Perspectives*, 5: 147 – 152.

Cooper and Hocking, *Governments*, 361.


Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, 50-51.


One example of this ongoing reappraisal is the paper ‘What Challenges Does the Regional Context Present for Diplomacy?’, presented by Ramesh Thakur at the 2006 Diplomatic Update Conference hosted by the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. In this paper, Ramesh Thakur innovatively argued that a threefold change in the world of diplomacy and diplomats can be evidenced: first, ‘in the levels of diplomacy, from the local through the domestic-national to the bilateral, regional and global; second, in the domain and scope of the subject matter or content of diplomacy; and third, in the rapidly expanding numbers and types of actors’ said to be engaged in diplomacy. This paper is available at http://apcd.anu.edu.au/events/2006/diplomaticupdate.htm

Lee and Hudson, *old and new*, 260.


Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, 47.


Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, 35.

Murray et. al., *Present and Future*, 17.